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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether real estate companies manipulate their earnings through the brokerage fee across ownership expropriation or not.

This study considers Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange listed real estate firms to investigate how the brokerage fee in the real estate industry might affect the earnings management of firms across its ownership expropriation. Using annual report data, the authors investigate the associations over a panel for the period 2008−2012. Robust panel regression is used to divulge the probability values with reference by probit regression.

Overall, the results show that high brokerage fees would drive more events of earnings management and that, generally, the ownership concentration among Malaysian real estate firms significantly affects the earnings management of the firms.

This study shows that firm profitability and brokerage fees enhance the probability of firm’s earnings management. A low brokerage fee would reflect low revenue to the company. Therefore, management would opt to manipulate earnings in order to overstate earnings, which garners more interest from investors.

Real estate values in Malaysia have climbed steadily over the years due to a combination of reasons giving companies a higher brokerage fee. Earnings management has become a big issue for property investors. The study demonstrates the relationship between earnings management and brokerage fee across ownership expropriation which can be considered by shareholders in their own strategic planning and investors in their own investing.

The aim of this paper is to focus on different compensation structures for real estate mutual fund Management Companies and assess whether management fees paid on either Net Asset Value (NAV) or Gross Asset Value (GAV) generate distorted incentives relative to those generated by performance fees paid on the market value of the fund.

To test whether management fees induce Management Companies to opportunistic behaviors, the relative effect of NAV- and GAV-based fees is compared over time using a plethora of econometric models.

It is found that Management Companies that are paid GAV-based fees start with higher leverage to expand assets under management, then, subsequently, drive leverage and over-investment down as fund maturity approaches to minimize the negative impact of negative NPV investments on the final market value of the fund and therefore on performance fees paid at maturity.

A dataset of Italian listed real estate mutual funds is used. While the Italian market can be considered an ideal setting for an empirical analysis, studies on other countries would make it possible to test implications of the model that are only weakly identified in our setting.

Results could be important when designing managerial contracts.

It is shown that Management Companies actively manage the size of their balance sheet to maximize fees, and that NAV-based fees produce effects similar to market-based fees in terms of managerial incentives.

Prior research has demonstrated that investment management performance fees have the characteristic of a call option. It is important to examine whether these performance fees are consistent with traditional fee structures used by investment managers. It is also worth examining whether clients or managers benefit significantly more than the other party under performance fee structures. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors use Black-Scholes options pricing methodology to examine three cases of performance fee structures. The Absolute Hurdle case examines the fee structure where the manager receives a portion of the return over a pre-defined absolute rate of return. The Benchmark Relative Hurdle case shows a fee structure based on performance in excess of the return of a benchmark portfolio. The Breakeven Relative Hurdle case illustrates the fee structure where there is revenue neutrality with the classic management fees when portfolio performance matches the benchmark.

The findings of this paper illustrate that a particular performance fee structure can be designed to have the same revenue as a traditional investment management fee structure. Such a structure is equally beneficial to both the investment manager and to the client and should have salutary motivational effects to improve investment results, while simultaneously rewarding the manager for value added at a fair price for both the manager and the investor.

This study is unique in that it examines three cases of performance fees and provides a comparison between performance fee structures and traditional investment management fee structures. The findings will assist investment portfolio managers in better setting management fees they charge clients. In addition, this study help with clients who feel they are being charged excessive management fees by their investment manager.

The paper aims to investigate the performance determinants of European non-listed private equity real estate funds between 2001 and 2014.

Using a sample of 363 funds collected from the Inrev database, the analysis evaluated the impact of fees and other intrinsic characteristics of these funds, such as leverage, size and duration, on the funds’ performance, intending to enhance the understanding underlying their relationship.

The findings show a negative relationship between the return of the funds and redemption fee, performance fee and management fee. Conversely, marketing fees have a positive effect on performance. When analyzing the investment style, the results reveal inhomogeneous behaviors of leverage on funds’ performance. This variable has a positive impact on the return in core funds, while there is a negative relationship in value-added investments. Finally, the emphasis on the global financial crisis shows that the effects of the independent variables on the performance do not significantly change in different economic cycles.

The practical implication of the research is to understand whether an investor can direct its resources in a fund, leveraging on certain intrinsic characteristics that can be observed a priori.

Even if there is a considerable body of literature on determinants of performance in European non-listed real estate funds, little research has analyzed the role of fees in driving their results. Besides, this paper takes advantage of observations from different investment styles to emphasize the impact of higher or lower risk profiles and from the full economic cycle to understand the effects of the crisis period.

Compensation of funds managers increasingly involves elements of profit sharing that entitle managers to option-like payoffs. An important example is the compensation of private equity fund managers. Compensation of private equity fund managers typically consists of a fixed management fee and a performance-related carried interest. The fixed management fee resembles common compensation terms of mutual funds and hedge funds, while the performance-related carried interest is uncommon among most mutual funds. Moreover, the performance-related carried interest typically differs from variable hedge fund fees. In this chapter, we derive the value of the variable components of private equity fund managers’ compensation based on a risk-neutral option-pricing approach.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between abnormal audit fees and accrual-based and real-based earnings management by using a sample of 1,055 UK firm-year observations from 2006 to 2015.

Linear regression was used to test the hypothetical relation between abnormal audit fees and accrual and real earnings management. Following prior research, several proxies have been used to measure abnormal audit fees, accrual earnings management and real earnings management.

Abnormal audit fees were negatively associated with real earnings management. A higher level of abnormal audit fees was the major driver of enhanced audit quality, in turn reducing managers’ flexibility to use real earnings management and to manipulate reported earnings. Abnormal audit fees were found to be negatively associated with abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production costs and the aggregated measure of real earnings management.

This paper outlines the importance of considering any abnormal audit fees paid to audit firms. It is expected that the abnormal audit fees might compromise auditor independence and lead to a higher level of earnings management. However, the findings of this paper provide a new insight to many interested parties, e.g. regulators, audit firms, investors and creditors, that abnormal audit fees are associated with higher audit quality and higher financial reporting quality in the UK. Regulators in the meanwhile should reform the audit market by, e.g. revising the types of non-audit services that are provided for the same client, setting a cap on the maximum fees that can charged by auditors and monitoring earnings management practices. Audit firms should take into consideration that any charged abnormal level of audit fees may have a direct impact on audit quality.

This is the first study to examine the impact of abnormal audit fees on accruals and real earnings management after major regulatory changes that took place in the UK. These major changes are the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005 and the new legislation concerning the ethical standards issued by the UK Audit Practice Board in 2004. These two major changes are expected to have a direct impact on both earnings management and audit fees, notably for the largest public listed firms. This study also focuses on one of the very developed and attractive stock markets in the world, the UK FTSE 350 stock index, that incorporates that largest 350 public firms.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the impacts of motivation for avoiding loss and actual abnormal audit fees on management behaviors of audit opinion shopping.

Using empirical research methods, this study employs regressive models and moderating effect models with data from Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2008.

By analyzing the empirical data, it is found that strong motivation for avoiding loss has a certain moderating effect on the relationship between abnormal audit fees and audit opinion shopping; abnormal descent of audit fees significantly increases both the likelihood of receiving modified audit opinions of annual financial reports and that of the improvement of audit opinions; listed companies reporting consecutive losses in the last two years have a higher likelihood of an improvement in unfavorable audit opinions because of stronger motivation for avoiding loss and audit opinion shopping of management; and strong motivation for avoiding loss has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between abnormal increase of audit fees and audit opinion shopping.

This study has a significant practical implication for market supervisors, small and medium investors.

The paper classifies abnormal audit fees into abnormal increase and descent of audit fees, and audit opinions differences into the improvement and deterioration of audit opinions, and further empirically analyzes and verifies the moderating effect of motivation for avoiding loss on the relationship between abnormal audit fees and audit opinion shopping.

This study examines the problems associated with the management fee on outsourced CIOs in the public pension funds in Korea and proposes a better management fee structure. The main results of this study are summarized as follows. First, the outsourced CIO is likely to make a profit, provided that the management cost of the outsourced CIO is lower than a fixed ratio in a fee structure. Second, the profit margin of public funds increases as the fixed ratio decreases. Third, the outsourced CIOs can make a sure profit under the existence of the fixed fee only, regardless of the performance of public funds. In addition, the profit of outsourced CIOs increases as the level of delegation fees for sub-management firms decreases. However, such a fee structure may result in making worse the overall performance of funds ultimately. Fourth, it is necessary to introduce the performance-linked fee structure when the outsourced CIOs of public pension funds are selected. Such a fee structure can mitigate the possibility that the outsourced CIOs reassigns fund to sub-management firms with low management capacities, thereby lowering the fund’s overall performance.

Even though the gender literature has addressed the independent effects of female audit committee members and female audit partners on audit quality, this research primary analyses whether the association between the presence of a female audit partner and audit quality depends on (fe)male participation on the audit committee of the audited client-firm. It further examines whether the relationship between female participation on the company's audit committee and audit quality is contingent on having a (fe)male audit partner.

A large sample of firm-year observations from the Swedish Corporation has been analyzed for the period that covers the years 2010–2019. The research hypotheses have been analyzed using the year and the industry fixed effect estimations clustered at the firm level.

In accordance with “the similarity-attraction theory”, the research findings provide support for a positively (negatively) significant relationship between female audit committee female representation and both audit fees and the audit reporting lag (earnings management) in client-firms of female audit partners, albeit insignificant in client-firms of male audit partners. This underscores that the presence of a female audit partner leads the beneficial link between female audit committee directorship and audit quality. Regression results on whether the relationship between female audit committee directorship and audit fees is contingent on having a (fe)male audit partner indicate that female audit partners earn higher (lower) audit fees in companies with gender-diverse (all male) audit committees. This corroborates (in somewhat) the male-female disparities in compensation within the public-audit firms' leading ranks, regarded as a male-dominated workplace worldwide. In conjunction with the argument that (compared to their male rivals) female auditors face more difficulties to reach partnership positions in the public-audit firms and are, thereby, more cautious about the loss of these positions through (in almost cases) exerting more audit efforts, and preventing their audited client-firms from manipulating earnings, the authors reveal that female audit partners are associated with longer (lower) audit reporting lags (earnings management) in both companies with gender-diverse and companies with all-male audit committees. The authors therefore conjuncture that the beneficial female auditor effect on audit quality is not contingent (in somewhat) on (fe)male participation on the company's audit committee. Collectively, the baseline reported results seem sound as they dissipate for a host of alternative metrics for both the dependent and the independent variables. Collectively, the baseline reported results seem sound as they dissipate for a host of alternative metrics for both the dependent and the independent variables.

This study heeds the recent claim for examining the gender effect on the interpersonal interaction between the main participants in the company's auditing process.

The Canadian mutual fund setting is unique in that two governance mechanisms – corporate and trust – coexist. This study empirically examines the impact of each mechanism on fund fees and performance. We find that corporate class funds charge higher fees but deliver superior fee-adjusted returns than trust funds. We then analyze the impact of various board characteristics on fees and performance for corporate class funds. We find that a board with smaller size, CEO duality, and a higher percentage of independent directors is more likely to charge lower fees. In addition, smaller boards are strongly associated with higher fee-adjusted performance. Our study supports agency theory over stewardship theory and provides valuable guidelines for Canadian investors and regulatory agencies.