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Introduction: The COVID-19 crisis is a major shock to the global economy, with serious repercussions on financial markets. Most economies, especially high-income ones, have made considerable efforts, including financial ones, to stimulate aggregate demand in the face of a loss of income on the one hand and to maintain the production potential of companies on the other. This fact required the intervention through various instruments on the money market, but also the mention of the money creation capacity of the banks through the lending mechanism. Apparently, this should have affected the stability of banking systems by increasing the credit risk assumed, but this was avoided because banks are better capitalised and the regulatory framework, including the macroprudential one, was strengthened after the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Therefore, the national authorities had sufficient leeway to respond to the recession and market instability caused by the pandemic by relaxing prudential requirements.

Aim: A theoretical review of literature and good practice of developed banking systems on how macroprudential policy can supplement expansionary monetary policy in overcoming the pandemic crisis. Identifying the risks for the excessive use of relaxed macroprudentialism and formalising recommendations to combine it with monetary policy instruments to overcome stressful situations for banking systems.

Method: In order to study the subject approached in this chapter, there were applied the following research methods, such as analysis and synthesis of conceptual approaches of macroprudentiality and the tools they use, deduction and induction, in order to elucidate the influencing factors using the relaxation of macroprudentiality in the context of pandemic crisis and research on the high-income states experience in order to formulate conclusions and opinions.

Findings: The authors find that countries have responded quickly to the outbreak of the crisis by easing capital and liquidity requirements, or at least refraining from the previously planned tightening. At the same time, the authors noticed that loan-based measures and minimum reserve requirements were rarely relaxed and risk weights were not changed at all.

Originality of the Study: The correlation of different monetary and macroprudential policy instruments in the need to relax them, the analysis of possible risks and the formulation of conclusions on the usefulness of applying these methods to solve the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Implications: Our results suggest that the macroprudential instruments can only be applied if banking systems have previously succeeded in consolidating the capitalisation of banks. A restrictive macroprudential policy can create premises for the use of excess capital in situations such as that generated by the pandemic, but it is recommended only to economies where overregulation does not affect development in periods of normal evolution.

This paper analyzes real and welfare effects of a permanent change in inflation rate, focusing on macroprudential policy’ role and its interaction with monetary policy.

While investigating disinflation costs, the authors simulate a medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints, credit frictions and macroprudential authority.

Providing discussions on different policy scenarios in a context where still it is expected high inflation, there are three key contributions. First, when macroprudential authority actively operates to improve financial stability, losses caused by disinflation are limited. Second, a Taylor rule directly responding to financial variables might entail a trade-off between price and financial stability objectives, by increasing disinflation costs. Third, disinflation is welfare improving for savers, while costly for borrowers and banks. Indeed, while savers benefit from policies reducing price stickiness distortion, borrowers are worried about credit frictions, coming from collateral constraint.

The paper suggests threefold policy implications: the macroprudential authority should actively intervene during a disinflation process to minimize costs and financial instability deriving from it; policymakers should implement a disinflationary policy stabilizing also output; the central bank and the macroprudential regulator should pursue financial and price stability goals, separately.

This paper is the first attempt to study effects of a permanent inflation target reduction in focusing on the macroprudential policy’ role.

The global financial crisis demonstrated that monetary policy alone cannot ensure both price and financial stability. According to the Tinbergen (1952) rule, there was a gap in the policymakers’ toolkit for safeguarding financial stability, as the number of available policy instruments was insufficient relative to the number of policy objectives. That gap is now being closed through the creation of new macroprudential policy instruments. Both monetary policy and macroprudential policy have the capacity to influence both price and financial stability objectives. This paper develops a framework for determining how best to assign instruments to objectives.

Using a simplified New-Keynesian model, the authors examine two sets of policy trade-offs, the first concerning the relative effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policy instruments in achieving price and financial stability objectives and the second concerning trade-offs between macroprudential policy instruments themselves.

This model shows that regardless of whether the objective is to enhance financial system resilience or to moderate the financial cycle, macroprudential policies are more effective than monetary policy. Likewise, monetary policy is more effective than macroprudential policy in achieving price stability. According to the Mundell (1962) principle of effective market classification, this implies that macroprudential policy instruments should be paired with financial stability objectives, and monetary policy instruments should be paired with the price stability objective. The authors also find a trade-off between the two sets of macroprudential policy instruments, which indicates that failure to moderate the financial cycle would require greater financial system resilience.

The main contribution of the paper is to establish – with the help of a model framework – the relative effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies in achieving price and financial stability objectives. By so doing, it provides a rationale for macroprudential policy and it shows how macroprudential policy can unburden monetary policy in leaning against the wind of financial imbalances.

This paper aims to focus on capital-related macroprudential policies in the context of recent policy discussions on the removal of barriers to the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the European Union (EU).

This study first discusses the link between financial stability and internal resource mobility of cross-border banks. Then, it examines past heterogeneity in structural capital buffers as key macroprudential capital instruments applied in the EU and relate them to costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union.

Observed phase-in patterns of structural capital buffers in the EU are broadly consistent with costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union as potential factors. The process of financial integration could be further enhanced through reduced uncertainty in the application of macroprudential policies that constrain capital mobility of cross-border banks.

This paper anchors macroprudential policies into a wider discussion on the mechanism and implications of ring-fencing in the EU over time. It discusses two policy areas, macroprudential policies and proposals for deeper financial integration, that share the same financial stability objective but tend to emphasize different implications of the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the EU. The study provides a discussion of potential implications of the recent adoption of the CRRII/CRDV legislation for future heterogeneity of macroprudential policies in the EU.

The purpose of the paper is to study the relevance of macroprudential policies (MPPs) in influencing bank lending in small open economies with dual banking systems.

In the analysis, the author employed the dynamic panel data methodology as compared to alternate techniques since it is able to address potential endogeneity challenges.

Using quarterly data from the period 2002–2020, the author finds that MPPs are highly effective in containing the growth of public credit, whereas its impact on private credit is much less effective. The disaggregated findings reveal that macroprudential measures are less effective in containing the growth of private credit by Islamic banks.

The majority of studies on MPPs are focused on emerging and advanced economies, limiting their policy appeal from the standpoint of small open economies. In this connection, this paper contributes to the literature on the relevance of such policies for a small open economy with a dual banking system and significant hydrocarbon exports. The paper's analysis therefore holds relevance for similar economies, both in the region and elsewhere, on the role and relevance of MPPs with emphasis on Islamic banks.

This paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of macroprudential and fiscal policies taken from a sample of ten advanced economies in relation to the mitigation of real-estate and credit bubbles by comparing their performance.

This comparison is elaborated with a seemingly unrelated regression methodology, which allows the assessment of individual countries’ performance and improves the estimation of the dependent variables versus an individual regression.

The analysis concludes that countercyclical measures have been more effective to control the growth of household debt. Furthermore, this study validates that macroprudential measures focused on the residential sector meet their objective of controlling the growth of house prices, whereas those macroprudential measures with more generic targets are effective to control the growth of household debt.

As opposed to previous panel-regression studies, which have analyzed the performance of macroprudential and fiscal measures in generic terms, this paper compares the performance of these tools in ten advanced economies. Based on the analysis performed, several recommendations are derived for policymakers.

Several developing economies witnessed a large number of systemic financial and currency crises since the 1980s that resulted in severe economic, social, and political problems. The devastating impact of the 1982 and 1994–1995 Mexican crises, the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, and the ongoing financial crisis of 2008–2009 suggests that maintaining financial sector stability through reduction in vulnerability is highly crucial. The world is now witnessing an unprecedented systemic financial crisis originated from the USA in September 2008 together with a deep worldwide economic recession, particularly in developed countries of Europe and North America. This calls for devising and using on a regular basis an appropriate and effective monitoring and policy formulation system for detecting and addressing vulnerabilities leading to crisis. This chapter proposes a macroprudential/financial soundness monitoring, analysis, and remedial policy formulation system that can be used by most developing countries with or without crisis experience as well as with limited data. It also discusses a process for identifying and compiling a set of leading macroprudential/financial soundness indicators. An empirical illustration using Philippines data is presented. There is an urgent need for increased coordination, collaboration, and partnership among central banks, banking and financial market supervision agencies, and ministries of finance, economic, and planning for proper macroprudential monitoring. A high-level national financial stability committee under the auspices of the head of the state as well as a ‘‘regional financial stability board’’ needs to be established to complement and support the activities of an “international stability board.”