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The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of the importance of socioemotional wealth (SEW) to family firms in Poland viewed through the lens of the events surrounding the first hostile takeover bid of the post-communist era on the Warsaw Stock Exchange when the clothing company Vistula & Wólczanka (V&W) made an unsolicited, leveraged bid for the family-controlled jewelry company W. Kruk.

The 2008 takeover and its aftermath are described in the context of the corporate governance and legal environment in Poland. The case study events demonstrate the connection between firm behavior and SEW theory.

After the acquisition of W. Kruk by V&W, the Kruk family purchased stock in the newly named Vistula Group and gained influence over the supervisory board in concert with a business ally, eventually wresting back control of the company in the style of a Pac-Man “defense.” The case study illustrates the importance of SEW in family firm takeovers.

The case study design has limitations for generalizability. Nevertheless the research highlights the important role of SEW preservation in understanding the market for corporate control of listed family firms in Poland.

Understanding the reaction by family firms to takeover bids requires recognition that there is a tradeoff between financial and SEW considerations, not just financial gains and losses.

The case study demonstrates the importance of SEW to family firms and suggests that the balance of power in takeovers on the Polish stock market rests with incumbent management.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the reasons for non‐compliance by Polish listed companies with elements of the Polish code of corporate governance Best Practices in Public Companies 2005.

Based on 250 publicly available compliance statements filed in 2005 by companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) content analysis is used to classify the explanations provided for non‐compliance with those corporate governance principles that attract high levels of non‐compliance.

The data analysis reveals that, despite a high level of overall compliance, three out of 50 code principles attract high levels of non‐compliance. These principles concern the independence of supervisory board members, the composition of supervisory board committees and the appointment of auditors. The most contentious principle concerns the independence of supervisory board members, due to the presence of many majority‐owned companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.

The paper sheds light on the operation of the “comply or explain” approach to corporate governance in Poland and provides suggestions for improving the level and quality of compliance with the revised corporate governance code Best Practices for WSE Listed Companies, applicable from 2008 onwards.

The paper provides an empirical investigation of the reasons given by Polish companies for non‐compliance with the most controversial corporate governance principles. It highlights a tendency for some companies to report compliance that is conditional, suggesting that reported compliance under‐represents the true level of compliance. We suggest that establishing a monitoring committee tasked with evaluating the quality of explanations for non‐compliance and reducing ambiguities in the wording of code principles will improve the quality of Polish corporate governance in the long term.