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This study explores how balanced scorecard format and reputation from environmental performances interact to influence performance evaluations.

Two general options exist for inserting environmental measures into a scorecard: embedded among the four traditional perspectives or grouped in a fifth perspective. Prior balanced scorecard research also assumes negative past environmental performances. In such settings, and when low management communication levels exist on the importance of environmental strategic objectives (a common practitioner scenario), environmental measures receive less decision weight when they are grouped in a fifth scorecard perspective. However, a positive environmental reputation would generate loss aversion concerns with reputation, leading to more decision weight given to environmental measures. Participants (N=138) evaluated performances with scorecards in an experimental design that manipulates scorecard format (four, five-perspectives) and past environmental performance operationalizing reputation (positive, negative).

The environmental reputation valence’s impact is more (less) pronounced when environmental measures are grouped (embedded) in a fifth perspective (among the four traditional perspectives), when the environmental feature of the measures is more (less) salient.

Findings provide the literature with original empirical results that support the popular, but often anecdotal, position of advocating a fifth perspective for environmental measures to help emphasize and promote environmental stewardship within an entity when common low management communication levels exist. Specifically, when positive past environmental performances exist, entities may choose to group environmental performance measures together in a fifth scorecard perspective without risking those measures receiving the discounted decision weight indicated in prior studies.

Prior research identified conflicts in implementing performance measurement systems that include both financial and non-financial measures. Attempts to incorporate non-financial measures, for example, balanced scorecards (BSCs), have shown short-term success, only to be replaced with systems that rely on financial measures. We develop a theoretical model to explore evaluators’ choice and use of the most important performance measurement criterion among financial and non-financial measures.

Our model links participants’ prior evaluation experiences with their attitudes about relative accounting qualities and with their choice of the most important performance measure. This choice subsequently affects their evaluation judgments of managers who perform differentially on financial versus non-financial measures.

Experimental testing of our structural equation model indicates that it meets the accepted goodness of fit criteria. We conclude that experience has an influence on choice of performance measures and on decision heuristics in making such evaluations. We suggest that an “experience gap” must be considered when deciding which performance metrics to emphasize in scorecards or similar performance reports. We analyzed four accounting qualities, importance, relevance, reliability, and comparability and found that importance, relevance, and reliability have strong effects on how managers prioritize and use accounting measures.

We conducted our study in a controlled, experimental setting, including participants with diverse experiences. We provide direct evidence of participants’ experience and attitudes about the relative accounting qualities of financial and non-financial measures which we link to their choice of the most important performance measure. We link this choice to their performance evaluations.

This paper aims to evaluate alternative theories about how perceived innovativeness and perceived relational skills interact with gender to explain evaluations by managers of scientists and engineers' promotability into management.

A cross‐sectional design is used. The sample (n=2,278) is drawn from 24 large US corporations. Separate surveys are administered in each corporation to scientists and engineers and to managers evaluating them.

Managers rate men and women equally promotable. Furthermore, women whom managers perceived to be especially innovative receive higher evaluations of promotability than similarly accomplished men. And, among those perceived to have low relational skills, women and men are evaluated similarly.

More research is needed to evaluate how ambivalent stereotypes and pressures from organizations to suppress categorical thinking might combine to affect evaluation and selection processes in diverse work settings.

Companies should be concerned about the potential tendency for managers to reward a few individuals when they exceed stereotypical expectations. Employees should be aware of and actively manage the impressions that managers have of them with regard to innovativeness and relational skills.

This paper calls attention to the role of ambivalence and legitimacy theories that predict that women will receive higher evaluations when they exceed stereotypical expectations of innovativeness and that when women do not meet stereotypical expectations of relational skills, managers will temper their harshness in evaluating them. In developing this analysis, it seeks to contribute to the understanding of evaluation processes by considering the context in which evaluations take place.

This research aims to investigate the differences in evaluations of job performance between male and female managers by those managers’ immediate bosses and peers.

Drawing on gender structure theory, along with ideas about status characteristics, the authors use hierarchical regression to test the hypotheses that male and female bosses and peers deferentially evaluate the male and female manager’s global job performance. The authors hypothesize significant two-way interactions (gender of the manager by gender of evaluator) in predicting a manager’s job performance.

The results suggest that while male peers rate female managers’ job performance significantly lower than that of male managers, female peers do not discriminate between genders in their performance evaluations. Also, managers’ bosses were found not to discriminate between genders of their subordinates.

The limitations of this study have to do primarily with the data. While the data are rich on some dimensions, they are weak on others, especially with regard to the detail about the jobs the respondents did, detailed level of familiarity with the evaluated managers, as well as racial background. The data also do not provide information on the different facets of job performance, the evaluation of which could potentially be impacted by managerial gender; this study is focused exclusively on global job performance.

The authors discuss various theoretical explanations of this pattern of results, as well as its possible influence on female managers’ careers. Although the effect size of the negative bias that male peers exhibit toward female managers is relatively small, it may be argued that lower performance assessments can accumulate over years in multiple job evaluations, negatively affecting the career of female leaders.

The evaluations supplied by different organizational members gain importance with the increased use of 360-degree feedback instruments not just for developmental but also for the job performance appraisal purposes. While the job evaluations of managers’ bosses have been investigated in the past with regard to the possible gender bias, this study provides the first known to the authors’, evidence. Also, this study points to a direct bias in performance assessments, rather than a potentially more subtle, non-performance-based bias that affects the disparities in wages and promotions of female managers. Thus, this study helps to fill a significant gap in the literature on organizations and it may have practical implications for the advancement of female managers. In addition to this contribution, this study also provides data that may be useful in resolving the ongoing debate whether female bosses act more as cogs in the machine or as change agents in organizations.

Managers can influence the evaluation of their performance by advancing various reasons for or making attributions regarding their financial achievement or the financial achievement of their divisions. In this study, an experimental design is used to determine the effect that the advancing of controllable reasons versus uncontrollable reasons, of which evaluators are either aware or not aware, has on the evaluation of managers’ performance in conditions in which they had recorded financial results that are lower or higher than the budgeted figures. The experiment reveals that performance evaluations are higher when variances are explained by means of controllable reasons in the abovebudget setting, whereas higher evaluations result in the below‐budget setting when variances are explained by means of uncontrollable reasons. Furthermore, the evaluator’s prior knowledge of these reasons results in a difference in the performance evaluation rating. Specifically, known reasons result in higher manager evaluation ratings. The experiment reveals that managers that record above‐budget performance are given higher evaluation ratings than managers that record below‐budget performance, even when variances are explained by means of reasons that the managers cannot control. This is known as the outcome effect. However, the findings indicate that the outcome effect is smaller when the evaluator has independent knowledge of the reason(s) advanced.

This study explores in the context of the use of the balanced scorecard (BSC) by management, whether the use of both financial and nonfinancial measures by top managers in their evaluations influences middle-level managers’ evaluations of their subordinates. This study uses a 2×2 experimental design where the subjects (MBA students) were asked to evaluate the performance of two lower-level managers under two different manipulation conditions. Subjects acted as middle-level managers of a hypothetical company. They were provided with the same performance information of two low-level managers under both conditions. However, under one condition, subjects were provided with additional information: the top management's evaluation style which used both financial and nonfinancial measures in their performance evaluations. No additional information was provided to subjects under the other manipulation condition. We also manipulated two performance information patterns of the two low-level managers. We predict that if middle-level managers are aware that the top manager uses both financial and nonfinancial measures in the BSC to evaluate their performance, middle-level managers would develop a mindset in which they will evaluate subordinates in a similar style, evaluating their subordinates on the basis of both financial and nonfinancial measures. The results of this study support the hypotheses. The findings of this study suggest that the contagion effect exists in the use of the BSC in performance evaluations.

I synthesize the extant experimental literature examining auditor evaluation of others’ credibility published in six top accounting journals over the last three-and-a-half decades. I adapt the original definition of credibility by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953): the extent of perceiving someone as competent and trustworthy. Audit guidance requires auditors to consider credibility of management, internal auditors, and staff, yet the research literature on auditor evaluation of others’ credibility is fragmented and scarce, limiting our understanding of determinants and consequences of auditor evaluations. I develop a framework for analysis of research on auditor evaluation of others’ credibility and review extant literature by types of examined effects (determinants of credibility vs. consequences of credibility) and by examined credibility components (competence, trustworthiness, or both). Throughout the literature review I suggest areas for future research.

The rapid development of multinational companies (MNCs) has resulted in the need for accounting systems which function to report, evaluate and control international operations and their managers' effectiveness. While the problems surrounding the evaluation and control of domestic firms remain the same for MNCs' parent company managers, the question of which country's currency should be used in the evaluation process represents additional complexities for them. The choice is essentially either that of the parent company currency or the currency of the foreign subsidiary. Parent company managers may also use both of these currencies, but it is likely that this choice will result in different decisions regarding the performance of foreign operations (see Demirag, 1987,1987a, 1987b). The aim of this paper is to critically review the theoretical and empirical literature on the use of parent and/or foreign subsidiary accounting information used by multinational companies in the evaluation of their foreign subsidiary operations and managers. In doing so, the paper addresses the following two questions. First, to what extent is translated information, untranslated information or both types of information significant in the evaluation of foreign subsidiary operations and their managers' performance in MNCs? Second, what are the major contextual variables which influence MNC foreign currency accounting practices in performance evaluations?

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is a widely studied topic in the theoretical and analytical accounting and economics literatures. The empirical literature also addresses this topic, with its main focus on executive compensation. This paper aims to extend the findings of the literature by assessing the extent to which RPE is used at lower organisational levels.

This study uses a purpose-developed survey to gather data from 325 business unit managers.

This study finds that RPE is used to a great extent in the performance evaluation of business unit managers. Additionally, the findings suggest that RPE use increases the informativeness of the performance evaluation through noise reduction. Noise in the performance evaluation is described in literature as the primary antecedent of RPE, but prior research provides only weak empirical support for this claim.

This study hypothesises a causal relation between RPE and noise in performance evaluation. However, the use of cross-sectional survey data only allows testing associations, not causations.

The originality and value of the paper lie in the focus on the business unit level and the use of survey data, which are almost completely absent in this area of research that almost exclusively uses archival data at the executive level.

The use of a balanced scorecard (BSC) for performance evaluation is meant to help evaluators make more complete decisions, as they have a variety of financial and non‐financial measures to assess. The problem is that users have difficulty taking all of the measures into consideration. The tendency to place more weight on common measures (measures that are the same across divisions) while either ignoring or placing very little weight on unique measures (measures are unique to a particular division) has become known as a “common measures bias”. The purpose of this paper is to extend a line of research that works to understand how this common measures bias might be mitigated.

This study examines whether the presence of task property feedback, a form of cognitive feedback, prior to a performance evaluation task, can help evaluators overcome the tendency to rely primarily on common measures. This study used a 2×2 experimental design where subjects were asked to evaluate the performance of two managers under either feedback or non‐feedback conditions. In the feedback condition, subjects were provided with their supervisor's suggestions about performance evaluation in the use of BSCs.

This study finds that when subjects were given task property feedback, a form of cognitive feedback, they tended to use more unique measures than if they were not given any feedback information at all.

In practice, more straight forward and simple feedback information is likely easier for companies to implement and easier for evaluators to follow. Feedback information that is too complex or that requires too much effort may frustrate evaluators, at which point they may abandon the effort. The authors' findings also indicate that direct and clear guidance from the top manager of a business may be seen as pressure by lower‐level managers. It is important for top managers to create such a performance evaluation environment so that all BSC measures are considered.

The paper finds that when evaluators judge the performance of managers through the use of a BSC, they tend to weight common measures more heavily than they do unique measures, unless they are provided cognitive feedback to cue them into the importance of using all measures. This study is one of many, following LS (2000), documenting a finding of common measures bias in the use of BSCs. Where this study contributes to the literature is in the use of task property feedback, a form of cognitive feedback, to overcome this bias. Since the use of unique measures is a key attribute of BSCs as they help users capture the nuances of a specific division's or firm's strategy, it is crucial that performance evaluators pay careful attention to them.