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Use of the Malthusian Paradigm for Justification of Compulsory Family Planning One of the most important issues in the contemporary debate concerning population policy has been the question of compulsion in family planning (or more specifically, compulsory sterilisation) for the quantitative control of population. The present‐day demographic scene in the Third World is characterised as one of “population explosion”. It is argued that despite the spread of family planning and the recent trends towards decline in fertility among two‐thirds of the populations of the developing countries, the burden of the population problem in terms of the requirements on the eve of the 21st century is not going to be light, considering the limited and fast depleting resources of this slender globe. Hence, pressures have been mounting from various quarters towards more and more stringent measures converging on coercion to control the family size and population growth in the low‐income countries. For example, during the Emergency in India (1975–77), it was felt by the then Government (under the prime ministership of Mrs Indira Gandhi), the ruling Congress Party and some groups and individuals that the time had come to put the population problems of the country on a war footing and adopt drastic measures such as compulsory sterilisation to meet the hydra‐headed scourge of over‐population. In fact, the Government of Maharashtra, a state within the Union of India, went a step further and pioneered for the first time in history a bill on the compulsory sterilisation of eligible persons, for introduction in the State Legislative Assembly which passed a revised version of this bill (1976). To support and justify compulsion in family planning, various arguments — scientific and pseudo‐scientific — are usually made. At the head of all the arguments is most distinctly the Malthusian — or rather the neo‐Malthusian — argument. The novelty of the Malthusian argument made is that it is advanced this time to present a justification, not for the mere control of population by some voluntary means, but for a strict regulation of the size of each family in society through the instrumentality of physical force having the sanction of the law of the land and having penal provisions for the defaulters. It is the major concern of this essay to examine whether and how far the Malthusian paradigm is relevant, adequate and correct, vis‐à‐vis the issue of compulsion in family planning. What exactly is the basis of the neo‐Malthusian position on compulsion? Would Malthus, if he were amongst us, have supported compulsory family planning for the reasons which generally go under the caption of Malthusianism? Is the issue of compulsion in family planning so narrow as to be capable of being fully tackled by the Malthusian paradigm? These are some of the important questions which are sought to be explored in the short space available for this article.

During the 1990s the value to an intending professional accountant of undertaking a period of liberal (general) studies was promoted internationally by a number of individuals and organisations, including the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (the “Institute”). The Institute significantly changed its admissions policy for Chartered Accountants in 1996 and one change was to require four years of degree level study with a compulsory liberal studies component. This study surveys the perceptions of New Zealand accounting practitioners on the impact of this compulsory liberal component. The results of this study demonstrate that there is little support from accounting practitioners for IFAC’s claim that liberal education “can contribute significantly to the acquisition of professional skills”, including intellectual, personal and communication skills. In addition, the majority of respondents did not perceive any improvements in the professional skills of the staff that had qualified under the Institute’s current admissions policy. However, any perceived improvements were mainly attributed to the Institute’s admissions policy change. Notwithstanding the lack of support for the assertion that liberal education develops professional skills, there is a strong belief by respondents in the value of liberal education for intending professional accountants.

In a letter written on 24 January, 1865 to Schewitzer, Marx, commenting on the work of Proudhon, observed: “Take, for instance, Malthus's book on population. In its first edition it was nothing but a sensational pamphlet … and yet what a stimulus was produced by this libel on the human race.”

The Nazi economic recovery, achieved between 1933 and 1938, displayed striking features of brilliant economic overhauling of a capitalist machine that had been plagued by a prolonged crisis. The means employed to effect the recovery appear to follow a Malthusian exercise in the rehabilitation of the function of effective demand: the Nazis, prompted by expediency and necessity, took remedial action that was very much in consonance with the canons of classical political economy. The succinct analysis of such an exercise in the context of the strong governmental regimentation of the Third Reich may provide insight into the nature and future of the capitalist regime, in the light of the fact that its principles, business and philosophical, and its implications for the world at large, so far, have not shown a marked departure from the way in which they were understood by the spirit of the 1930s, in Germany, as well as abroad.

Marx is widely regarded today as an “evolutionary” economist. However, what is clear from a close examination of the writings of both Marx and Engels is that they did not actually take Darwin′s theory of natural selection on board. Consequently, if their theory of socio‐economic change is evolutionary, it is not so in a Darwinian sense. Considers the different sense in which the economics of Marx can be regarded as “evolutionary” and the distance between Darwinian and Marxian conceptions of natural or social change.

Streissler considers Roscher′s theory of crisis to be highly original and important. Schumpeter, on the other hand, considers it only a rehash of the ideas of others. Examines this contradiction, beginning with a reflection on the essential elements of the debates on Keynes, Say′s law and classical economics. Continues by analysing the statements of German economists before Roscher on the issues of the general glut controversy. Ends with a closer inspection of Roscher′s own theory of crisis.

Many of the early debates about economic methodology, marginalism versus discontinuous change, stasis versus turbulence, co‐operation versus competition, were at base questions of general scientific methodology. During the past 20 years or so there has been a virtual revolution in the field of evolutionary biology. This revolution has had a profound impact on the philosophy of science; an impact which is beginning to be felt in the field of economics. The purpose of this article is to analyse some past controversies in economic methodology in the light of recent developments in evolutionary biology.

By “political economy” I mean both the method of thought and the body of knowledge which refer to human economising behaviour. The body of knowledge includes both theory — theorems, laws, empirical generalisations, etc., and “facts” — history, description of institution, statistical data, etc. By “Christian theology” I mean both the method of thought and the body of knowledge which refer to the human religious understanding of Jesus of Nazareth. “Religious” here implies awareness of, or belief in, God. The body of knowledge may include pre‐Christian religion (such as that reported in the Old Testament), and the results of independent inquiry (such as natural theology) in so far as these are interpreted by, or “refracted” through what theologians call the “Christ event”.

Mainstream economists now consider their discipline to be a technical one that is free from ethical concerns. I argue that this view only arose in the twentieth century. In this paper I set out a brief history of economics as a moral science. First, I sketch the evolution of economics before Adam Smith, showing that it was generally (with the exception of the mercantilists) conceived of as a part of moral philosophy. Second, I present elements of the new interpretation of Smith, which show him as a developer of economics as a moral science. Third, I show that even after Smith, up to the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of leading economic theorists envisioned economics as a moral science, either in theory or in practice. Fourth, I sketch the decline of economics as a moral science. The key factor was the emergence and influence of positivism. Overall, I show that the current view of the detachment of economics from morals is alien to much of the history of the discipline.

The first Principia Mathematica (1686) by Sir Isaac Newton with reference to natural philosophy and his system of the world has largely contributed to the first revolution in scientific thinking in modern times. It has created the conceptual basis of modern science in the classical tradition by providing the tools of analysis and the technique of reasoning in terms of stability—from—within or, as we would say today, the model of stable equilibrium conditions.