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China’s outward foreign direct investment (ODI) has become a recent phenomenon in that China is now rated as the world’s third largest country for ODI. Previous studies have found that China’s ODI is driven by the attractions of natural resources and overseas markets. Yet these studies have ignored the role of corporate governance at a national level, the paper aims to discuss these issues.

The Kaufmann et al. (1999) data set is used in our study and the data sample have covered the period from 2003 to 2012 for a comprehensive set of 171 host countries. Random effects model are applied in the paper and population average model is used to check the robustness of the results.

The authors find that the effects of macro-corporate governance are distinct in different sample periods, as well as in geographical and economic regions, when attracting China’s ODI. Indicators such as political stability, the absence of violence, regulatory effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law and the control of corruption are found to be positively related to China’s ODI.

This is one of the first papers to investigate the relationship between macro-corporate governance indicators and China’s ODI. 171 countries are included in the data sample and sub-sample tests are also conducted.

This chapter investigates the role of macro corporate governance (legal and extra legal institutions) in determining the extent of ultimate excess control (i.e., the ownership-controls rights divergence of the ultimate owner) using a large sample of Asian and European companies. We find that the level of excess control is lower in countries with (1) good investor protection and better enforcement of information disclosure and (2) fairer competition laws, higher newspaper diffusion, and more regulated insider trading. Controlling for institutions subsumes the effect of firm-level determinants, as only leverage appears to be negatively and significantly related to excess control.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the relationship between some management features (management capability, management entrenchment, agency costs and overconfidence) and the innovation of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

The study carried out during 2009–2015. A total of 125 companies were selected from eight industries as the sample of study using the method of systematic elimination. A descriptive-correlational design was used in this study and panel data regression models were employed for developing the relationship between research variables.

The obtained results indicated that managerial ability could foster innovation, while managerial entrenchment could stifle innovation and agency costs and overconfidence have no effect on innovation.

The current study is almost the first project which focuses on the management characteristics and firm innovation in developing countries.

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

Growing social concerns and ecological issues accelerate firms’ environmental, social and governance (ESG) engagement. Hence, this study aims to advance the existing literature by focusing on the interplay between institutional and firm governance mechanisms for greater ESG engagement. More specifically, the authors investigate whether public governance stimulates excessive ESG engagement and whether corporate governance moderates this relationship.

Using a sample of 43,803 firm-year observations affiliated with 41 countries and 9 industries, the authors adopt a country, industry and year fixed-effects regression analysis.

The authors find that public governance strength via its six dimensions stimulates excessive ESG engagement. This implies that firms in countries with strong voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption are more motivated for ESG engagement. Furthermore, corporate governance negatively moderates the relationship between all public governance dimensions (except political stability) and excessive ESG engagement. This implies that public governance and corporate governance are substitutes for encouraging firms to commit to ESG. Further tests reveal that whereas these results in the baseline analyses are valid for developed countries, they are not valid in emerging markets.

The findings support the interplay between institutional and agency theories. In countries with strong (weak) institutional mechanisms, corporate governance becomes weak (strong) in inciting greater stakeholder engagement. This implies that the public governance mechanism alleviates agency costs, rendering internal mechanisms of corporate governance noncompulsory for ESG engagement.

The findings suggest that emerging countries need to reinforce their institutions for greater accountability, regulatory quality and control of corruption, which will have a domino effect on firms in addressing stakeholder expectations. The results also advise emerging country firms to augment their internal monitoring mechanisms for greater stakeholder engagement, such as structuring boards and establishing corporate social responsibility mechanisms, committees and policies.

This study contributes to the recent literature investigating the role of corporate governance mechanisms in excessive ESG engagement. The study also explores whether public governance is associated with greater ESG involvement and provides a comprehensive analysis of the association between six indicators of public governance quality and excessive ESG practices in developed and emerging economies.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss empirical research examining the impact of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) adoption and board governance on the accounting quality, in terms of relevance and faithful representation.

The research uses a sample of 454 observations of publicly listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the fiscal year that ends on December 31, 2008 through 2011. Relevance is measured by predictive value, whereas faithful representation is measured by absolute discretionary accrual as an inverse measure. Board governance is measured by the board of commissioner score whereas IFRS adoption is measured by the percentage of IFRS adopted. The data used in this study are obtained both from Indonesian Capital Market Directory, Indonesian Stock Exchange database, and from company annual reports.

This research found evidence of a positive association of IFRS adoption on the relevance of accounting information quality. With respect to faithful representation, this study proves a positive association after IFRS adoption. This research also found that board governance has a positive impact on accounting information quality after IFRS adoption both in relevance and faithful representation. This result is in line with investor’s expectations that fair value IFRS adoption enhances the relevance of accounting information.

This study provides further evidence on the effect of IFRS adoption and board of governance on accounting information quality using data from Indonesia. Moreover, this study measures and tests both dimensions of earnings quality which are relevance and faithful representation and portrays a complete story about the quality of earnings. This study uses the qualitative characteristics of accounting information as proxies for accounting quality, so that it enriches the accounting literature about the role of accounting standards in financial reporting quality.

This study aims to provide a review of corporate governance in China because effective and strong corporate governance is necessary for the efficient functioning and long-term sustainability of financial markets and corporations.

The author provides a literature review of corporate governance in China through themes such as the concentration of state ownership, the degree of independence among board directors, insider trading, quality of financial disclosures and the maturity of capital markets.

The author reviews empirical work surrounding key corporate governance variables and identifies avenues for future research. The author finds that corporate governance mechanisms exhibit implications for firm performance, fraud, capital retention, financial constraints, institutional investors, auditing and the quality of financial disclosures. In addition, the author reviews evidence documenting the importance of independent board directors in regulation and ethical conduct.

The literature review contributes to the growing literature on responsible corporate governance and provides further understanding of the importance of business ethics for promoting the integrity and long-term sustainability of China’s capital markets and corporations and to ensure that company assets are used efficiently and productively in the best interests of investors and other stakeholders. This study offers insights to policy-makers interested in enhancing the quality of corporate governance within their nation. In addition, it provides a macro-level perspective for executives of multinational firms to consider if they are considering making a direct investment in China.

Purpose – Examine the role of institutional investors in accelerating the development of capital markets and economies abroad, the determinants of their investment, both in the domestic and foreign markets, and their importance in promoting good corporate governance practices worldwide and facilitating increased financial integration.

Methodology/approach – Review and synthesize recent academic literature (1970–2011) on the process of international financial integration and the role of foreign institutional investors in the increasingly global financial markets.

Findings – Despite the concern that short-term flow of international capital can be destructive to the emerging and developing market economies, academic evidence on a destabilizing effect of foreign investment activity is limited. Institutional investors’ systematic preference for stocks of large, well-known, globally visible foreign firms can explain the presence of a home bias in international portfolio investment.

Research limitations – Given the breadth of the two literature streams, only representative studies (over 45 published works) are summarized.

Social implications – Regulators of emerging markets should first improve domestic institutions, governance, and macroeconomic fundamentals, and then deregulate domestic financial and capital markets to avoid economic and financial crises in the initial stages of liberalization reforms.

Originality/value of paper – A useful source of information for graduate students, academics, and practitioners on the importance of foreign institutional investors.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of board structure on non-US acquirer returns in 11,499 acquisition transactions from 60 countries during the period from 2001 to 2011.

In this paper the authors employ event study methodology and regression analyses including instrumental variables two-stage least squares regressions.

The authors find that board independence in non-US firms is associated with significantly higher acquirer returns, but this effect is only present in countries with lower levels of investor protection. The authors contribute to the literature by documenting that due to the substitution effect between internal and external governance, when external governance mechanisms are not adequately developed, better internal governance (as measured by higher degree of board independence) reduces agency problems and leads to better firm decisions and outcomes (as measured by the quality of corporate acquisitions).

The paper is the first to empirically examine the relation between board independence and acquirer returns in non-US firms. The findings have important implications for both company managers and national policy makers who are debating the costs and benefits associated with increasing the degree of board independence in publicly traded companies around the world.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how revelations of corporate misconduct are associated with trade credit. Specifically, it investigates how this association varies in different regions, in different types of industries and in response to companies’ subsequent charitable donations.

The authors empirically tested various hypotheses using a sample of 2,725 Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2014 based on signaling theory. Fixed effect models underpinned the methods used.

The authors found that corporate misconduct has a significant negative impact on an irresponsible company’s trade credit received and granted, and the negative impact is heterogeneous for different regions and industries. There is no evidence that charitable donations mitigate the effect on the trade credit of irresponsible companies following revelations of corporate misconduct.

The results suggest that listed companies in China should obey national and local laws and regulations if they wish to avoid the risk of significant trade credit loss. If a company’s violation of these laws and regulations is disclosed, making charitable donations is not an effective strategy for safeguarding trade credit.

This study enriches understanding on the consequences of corporate misconduct and extends the literature on trade credit. It fills a research gap by identifying the impact of corporate misconduct on trade credit.