The purpose of this paper is to develop an explicitly macroprudential supervisory framework designed to identify threats to financial stability use existing mechanisms to…
The purpose of this paper is to develop an explicitly macroprudential supervisory framework designed to identify threats to financial stability use existing mechanisms to reduce the risk of these threats and to provide information to the authorities to more efficiently mitigate any instability that does arise.
This paper begins with an analysis of the limitations of microprudential regulation. It then develops a macroprudential surveillance framework focused on those financial markets that have the potential to undermine financial stability. It concludes with a discussion of how the surveillance results may be used to enhance financial stability.
The current supervisory focus on microprudential supervision of systemically important institutions is insufficient; an explicitly macroprudential focus is required.
Although this paper’s conceptual framework is applicable to all advanced financial systems the discussion of specific regulatory structures focuses on the USA.
An explicit supervisory focus on the threats posed by major financial markets is feasible and desirable.
The probability of a financial crisis and the economic damage caused by a crisis can be significantly reduced by redirecting some regulatory efforts toward in-depth analysis of major financial markets.
The paper emphasizes that macroprudential supervision must include both quantitative and detailed analysis of the qualitative aspects of key markets.
This paper aims to focus on capital-related macroprudential policies in the context of recent policy discussions on the removal of barriers to the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the European Union (EU).
This study first discusses the link between financial stability and internal resource mobility of cross-border banks. Then, it examines past heterogeneity in structural capital buffers as key macroprudential capital instruments applied in the EU and relate them to costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union.
Observed phase-in patterns of structural capital buffers in the EU are broadly consistent with costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union as potential factors. The process of financial integration could be further enhanced through reduced uncertainty in the application of macroprudential policies that constrain capital mobility of cross-border banks.
This paper anchors macroprudential policies into a wider discussion on the mechanism and implications of ring-fencing in the EU over time. It discusses two policy areas, macroprudential policies and proposals for deeper financial integration, that share the same financial stability objective but tend to emphasize different implications of the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the EU. The study provides a discussion of potential implications of the recent adoption of the CRRII/CRDV legislation for future heterogeneity of macroprudential policies in the EU.
This chapter is devoted to the issue of ensuring financial stability in the state. The main goal of the research is to determine the role and policy of the National…
This chapter is devoted to the issue of ensuring financial stability in the state. The main goal of the research is to determine the role and policy of the National (Central) Bank, which was called up, together with the Government, to ensure financial stability in the Republic of Belarus. The actions of the National Bank for the implementation of monetary policy, macroprudential regulation, and supervision are reviewed. It is noted that the regulation and supervision of banks, nonbank credit and financial organizations, the payment system, the sector of other financial intermediaries (leasing activities, microfinance activities, activities of forex companies) is carried out by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. The main practical actions of the Government and the National Bank aimed at maintaining and ensuring financial stability is highlighted: monitoring of financial stability (goals, tasks, objects, monitoring directions are defined); creation of the Financial Stability Board (goals, objectives, representation, personal responsibility); disclosure of information on financial stability is carried out on an ongoing basis – the publication of the analytical review “Financial Stability in the Republic of Belarus.” The research provided a summary of the state of the country's financial sector and presented the achievements of the National Bank and state institutions for ensuring financial stability. The main problems affecting financial stability are highlighted: insufficient efficiency of the activities of large enterprises of the real sector of the economy; high levels of credit risk in banks; high dollarization of bank balance sheets. The directions of development of the financial market of the Republic of Belarus, contributing to ensuring financial stability are presented.
The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The…
The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.