Search results

The purpose of this paper is to review and summarize research into managerial incentives, merger activity, performance, and the use and structure of compensation to mitigate agency problems in the firm.

The authors discuss studies of size elasticity and compensation, pay for performance, changes in managerial compensation due to merger activities, incentives and risk taking, and the relationship between managerial risk aversion and acquisitions.

The paper identifies several prominent themes in the literature. First, size and performance both appear to be positively related to managerial compensation. There appears to be a strong relation between pay and performance, but results depend upon whether the pay measure includes all forms of compensation. With mergers, any merger gains seem to accrue to the acquired firm. It appears that acquiring managers can increase their pay by merging with other firms, and this is likely to happen in cases where shareholder returns are negative. Regarding managerial risk taking and compensation, it is likely that the sensitivity of a manager's equity‐based compensation (options, in particular) to changes in the total risk of the firm is an indicator of how willing managers will be to seek out more risk on behalf of shareholders.

This paper synthesizes a large body of research into an organized discussion of the issues relating to merger activity, managerial incentives, compensation, and pay for performance issues.

The extant literature provides evidence that single CEOs are less risk-averse. Building on the theory of risk aversion, the authors argue that the risk aversion trait arising from CEO’s marital status partially explains capital allocation efficiency. The paper aims to examine the association between CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency.

The primary sample includes 9,671 observations from 1,264 US firms. The authors apply multivariate regression and a series of endogeneity tests to examine the association between CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency.

Single-CEO firms have higher capital allocation inefficiency than those with married CEOs. The findings continue to hold after a series of endogeneity tests such as propensity score matching, change analysis and instrumental variable regression analysis and are robust to alternative proxies for capital allocation inefficiency. The capital allocation inefficiency in single-CEO firms arises from overinvestment but not underinvestment, and corporate risk-taking channels the effect.

The study is limited to the effect of CEO marital status, not CEO marital quality.

The findings imply that besides information asymmetry and agency conflicts, CEO marital status should receive special attention for capital allocation efficiency. Also, marital status influences the CEOs’ commitment to the general good of society, affecting the potential conflict of interest with different stakeholders from inefficient capital allocation.

This study extends corporate finance literature on CEO marital status by providing novel evidence on the effect of single CEOs on capital allocation efficiency. The authors conclude that CEOs’ personality traits, such as marital status, matter in corporate policy choices.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of managerial risk exposure on capital structure selection (net debt, or debt minus cash) as well as return on assets, capital expenditures, research and development expenditures and stock price performance.

The paper compares a sample of 123 all‐equity firms to a set of matching levered firms selected on the basis of industry, market cap and market‐to‐book assets. Managerial incentives are measured using the delta and vega of the manager's stock and option holdings.

Net debt levels decline as CEO wealth sensitivity to stock price changes (delta) increases. However, the paper finds no differences between the all‐equity firms and their levered matching firms in terms of return on assets, capital expenditures, R&D expense, or long run stock price performance.

Findings are consistent with the idea that managerial incentives drive net debt decisions even among all‐equity firms. However, given that there are no differences between the sample firms and their matched firms in terms of investment or stock price performance, the effect of managerial risk aversion appears to be confined to financial policy.

The paper uses modern methods for measuring managerial risk exposure to revisit the literature on all‐equity firms, and show that managerial risk exposure affects the net debt decision in these firms.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of idiosyncratic risk on firm decisions.

By introducing managerial ownership as a key variable, the paper presents a parsimonious model to describe the consequences of idiosyncratic risk on firm decisions. Then the paper uses data from the Chinese stock market, in which the managerial ownership is very low (around 0.02 percent) to examine the model predictions.

The authors find that: first, the negative relation between idiosyncratic risk and firm investment, which is found in prior studies, tends to be insignificant when managerial ownership is very low; second, diversification, as an alternative firm decision to lower risk positively, relates to idiosyncratic risk despite lower managerial ownership; and third, this kind of positive relation is weaker for firms with more managerial incentives when diversification is endogenously modeled.

This paper provides new evidence to complement existing studies from developed markets, in which executives hold substantial stakes.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether CEO compensation scheme may induce some agency conflicts in the foreign exchange risk hedging policy.

Residual exposure is a post-hedging variable computed as the ratio of unrealized foreign exchange risk gains/losses to international sales. The authors follow the optimal hedging theory developed by Smith and Stulz (1985). The residual foreign exchange risk exposure is a way to capture some consequences of the managerial risk aversion, whereas the compensation scheme granted to CEO reveals that of the shareholders. The authors interpret any deviation to the predictions of this theory as a mark that some agency conflicts exist.

CEO compensation (stock-options, shares and so) significantly influence the level of the residual foreign exchange risk exposure. Both in-the-money exercisable options and shares are negatively related to the residual exposure of foreign exchange risk. The authors also document that the effect of agency problems is rather contingent because shares and options have especially a negative impact when the level of foreign exchange risk is relatively high.

The residual FX risk exposure variable the authors promote in this paper completes the traditional proxies used to depict the corporate hedging policy such as the nominal or total fair value of currency derivatives (Davies et al., 2006), use of nominal values (Spanò, 2007), use of fair values of derivatives and the fraction of production hedged (Wang and Fan, 2011). The information that it conveys differs significantly from the one provided by traditional proxies because it captures the year-end post hedging firm’s risk profile.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between board composition and firm performance variance in the context of recent corporate governance reforms, based on the agency and organisational literatures.

This paper uses 384 of the top 500 Australian companies as its dataset. Board composition measures include the percentages of affiliated, executive and independent members on the board. Firm risk is represented by the standard deviation of shareholder return. Several control variables are introduced in the regression analysis.

The results show a negative impact of executive directors on subsequent risk. Affiliated and independent directors, however, have no significant effect on the level of performance variance. Blockholders give a positive influence on firm risk. Moreover, companies with poor dividend payout or low managerial shareholdings tend to be riskier.

This paper does not examine the actual risk preference of individual directors, which could involve an attitudinal survey of board members. Future research may also examine the specific attributes towards risk for each type of affiliated directors.

The findings cast doubts on the hope that promoting board independence would reduce agency conflicts relating to managerial risk aversion, and support the proposition that, although firms may comply with the demands for more independent directors, they could employ a number of tactics to neutralize the power of outsiders.

The empirical work surrounding this topic has been scant. This study may present the first Australian empirical evidence on the relationship between board composition and firm performance variance.

No systematic models are being used in empirical research that provide assurance for the choice of proxies that are being used. The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the proxies being used in empirical research, and as a case study, it focuses on the area of financial derivatives.

First, the authors review results of proxies from the financial derivatives literature and follow with empirical tests to confirm the findings from the review.

The review shows that proxies provide mixed results. The findings are further supported by the results from empirical tests. It suggests that measures used in the studies related to financial derivatives theory may need to be refined and highlights that no solid bases or tests have been developed for the proxies used to measure the constructs.

As individual proxies are examined across studies, a meta-regression analysis cannot be used, and there is no other available model to capture this type of examination. The approach adopted has some limitations but provides a basis for examining the reasonableness of proxies as measures of constructs.

This is the first study that attempts to examine the strength of proxies in capturing related constructs. The methodology is unique to a review of past studies in financial derivatives. It supports the need for developing more rigorous models/bases for the measures being used, and this is an area that has been ignored in empirical research.

Evidence reported by Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) showed that foreign exchange risk had a significant influence on the use of currency derivatives but that interest cover and financial leverage did not. In this study, we suggest that the reason why foreign exchange risk was significant but interest cover and financial leverage were not significant in the evidence was because currency derivatives were used to measure the dependent variable. We verify the validity of this suggestion by testing the influence of interest cover and financial leverage on the use of interest rate derivatives. Our sample comprises 140 firms in the UK, 48 of which use interest rate derivatives. Evidence observed shows that interest cover and financial leverage have a significant influence on the use of interest rate derivatives and that foreign exchange risk does not. We also compare the previous evidence referred to above with our results to determine whether there is a difference between the factors that motivate firms to use currency derivatives or interest rate derivatives. The result of the comparison indicates that dependence on overseas product and capital markets, tax, institutional shareholding and economies of scale are the factors that motivate firms to use currency derivatives. The result also indicates that high interest cover (i.e. interest/profit before interest and tax)or total debt ratio, economies of scale and directors’ shareholding are the factors that motivate firms to use interest rate derivatives.

We document three new facts about gender differences in executive compensation. First, female executives receive lower share of incentive pay in total compensation relative to males. This difference accounts for 93% of the gender gap in total pay. Second, the compensation of female executives displays lower pay-performance sensitivity. A $1 million dollar increase in firm value generates a $17,150 increase in firm-specific wealth for male executives and a $1,670 increase for females. Third, female executives are more exposed to bad firm performance and less exposed to good firm performance relative to male executives. We find no link between firm performance and the gender of top executives. We discuss evidence on differences in preferences and the cost of managerial effort by gender and examine the resulting predictions for the structure of compensation. We consider two paradigms for the pay-setting process, the efficient contracting model and the “managerial power” or skimming view. The efficient contracting model can explain the first two facts. Only the skimming view is consistent with the third fact. This suggests that the gender differentials in executive compensation may be inefficient.

The purpose of this paper is to examine if the structure and design of CEO compensation has any effect on firm innovation. It further investigates the effectiveness of each component of portfolio of compensation incentives in encouraging innovation.

This study uses systems of simultaneous equations to model the interdependence between compensation incentives and measures of firm innovation.

Results indicate that the pay‐performance sensitivity of the CEO portfolio of compensation incentives is positively related to investment in R&D expenditures, number of patents and citations. Options in general are more effective than stocks. However, within the options portfolio, recently awarded and unvested options are more effective than previously awarded and vested options. Restricted stock is more effective than unrestricted stock.

Measuring innovation output is difficult as innovation could take different forms, including business model innovation, which does not appear in the patent data.

Stock options encourage investment in value‐increasing innovations and should remain a significant part of managerial compensation. If the firm awards stock, it should only award restricted stock.

This study uses comprehensive measures of compensation incentives and firm innovation. It views incentives as a portfolio of stock and options and uses incentives in their entirety. It examines the effectiveness of each component of the portfolio in encouraging innovation. It measures innovation as investment into the innovation process (R&D expenditures) and the resulting success of that investment (patents and citations).