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This paper aims to examine whether ownership concentration and earnings management affect the stock market liquidity of Malaysian firms.

This study uses a sample of 2,020 yearly firm observations in Bursa Malaysia over the period 2009-2012. The ordinary least square regression is used to examine the relationships. The study undertakes a sensitivity test by regressing the main study variables by using different measurements. Another robustness test is then used, where a regression based on the change in variables and a one-year lag of the independent variables are used. Furthermore, to alleviate the concern of possible endogeneity, the simultaneity and reverse causality are checked using the lag of the dependent variable, fixed effect regression, two-stage least squares using the instrumental variables and the generalized method of moments using instrumental variables analysis.

The study finds that firms with a high level of ownership concentration have discrepancies in information between informed and uninformed traders, which impair the stock market liquidity. In addition, this study finds that firms with high earnings management experience greater liquidity. A possible explanation for this is that firms might manage earnings to convey private information to enhance the information content of the earnings. Overall, the evidence suggests that manipulating earnings signals information informatively, particularly in a country with a higher level of ownership concentration and a higher likelihood of expropriating minority shareholders.

This study enriches the limited empirical research devoted to the impact of earnings management and ownership concentration on stock market liquidity especially in the context of emerging economies. The findings of this study are robust to alternative liquidity measurements, to alternative estimation methods, and to endogeneity bias.

Emerging markets are characterized by weak institutions and strong relationships, which give rise to different market characteristics in supply chain relationships. This study investigates the impact of customer concentration on suppliers' real earnings management.

Based on China's relationship-based transaction, this study selects 2007–2019 Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange A-share manufacturing listed companies as the research samples. The empirical analysis is derived from the ordinary least square regression model with industry and year fixed effects, and cross-sectional analysis is used for further analysis.

It is found that the higher the degree of customer concentration, the more likely a company is to engage in real earnings management mainly through discretionary expenses instead of accrual-based earnings management. Further research shows that when suppliers provide customers with higher commercial credit and make more relationship-specific investments, and when major customers are also major suppliers, the effect of customer concentration on real earnings management is more significant. It can be seen from the results that high customer concentration is beneficial for suppliers to cooperate with major customers in emerging markets.

This research expands the relationship between customer relationship-based transaction and earnings management from the perspective of collaboration. These conclusions are of great significance for market regulators to reform information disclosure related to customers and for participants to pay attention to the composition of major customers of the company.

This study examines a link between firms' product market power, industry concentration, the degree of earnings management and the role of governance in curbing earnings management.

The author uses different panel techniques of feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and system generalized method of moments (GMM) to show robust study findings.

The study results reveal that firms lacking product market pricing power engage in earnings management, adding a new dimension to the existing literature. These findings mirror even at the industry level, where the authors document immense competitiveness led to earnings manipulation and stringent corporate governance mechanism has the potency to curb earnings management.

The paper has valuable insights and practical implications for policymakers and market participants. The results indicate robust institutional oversight mechanisms can deter earnings management in a concentrated market.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is among the first paper from India, a growing emerging economy, to look at the various aspects of market characteristics, earnings management and the role of corporate governance.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between related party transactions and both accrual and real earnings management practices in Jordanian industrial public-listed companies, taking into account the uniqueness of the Jordanian company ownership structure.

Data were collected from Jordanian industrial public-listed companies for the period 2011–2017. Accrual earnings management is measured by using the modified Jones model, whereas real earnings management and related party transactions are measured by using relevant proxies. A regression model is developed and used to assess the relation between related party transactions and earnings management, taking into account the effects of ownership concentration, family ownership and institutional ownership levels of the companies involved.

Accrual earnings management is negatively associated with related party transactions. Regarding the role of ownership structure, the presence of institutional investors is positively associated with using both related party transactions and real earnings management, whereas ownership concentration plays an efficient role to mitigate the use of both accrual earnings management and related party transactions. No statistically significant relations between real earnings management and related party transactions exist.

This study has direct practical implications for the Jordanian regulatory authorities to enact regulations to limit the misuse of related party transactions and earnings management transactions and ensure sufficient monitoring of these transactions because of their prevalence. Jordanian companies should also enhance their corporate governance systems to better approve and monitor such transactions, including enhancing the role of independent and non-controlling board members in this process.

Related party transactions are considered as a major concern of financial reporting quality in developed countries, and such transactions are found to be relatively more problematic in developing countries, where corporate governance is generally weak, and there is limited disclosure and transparency in financial reporting. From this perspective, this study is one of the very few studies in developing countries that explore the issue of related party transactions and their association with earnings management practices. Thus, the findings of this study can arguably be to some extent generalized to other developing country contexts, because of relatively similar business environment conditions, and therefore potentially fill a gap represented by the paucity of similar studies in developing countries.

The paper describes an integrated, interdisciplinary nonprofit management three-course concentration developed for an undergraduate public service major at a small, private college. We describe the course development process and implementation issues pertinent to nonprofit management education that include where to house programs, faculty issues, interdisciplinary teaching, students’ needs and experiential learning. Our course objectives aimed to develop business competencies from accounting, finance, management and marketing in the context of nonprofit organizations for students with no prior business knowledge. The paper concludes with a description of our three courses.

The current research inspects the moderation role of ownership concentration on chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics and real earnings management (REM) relationship in Jordan.

Driscoll–Kraay regressions were run using data from 348 firm-year observations for companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange between 2013 and 2018.

Driscoll–Kraay regressions demonstrate that CEO experience, tenure and political connections improve REM practices. Ownership concentration diminishes and limits REM practices when combined with CEO experience, tenure and political connections, since all three have a negative and significant link with REM.

Initial constraints include the study’s lack of generalisability due to a small number of CEO-related parameters. Second, critics of the ideal model for judging EM have a foreseeable flaw. No generally accepted model is perfect.

This study’s conclusions are crucial for industry participants, including companies, policymakers, investors and the general public. These findings will help investors, practitioners and regulators understand that businesses with significant ownership concentrations and experienced CEOs have superior earnings and low REM practises.

The findings of this study have an optimistic impact on the existing body of knowledge. The current literature has yet to properly inspect the moderation role that ownership concentration has on the connotation between CEO characteristics and EM.

Despite several research studies in both developed and developing nations, ownership concentration has been almost virtually neglected. The current study could fill a hole in earlier research, rendering it a novel study.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether real estate companies manipulate their earnings through the brokerage fee across ownership expropriation or not.

This study considers Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange listed real estate firms to investigate how the brokerage fee in the real estate industry might affect the earnings management of firms across its ownership expropriation. Using annual report data, the authors investigate the associations over a panel for the period 2008−2012. Robust panel regression is used to divulge the probability values with reference by probit regression.

Overall, the results show that high brokerage fees would drive more events of earnings management and that, generally, the ownership concentration among Malaysian real estate firms significantly affects the earnings management of the firms.

This study shows that firm profitability and brokerage fees enhance the probability of firm’s earnings management. A low brokerage fee would reflect low revenue to the company. Therefore, management would opt to manipulate earnings in order to overstate earnings, which garners more interest from investors.

Real estate values in Malaysia have climbed steadily over the years due to a combination of reasons giving companies a higher brokerage fee. Earnings management has become a big issue for property investors. The study demonstrates the relationship between earnings management and brokerage fee across ownership expropriation which can be considered by shareholders in their own strategic planning and investors in their own investing.

The study developed and tested a model that attempts to describe the influence of ownership structure, diversification strategy, firm size and firm performance on CEO compensation. Results based on data from a cross‐sectional set of 216 Fortune 500 firms suggested that firm size, ownership structure and diversification strategy affect CEO compensation through the mediating effects of firm performance.

The theory of financial management suggests that the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth. The valuation of the firm is its net operational cash flows discounted at the stock market's average required rate of return. A firm's risk class determines the rate of return required by investors. The operating objective for management is to maximise the difference between operational receipts and operational expenditures plus investment, whilst minimising risk. However, the separation of ownership by shareholders and control by professional managers enables directors to pursue objectives other than maximisation of shareholder wealth. Directors might attempt to maximise sales revenue, maximise growth in assets or employees, maximise value added or even their own well‐being. They may choose to pursue multiple objectives as described in corporate planning systems. Multiple objectives may include social goals as well as goals relating to marketing, production, personnel and finance. It has been suggested that levels of directors' remuneration might be associated with the extent to which directors achieve corporate objectives. Several research projects have tried to identify the major determinants of directors' remuneration. Some of these are summarised below.