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Looks at the development of mail order trading in the UK and the USA, showing that there are substantial differences. Uses tables to give emphasis to the growth of UK mail order and follows this up with a similar study of the USA. Confirms that it is difficult to forecast the future of total sales through the medium of mail order, that it is unlikely that it will not pick up relative share, but that its growth rate will probably slow down. Sums up that there is certainly room for expansion in this market.

The purpose of this paper is to explore and identify the causes of the failure of the Larkin Company (Buffalo, NY), once one of the nation's largest mail‐order houses in the decades surrounding 1900.

Borrowing conceptual frameworks from both recent management and historical scholarship on organizational failure that integrates exogenous and endogenous factors, this study employs traditional historical methods to explain the causes of Larkin's failure. The main primary sources include the Larkin Company records, government documents, personal papers, trade journals, and other primary sources.

Begun as a modest soap manufacturer by John D. Larkin, in Buffalo, in 1875, the Larkin Company grew to become one of the largest mail‐order houses in the USA in the decades surrounding 1900 owing to its innovative direct marketing practices, called the “factory‐to‐family” plan, that relied on unpaid women to distribute its products. In 1918, anticipating the chain store boom, Larkin established two grocery store chains (other retail ventures followed). The company regularly lost money in these ventures and, combined with a shrinking mail‐order economy, struggled during the 1920s and 1930s, and eventually liquidated in 1941‐1942. A number of exogenous and endogenous factors, acting alone and in various combinations, proved too challenging to second‐ and third‐generation family members who ran the company after 1926.

This research paper tries to understand the decline of an important progressive firm during the interwar period. Whereas Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward were able to make the transition from mail order to stores, Larkin Company failed to navigate this transition successfully. It also adds to the small but important literature in management and business history on organizational failure and may serve as a cautionary tale for family businesses.

Discusses mail‐order trading and its status as a vigorous growth industry since the 1950s. Looks at the difference between mail‐order organisations – especially in the North American region, where Sears, Roebuck is supported by a widespread network of local stores and depots, and an increasing part of the business arises from telephone rather than mail orders – whereas in the UK most business is done through agents, whereby each customer has his/her personal catalogue – constitutes only a small proportion of the UK industry. Investigates postal agencies in the UK; the social organisation of agencies; types of agency; competition within the industry regarding number of agents; volume per agent and agent recruitment.

In a study of catalog and mail‐order houses, both perceptual and objective measures of risk supported the U‐shaped risk‐return association proposed by Fiegenbaum and Thomas. Results also supported prospect theorists contention that there is a steeper slope for firms below the target performance. Unlike the prediction by prospect theory that steeper slopes exist around the referent point, steeper slopes were found in the outermost tertiles.

Storing and handling for the mail‐order market presents problems because of the large number of small items or cartons. Chris Askew, chief industrial engineer of the major UK mail‐order house Kay & Co., outlines his company's carton store which is designed to overcome handling problems. He describes its operation and overviews the computer system and management information produced by the system. Its success is judged by the fact that Kay's sister company GUSCO has adopted the same principle.

Given the dominance of energy costs in retailing and distribution, it would seem logical to turn our attention away from traditional methods of displaying goods in the shops and look again at mail order. A recent Post Office study indicates that mail order distribution is a much more efficient use of our energy resources, and this could augur well for the growth of mail order.

The strategic growth directions, taken by a sample of 27 major European retailers selected across the main EC states, are explored. A descriptive model is developed to assess such directional growth and the paths taken by the sample companies within the framework of the model are analysed. The findings indicate that similar patterns of development have occurred within certain sectors across national boundaries. The majority of trading activity exists within the national boundaries of the sample companies. Furthermore, the cross‐border activity that exists tends to be small in scale relative to the size of the company, and in close geographic and marketing proximity to the country of domicile and the core business.

Non‐store retailing in Japan mostly takes one of three forms: mail order, door‐to‐door selling and on‐line shopping. There is still much scope for development in all these areas in Japan. However, there are many factors to take into consideration before achieving success in these areas. Two particular areas are distribution and marketing skills.

While the share of all retail sales taken by the mail order sector has increased from 4.7% in 1976 to 6.4% in 1982, such companies face special problems when it comes to inventory control. In their paper Alan Waddington and Leslie Chadwick examine the difficulties and demonstrate how successful inventory control can boost sales turnover and profit growth.

The purpose of this paper is to enhance students’ ability to use theory to assess facts logically and creatively. To achieve this end, the author explicates the evolution of retailing from its pre-industrial genesis to its Internet descendants in a historically based retail strategy class that investigates the determinants of new retail formats (major retail innovations – MRIs) over a > 200 year span. MRIs entail a major reconfiguration of the retail mix (i.e. price, product, place, promotion and personnel) , take significant business from existing formats that sell the same goods, generate greater benefits to customers than do rival formats and are widely imitated.

The author chronologically presents how the industrial revolution generated major environmental changes that facilitated a creative and highly effective re-organization of the retail mix.

Changes in environmental factors (e.g. mass production, transportation, location of population and communication) made possible retail formats that could not have existed earlier.

The course is based on two theories that are linked by the retail mix; one theory relates to consumer store choice, while the other relates to the minimum market size required for a retail format to be viable. To illustrate, more personnel raises service, drawing customers from rivals while raising costs; higher costs raise the needed market size.

All six MRIs are derived from the two aforementioned theories. Experience indicates these theories are valid for assessing retailing at all stages of economic development. The course is based on the authors own material.