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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the qualitative effect of corporate governance components, in the form of managerial entrenchment index, on earnings management and innovation.

In this study, the variable of managerial entrenchment, which includes the variables of management independence, dual role of management, management tenure, the board compensation and the board ownership percentage, was initially estimated through the exploratory factor analysis and its effect was evaluated on the dependent variables of the study using the test of multivariable regressions. Hence, a total of 103 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange were selected and analyzed during 2011–2016. In this paper, the Jones model is used as the variable of accrued earnings management and for calculating the real earnings management, the models of abnormal operational cash flows, abnormal production costs and abnormal optional costs are employed. Moreover, the research and development cost to total costs ratio is used for calculating the innovation.

The results indicate a negative and significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and accrual-based earnings management; moreover, the entrenched managers are less likely to engage in manipulating the real activities accruals in Iran context. Furthermore, the findings show that there is a positive and significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and firm innovation.

What really sets this paper apart from other studies is that this research will make aware investors and stakeholders of this fact that managerial entrenchment will be a good way to diminish the manipulation of financial reporting and improve the corporate situation in emerging markets, particularly those bazaars facing with economic sanctions such as Iran. Undeniably, the study results will complete the knowledge gap between the developed economies and the emerging markets.

The present study's main objective is to assess the relationship between business strategy and management entrenchment in listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

In this paper, 128 firms have been assessed during 2012–2017. The management entrenchment variable is measured using five factors: management ownership, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, managers' compensation and CEO duality.

The obtained results show a negative and significant relationship between the aggressive strategy of the current year (and that of the previous year) and management entrenchment such that adopting an aggressive business strategy in the current and previous years can debilitate the management entrenchment. Moreover, there is a negative and significant relationship between the current year's defensive strategy and management entrenchment, and employing a defensive business strategy in the current year can also weaken the management entrenchment. At the same time, there is no significant relationship between the previous year's defensive business strategy and management entrenchment.

Managerial entrenchment is a determining factor in the economy, and regarding the dominant norms in the emerging markets and developing countries, this factor is different from that of the developed countries. It is more important in some markets, like Iran that is dealing with economic sanctions. On the other hand, Tehran Stock Exchange observes numerous modifications, especially providing financial statements in accordance with international standards that are expected to affect the determination of business strategy in firms.

This study aims to assess the relationship between managerial entrenchment and the chance of fraud in financial statements, which are the only available source for shareholders’ decisions, so their accuracy and reliability are of great importance. Hence, the realization of contributing factors to preventing financial information distortion is vital. Moreover, managerial entrenchment on the chance of fraud in the company’s upcoming years has also been analyzed.

The factor analysis of five variables [chief executive officer (CEO) duality, managerial ownership, board independence, board compensation and CEO tenure] is used for management entrenchment. To examine the hypothesis testing, multivariate regressions, feasible general least squares regression and Logit model regression are used. The statistical sample under study in this paper includes 1,122 year-company observations during 2013–2018 and Beneish’s (1999) model is used for evaluating fraud.

The study results show a negative and significant relationship between management entrenchment and the chance of fraud in financial statements. That means managers with a higher degree of managerial entrenchment are more likely to create value and acquire wealth for the firm, and that causes them not to waste and waste the firm resources through enhancing the supervisory mechanisms. Moreover, the study results also show that improving and strengthening management entrenchment will lower the upcoming years’ fraud condition.

The current paper is the first time that the relationship between managerial entrenchment and financial statement fraud is assessed within a study. The results of the paper help the beneficiaries and shareholders realize different aspects of management entrenchment. That means managers’ power and authority can be used to make shareholders’ interests, but they can hinder misuse and fraud.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between some corporate characteristics, audit quality and managerial entrenchment in Tunisian companies.

The multivariate regression model is used for hypothesis testing using a sample of 224 listed observations on Tunisian Stock Exchange during 2014–2020. An exploratory factor analysis of four variables (chief executive officer (CEO) duality, CEO tenure, CEO seniority and CEO age) is used for calculating a unique index assessing the managerial entrenchment.

The results show a negative and significant relationship between audit quality and managerial entrenchment. The authors also find that firm characteristics affect management entrenchment. Precisely, corporate financial performance and firm leverage show positive connections with managerial entrenchment (ME). Additional analysis confirms the negative impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on managerial entrenchment level.

The study’s findings have practical implications that may be useful to different stakeholders, policymakers and regulatory bodies interested in reducing management entrenchment. This study offers signals to shareholders about specific governance attributes, namely audit quality, that control the extent of manager's entrenchment.

The originality of this paper consists in focusing on developing countries, namely the Tunisian context; while the managerial entrenchment phenomena has been widely examined in developed markets. Moreover, contrary to the overwhelming majority of previous studies that has used individual indexes for evaluating the entrenchment, the authors calculate a mixed index of managerial entrenchment using the principal component analysis based on four governance mechanisms (CEO duality, CEO age, CEO seniority and CEO tenure).

The present study aims to assess the effect of managerial entrenchment on firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and financial performance in Iran.

In this paper, the variable of managerial entrenchment, which includes board independence, management duality, management tenure, the board compensation, independence and ownership percentage, is initially analyzed using the exploratory factor analysis method, and its effect on performance and CSR is evaluated using the multivariable regression test. Given that a total of 103 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange are selected during 2012–2017. In this paper, return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q are the two variables to measure financial performance.

The results of hypotheses testing indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and financial performance based on the ROA and Tobin’s Q indices, separately. Moreover, the results of this study indicate that there is also a positive and significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and CSR activities.

The current study almost is the first study, conducted in a developing country similar to Iran, and the provided results might be beneficial to other developing countries.

The main objective of the paper is to examine the relationship between managerial attributes (e.g. managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia and managerial overconfidence) and firm risk-taking on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The study’s sample comprises 150 companies listed on the TSE from 2011 to 2017. Risk-taking is calculated as the standard deviation (SD) of stock return. Explanatory factor analysis was performed to calculate the weight of each of the five variables managerial ownership, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, board compensation and CEO duality as a proxy for managerial entrenchment. The study by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) was also used to calculate managerial myopia, and the study by Schrand and Zechman (2012) was used to calculate managerial overconfidence.

The results indicate that the effect of managerial entrenchment and managerial myopia on risk-taking of listed firms on the TSE is positive and significant, implying that an increase in CEO entrenchment is likely to give rise to risk-taking. The authors conjecture that this finding could be due to the investment projects impairing the firm performance in the long run. Furthermore, the effect of managerial overconfidence on listed firms' risk-taking on the TSE is significantly negative. Since overconfidence is one of the traits of narcissism and corporate managers tend to be encouraged and admired, it is implied that they tend to make efficient and low-risk investments that ultimately reduce the firm risk-taking.

Several theoretical studies show that managerial behavior is a determining factor in the economy. One of the reasons which justify the originality of this study is the context and institutional environment. Undoubtedly, managerial behavior (e.g. managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia and managerial overconfidence) is expected to have some significant variations in developing countries compared to prevailing in developed countries, particularly in the Iranian stock market the economic sanctions. Furthermore, due to the direct impact of individuals' psychological and behavioral characteristics on their decisions and the effect of companies' risk-taking on increasing and decreasing shareholders and companies' wealth, this research is essential. Given the function of designed behavioral criteria for assessing risk-taking behaviors, the relationship between managerial attributes and firms' risk-taking is still unclear and investigated in this study.

This paper aims to analyse the use of level of debt as an external control mechanism against an entrenchment strategy based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices.

The authors use a database of 1,916 international companies for the years 2002 to 2010.

The evidence obtained confirms in a context of asymmetric information, bounded rationality and divergent interests, the use of debt as a control mechanism of managers’ discretionary comportment. In other words, CSR practices can be used by managers as an entrenchment strategy and self-defence with the aim of decreasing the possibility of being identified by those shareholders and stakeholders whose interests have been damaged. In this context, the market demands higher debt levels to solve agency frictions, playing an active role in monitoring the management. Moreover, the demand of higher debt as a control mechanism that minimises the expropriation risk by managers through CSR is lower in contexts of greater investor protection.

The findings reveal that CSR engagement can be explained by the hypothesis of being a strategy of entrenchment and self-defence. Overall, this study differs from previous literature in this field by taking an alternative approach to CSR practices, in contrast to the conventional wisdom of the benefits of CSR practices. The authors contribute by empirically testing the theoretical model proposed by Cespa and Cestone (2007) who suggest the discretionary use of CSR from an agency perspective. They also give empirical relief showing the use of CSR as an entrenchment strategy. Moreover, they demonstrate that the capital market of debt decreases in a context with a greater degree of investor protection, likewise under CSR promoted as an entrenchment tool, the demand for debt as a disciplinary mechanism is less necessary to control managers. In addition, the study is enriched by the database analysis.

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of fairness psychology on the motivation and behavior that drives managerial entrenchment. The paper also provides a theoretical basis to set up an effective incentive and restraining mechanism for corporations.

This paper conducts an experiment to investigate the effect of fairness preference on managerial entrenchment in enterprises.

The results of the experiment show that managers are very concerned about fair payoffs, i.e. the comparison of the principals’ earnings with managers’ market average levels of pay. The worse managers’ fairness preference becomes, the greater are the degrees of managerial entrenchment exhibited. In addition, a large payoff gap between managers and principals produces a higher sensitivity in high-ability managers, while a large payoff gap between managers and managers elsewhere in a market leads to a higher sensitivity in low-ability managers.

This paper provides new insights into incentives and constraints affecting the behaviors of managers at the corporate board level. Maintaining equity between managers’ payoffs, principals’ earnings and managers’ market average pay levels can restrain both the entrenchment behavior of managers caused by unfair psychology and also the increasing costs of staff switching jobs, thus producing greater profits for companies.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between management characteristics including management capability, management entrenchment, agency costs and overconfidence and firm performance in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange market.

The research population includes 125 companies after applying systematic elimination sampling method during 2010-2016. The primary measure for companies’ performance is return on assets and Demerjian et al. (2012a) model is used to measure managerial characteristics.

The results indicated that two management characteristics, namely, management capability and overconfidence are positively associated with firm performance and improve the level of performance. Agency costs did not have any significant effect on firm performance and management entrenchment leads to deterioration in firm performance.

The paper focuses on managerial characteristics and firm performance, which the results may very helpful to companies and investors to hiring managers with specific characteristics. Moreover, the results may give strength to further studies.

The present study attempts to assess the relationship between management characteristics (managerial entrenchment, CEO narcissism and overconfidence, managers' myopia, real and accrual-based earnings management) and financial statement readability of listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In other words, this paper seeks to answer the question that “whether management characteristics have a favorable effect on financial statement readability or not.”

Multivariate regression model is used to meet the purpose of this study and research hypotheses are also examined using a sample of 1,050 listed observations on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2012–2017 and by employing multiple regression patterns based on panel data technique and fixed effects model. Moreover, exploratory factor analysis of six variables (tenure, board independence, CEO duality, CEO ownership, board compensation and CEO change) is used for calculating managerial entrenchment and the FGO index is used for measuring readability.

The obtained results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and accrual-based earnings management and a positive and significant relationship between real earnings management, managers' myopia, managers' narcissism and overconfidence and financial statement readability.

Since the present study is the first paper to investigate such a topic in the emerging markets, it provides useful information about intrinsic and acquisitive characteristics of management for accounting information users, analysts and legal institutions that contribute greatly to financial statement readability. Besides, the results of this study aid the development of science and knowledge in this field and fill the existing gap in the literature.