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The purpose of this paper is to develop an explicitly macroprudential supervisory framework designed to identify threats to financial stability use existing mechanisms to reduce the risk of these threats and to provide information to the authorities to more efficiently mitigate any instability that does arise.

This paper begins with an analysis of the limitations of microprudential regulation. It then develops a macroprudential surveillance framework focused on those financial markets that have the potential to undermine financial stability. It concludes with a discussion of how the surveillance results may be used to enhance financial stability.

The current supervisory focus on microprudential supervision of systemically important institutions is insufficient; an explicitly macroprudential focus is required.

Although this paper’s conceptual framework is applicable to all advanced financial systems the discussion of specific regulatory structures focuses on the USA.

An explicit supervisory focus on the threats posed by major financial markets is feasible and desirable.

The probability of a financial crisis and the economic damage caused by a crisis can be significantly reduced by redirecting some regulatory efforts toward in-depth analysis of major financial markets.

The paper emphasizes that macroprudential supervision must include both quantitative and detailed analysis of the qualitative aspects of key markets.

This paper aims to focus on capital-related macroprudential policies in the context of recent policy discussions on the removal of barriers to the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the European Union (EU).

This study first discusses the link between financial stability and internal resource mobility of cross-border banks. Then, it examines past heterogeneity in structural capital buffers as key macroprudential capital instruments applied in the EU and relate them to costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union.

Observed phase-in patterns of structural capital buffers in the EU are broadly consistent with costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union as potential factors. The process of financial integration could be further enhanced through reduced uncertainty in the application of macroprudential policies that constrain capital mobility of cross-border banks.

This paper anchors macroprudential policies into a wider discussion on the mechanism and implications of ring-fencing in the EU over time. It discusses two policy areas, macroprudential policies and proposals for deeper financial integration, that share the same financial stability objective but tend to emphasize different implications of the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the EU. The study provides a discussion of potential implications of the recent adoption of the CRRII/CRDV legislation for future heterogeneity of macroprudential policies in the EU.

Financial crises pose a challenge to the legal systems of the concerned countries and international organizations. The current crisis has exposed significant failures of regulation and supervision, making the Financial Market Law a key topic on the political agenda. Thus, great changes and challenges are ahead of us. These were the focus of an interdisciplinary and comparative conference held at the University of Marburg. The paper deals with the individual presentations and carries out an overall analysis.

The paper covers the most important issues in financial regulation.

An extensive regulation is confronted with several obstacles; suitable approach could be the co-regulation; desirable aim is the instauration of the mechanism of capital markets. Those who gain the benefits in case of success should also bear the losses in case of failure instead of being rescued at taxpayers’ expense.

The difficulties arising from extensive regulation suggest a more liberal approach to financial regulation.

The global financial and economic crisis resulting from the US housing crisis has shown that house prices can have far-reaching consequences for the real economy. For macroprudential supervision, it is, therefore, necessary to identify house price bubbles at an early stage to counteract speculative price developments and to ensure financial market stability. This paper aims to develop an early warning system to signal speculative price bubbles.

The results of explosivity tests are used to identify periods of excessive price increases in 18 industrialized countries. The early warning system is then based on a logit and an ordered logit regression, in which monetary, macroeconomic, regulatory, demographic and private factors are used as explanatory variables.

The empirical results show that monetary developments have the highest explanatory power for the existence of house price bubbles. Further, the study reveals currently emerging house price bubbles in Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

The results implicate a new global housing boom, particularly in those countries that did not experience a major price correction during the global financial crisis.

The ordered logit model is an advanced approach that offers the advantage of being able to differentiate between different phases of a house price bubble, thereby allowing a multi-level assessment of the risk of speculative excesses in the housing market.

The purpose of this study is to employ a duration-based approach to model the inter-arrival times of bank failures in the US banking system for the period of 1934-2014, in line with the suggestions of Focardi and Fabozzi (2005), who used a similar model for explaining contagion in credit portfolios.

Conditional duration models that allow duration between bank failures to depend linearly or nonlinearly on its past history are estimated and evaluated.

The authors find evidence of strong persistence along with nonmonotonic hazard rates, which imply a financial contagion pattern, according to which a high frequency of bank failures generates turbulence, which shortly after leads to additional fails, whereas prolonged periods without abnormal events signify the absence of contagious dependence, which increases the relative periods between bank failure appearance. Further, the authors obtain statistically significant results when they allow duration to depend linearly on past information variables that capture systemic bank crisis factors along with stock and bond market effects.

The originality of this study consists in proposing a new time series approach for the prediction of bank probability of default by incorporating a default-risk contagion mechanism. As contagious bank failures are a key topic in macroprudential supervision, this study could be of value for supervisory authorities in setting pro-active actions and tightening regulatory measures.

This research is designed to investigate the presence of market discipline in the banking sector, across Balkan states in Europe. Specifically, the effects of CAMEL variables on the cost of funds and deposit-switching have been assessed.

The CAMEL method of bank evaluation has been applied as well as two measures for market discipline (costs of funds and deposit-switching behaviour). Data have been obtained for 10 Balkan states for the 2006–2019 period. For data analysis, ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects models have been utilized. The generalized method of moments (GMM) method has been deployed as well as a dynamic panel model.

Evidence of market discipline has been found, in the form of a higher cost of funds in the context of capital adequacy (but not for other CAMEL variables). Evidence of market discipline in the form of deposit-switching, however, has not been found. In addition, it has been discovered that bank size and gross domestic product (GDP) growth lower the costs of funds for banks.

In the wake of the pandemic, banks need to prepare themselves for very difficult situations and relevant studies can provide help. Therefore, this research has contributed to the developing literature on this topic. In addition, the findings have important practical implications. Results show that banks should maintain adequate levels of capital if they want to control their costs of funds. Results also show that market discipline, in the form of higher costs of funds, can be imposed on banks to discourage excessive risk-taking. Findings highlight the value of appropriate policies and strong supervision of the financial industry. Findings also underline the importance of offering financial incentives to banks. For example, if banks know they will be able to avoid higher costs of funds by controlling their risk levels, they will avoid unrestrained risk-taking.

This paper aims to investigate the drivers of systemic risk and contagion among European banks from 2007 to 2012. The authors explain why some banks are expected to contribute more to systemic events in the European financial system than others by analysing the tail co-movement of banks’ security prices.

First, the authors derive a systemic risk measure from the concepts of marginal expected shortfall and conditional value at risk analysing tail co-movements of daily bank stock returns. The authors then run panel regressions for the systemic risk measure using idiosyncratic bank characteristics and a set of country and policy control variables.

The results comprise highly significant drivers of systemic risk in the European banking sector with important implications for research and banking regulation. Using a set of panel regressions, the authors identify bank size, asset and income structure, loss and liquidity coverage, profitability and several macroeconomic conditions as drivers of systemic risk.

Analysing the tail co-movement of security prices excludes a number of “smaller” institutions without publicly listed securities. The other shortfall is that we do not assess the systemic impact of non-bank financial institutions.

Regulators have to consider a broad variety of indicators for assessing systemic risks. Existing microprudential-oriented rules are less effective, and policymakers may consider new measures like asset diversification to mitigate systemic risks in the banking system.

The authors contribute to existing empirical analyses in three ways. First, they propose a method to identify systemically important banks (SIBs). Second, they develop two measures to assess their potential negative impact on the system. Third, they contribute to the closing of the research gaps by analysing which macroprudential regulations for SIBs are most effective without hampering free market forces.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation in relation to Basel accords implementation. As a risk manager practitioner at a financial institution and in-charge of Basel implementation in a Basel accords environment of banking regulation, the author has been intrigued by the theoretical basis of the design of Basel accords. The objective was to investigate a theoretical model in the literature according to which the accords were designed. In case of deficiency in the literature of this model, the author seeks to provide a juxtaposition to the theoretical model that explains the accords adoption and implementation by regulators.

This paper presents a review of existing literature.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

This paper aims to analyzing the main risk culture traits of a sample of Central Banks and Supervisory Authorities in Europe as well as of the European Central Bank (ECB).

Risk culture is measured through text data processing of the official discourses made by the head Supervisory Authorities, during the years from 1999 to 2012.

Results highlight heterogeneous but converging risk cultures for European Union (EU) supervisors and the presence of a “distance” between these cultures and the risk culture of the ECB.

The paper points out that cultural differences, especially in presence of credit markets still characterized by poor integration, could create unwanted distortion effects during the initial stages of the Banking Union.

During the Greenspan‐Bernanke era, the responses of Federal Reserve officials to financial crises resulted in an extraordinary involvement of the US central bank in the non‐banking financial sector. The purpose of this paper is to examine the informal and evolving conceptual framework that allows Federal Reserve officials to pursue a strategy of “constrained discretion” in responding to financial disturbances.

Behavioural economics relies on designed psychological and economic experiments to predict behavioural biases at the group level. As an analogue applicable to understanding biases in the intuitive judgments of individual policymakers, a naïve behavioural economics approach relies on intuitive or naive psychology and the interpretation of historical events as natural experiments to explain why intuitive judgments of Federal Reserve officials will contain biases.

Under the Greenspan‐Bernanke conceptual framework, Federal Reserve officials exercise “constrained discretion” in responding to disturbances arising from macro structural changes in the financial sector. The two key concepts are the Greenspan‐Bernanke doctrine on how the Federal Reserve officials respond to financial asset price bubbles and their collapses, and Bernanke's financial accelerator. Several examples are cited in which policy errors made by Alan Greenspan were attributable to identifiable biases in his intuitive judgment. In addition, Bernanke's response to the financial crisis of 2007‐2009 was based on his interpretation of the Great Depression as a natural experiment. But that interpretation was heavily biased by the influence of Milton Friedman on Bernanke's intuitive judgment. While Federal Reserve officials will need to exercise discretionary judgment in responding to financial crises, the potential for errors due to biases in that judgment can be reduced through regulatory reforms that lessen the potential for financial crises to occur.

While quantitative analyses of the effects of the Federal Reserve's actions on non‐bank financial institutions and the financial markets are ongoing, little attention has been given to the psychological aspects of the intuitive judgment that influences the discretionary decisions of the policymakers.