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The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.

Purpose – The relationship between the board characteristics (i.e. board independence, CEO duality, board size, board meeting and board tenure) and the ownership structure (i.e. managerial ownership, family ownership and institutional ownership) and earnings quality is examined.

Design/methodology/approach – Data from 280 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia's Main Board for the year 2004 is used.

Findings – Significant association was found between board tenure and earnings quality. In addition, a positive significant association was found between outside board ownership and family ownership and earnings quality. However no significant relationship was found between board of directors’ independence and earnings quality.

Research limitations/implications – The association between audit committees’ characteristics and earnings quality was not examined. An examination of the impact of ownership structure on boards of directors and audit committees is warranted. An investigation of the impact of the ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia using separate test on family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms is suggested.

Practical implications – The appropriateness of policy directives requiring majority independent directors may be considered by policy makers.

Originality/value – The conflict of interest between outside shareholders and managers in a diffused ownership support the agency theory. However, utility of agency theory to explain the conflicts between the controlling owners and the minority shareholders where ownership concentration is prevalent is limited. Whilst demonstrating the dominant impact of ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia the study calls for alternative explanations of corporate governance practices in different institutional settings.

This paper empirically explores the relationship between the identity and concentration of different block holders and firm value for 89 industrial and service firms listed at the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period 1998–2001. The paper examines the role of block holders (institutional investors who are not on the board of directors, the institutional investors who are on the board of directors, the ownership of the board of directors, and the financial policy of the firm, such as the capital structure) in controlling the managerial actions which leads, on average, to better firm valuation in the emerging market of Jordan. The paper employs a piecewise regression specification methodology. The results of the piecewise regression analysis indicate a positive and significant relationship between the ownership of securities above 25% by the board of directors, institutional investors on the board of directors, the institutional investors not on the board of directors and firm value. There is no significant relationship between the above-mentioned ownership and firm value for ownership below 25%. The results also indicate a significant and negative relationship between ownership by the CEO below 5% and firm value. Leverage is significantly and positively related to firm value when we relate ownership by institutional investors not on the board of directors and firm value. This might imply that creditors work as complementary monitors of value along with institutional investors who are not on the board of directors. The paper concludes that block holders are important monitors of firm value especially if they own large amounts of securities to justify the high cost of monitoring.

Diversity management is now a well-established field of research in organisation and management studies. Yet, the majority of the managing diversity studies are based on quantitative research, whereas some others use qualitative data or case studies in order to explore issues related to diversity management. This chapter is a rare example, which offers an analysis of empirical data by incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods. As the mainstream diversity management literature engenders a tendency to de-contextualise the diversity management process by isolating it from its socio-economic and organisational settings, overlooking the issues of power which are embedded in organisational processes of diversity management is particularly relevant. But the agency of diversity managers, who are the most visible actors in the process of managing diversity, still continues to be an under-researched area. This chapter acknowledges that diversity managers, whose agency is relational and multi-layered, are important actors in diversity management process, using a Bourdieuan approach in order to understand diversity managers as a professional group through the combined explanatory power of individual, organisational and societal influences.

Dynamic predictions of financial distress of the firms have received less attention in finance literature rather than static prediction, specifically in Malaysia. This study, therefore, investigates dynamic symptoms of the financial distress event a few years before it happened to the firms by using neural network method. Cox Proportional Hazard regression models are used to estimate the survival probabilities of Malaysian PN17 and GN3 listed firms. Forecast accuracy is evaluated using receiver operating characteristics curve. From the findings, it shown that the independent directors’ ownership has negative association with the financial distress likelihood. In addition, this study modeled a mix of corporate financial distress predictors for Malaysian firms. The combination of financial and non-financial ratios which pressure-sensitive institutional ownership, independent director ownership, and Earnings Before Interest and Taxes to Total Asset shown a negative relationship with financial distress likelihood specifically one year before the firms being listed in PN 17 and GN 3 status. However, Retained Earnings to Total Asset, Interest Coverage, and Market Value of Debt have positive relationship with firm financial distress likelihood. These research findings also contribute to the policy implications to the Securities Commission and specifically to Bursa Malaysia. Furthermore, one of the initial goals in introducing the PN17 and GN3 status is to alleviate the information asymmetry between distressed firms, the regulators, and investors. Therefore, the regulator would be able to monitor effectively distressed firms, and investors can protect from imprudent investment.

This study investigates the impact of insider-ownership of publicly traded firms on their performance, cost of debt (COD) and cost of equity. We use a sample of 104 non-finance listed companies of Pakistan for the period from 2006 to 2016. Our study is conducted in Pakistan as a developing country in which insider-ownership is dominant, and a weak external corporate governance mechanism increases the payoffs from insider-ownership. We use feasible generalized least square (FGLS) regression methods to examine these hypotheses. Based on agency theory, we find that insider-ownership enhances firm performance. Furthermore, our results show that insider-ownership reduced the COD and equity. Higher ownership decreases the opportunistic behavior of insiders. It also reduces the creditor’s perception of the likelihood of default on loan payments and reduces agency issues among shareholders. The insider will invest in positive NPV projects which will help maximize shareholders’ wealth and minimize the COD. Similarly, the relationship between insider-ownership and cost of equity is significant but negative. Supporting the convergence of interest increase in ownership helps in aligning the goals of managers and stakeholders whereby the insider will focus on value creation by minimizing equity cost.

The first alternative is to enrich shareholding by management. The basic theory of this research is the agency theory. This study aims to examine the institutional ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and risk that are interconnected directly or indirectly. The research sample was a non-financial company from 2010 to 2014. Four variables will be tested using Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) in the SPSS application. The result of this study represents the overall interdependency relationship among institutional ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and risk. The research outcome signifies an interdependency relation for endogenous variables, even if some exogenous variables have no significant relation. In addition, the effects of substitution between institutional ownership and dividend policy, debt policy and dividend policy, and institutional ownership and risk. Meanwhile, institutional ownership and dividend policy, risk and dividend policy, and risk and debt policy have no substitution effect.

This chapter expands our understanding of daughters’ inclusion in family business succession, analyzing why and how it can and does take place. Our work reveals that things are much more complex and diverse than research tells us in terms of daughters, their families, and their businesses.

Daughters are not only “in” or “out” of the family business. They can be included in a variety of ways, at different moments, following different paths, in a diversity of contexts. Based on 10 years of qualitative research data on family business succession, we explain and discuss how gender dynamics in the family and the business systems affect succession practices and outcomes, beyond the individual level analysis.

We used six selected and contrasted cases to illustrate the influence that gender, birth order, family inherited culture, business hierarchies and history, interpersonal relationships (parents-heirs-other stakeholders), as well as ownership transfers, governance rules and management procedures have on intergenerational succession, and particularly in daughters’ family business inclusion. From our findings, readers can draw practical recommendations for family business owners, managers and successors.

The resolution of conflicts between shareholders and managers, at minimal cost, is the goal of corporate governance. In 1999, an intriguing series of events occurred that dramatically reshaped the Canadian airline industry. This clinical study considers these events in relation to four corporate governance mechanisms. The results of this clinical study suggest that these four mechanisms may not be sufficient to control a management team that is committed to a course of action and to retaining their positions. In practice, corporate governance can be severely limited, even when the majority of board members are outside directors. In addition, institutional shareholders may not be the disciplining force that theory and logic suggests. Overall, the results imply that managerial entrenchment is a powerful motivating force that may be impossible to counter even for a large, poorly performing corporation that is subject to a very attractive takeover offer.

We examine the influence of ownership structure on a blockholder’s power in a firm. We first describe the presence and ownership stakes of blockholders in a comprehensive sample of US firms. We develop a measure of the influence of the ownership structure on a blockholder’s power and show that an average blockholder loses 12% of her potential power due to the presence and size of the ownership stakes of other blockholders. Further, the influence of ownership structure varies systematically with a blockholder’s rank and identity, with the second and nonfamily manager blockholders experiencing the largest loss of power.