The structural links of non‐formal education tothe world of work and graduate unemploymentin Nigeria are examined. The role ofgovernment′s stop‐gap measures and…
The structural links of non‐formal education to the world of work and graduate unemployment in Nigeria are examined. The role of government′s stop‐gap measures and the inadequacies of the formal educational institution are discussed. These policies resulted in the worsening of graduate unemployment, labour market segmentation and élite class formation, while only marginally increasing employment. Non‐formal education represented a more meaningful approach to solving graduate unemployment, and matching skills with job needs, than the contemporary approach.
Manpower planners in less‐developed countries have traditionally considered their greatest challenges to be:
The emergence of the Chinese aid consensus has come to have profound implications for sustainability. The Beijing Consensus “sovereignty doctrine” of non‐interference…
The emergence of the Chinese aid consensus has come to have profound implications for sustainability. The Beijing Consensus “sovereignty doctrine” of non‐interference, presents a stark contrast to the Washington Consensus architecture of imposed conditionalities and the serving of geopolitical interests. For this reason, from Africa's perspective, the Beijing Consensus appears to represent the preferred comprehensive meta‐narrative for Africa. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the attributes of “good” aid architecture in relation to the peculiarities of Africa's challenges.
In examining its principles, objectives, framework differences and impact, the Beijing model shows that it supports the human rights which “unleash”, empower and protect self‐directed development grounded in ownership and in the strategic interests of recipients.
The Washington Consensus has been problematic for African development because it is economistic and exclusively instrumentalist. While conceding to this shortcoming, the inability of the consensus to appreciate the unique and complex development problems of Africa is more troubling. Comparing the two, the Beijing Consensus, which is multidimensional and encompasses the intrinsic and non‐economic roles of development aid, with the consequence of over‐emphasizing expanding local policy, is adjudged practical for Africa. The conclusion is that the dominant Washington Consensus is too poorly articulated and structured to respond to declared determination for ownership, mitigating capabilities deprivation, and improving development control.
This paper has argued that the basic approach of the Beijing Consensus has been more generous and more attractive for sustainable development in Africa. Much more important, perhaps, is the ability of the consensus to appreciate the unique and complex development problems which occur as a consequence of donor deafness on limited rights and conditionalities. In sum, the Beijing Consensus results in exclusionary changes of “less magnitude and speed” and promotes poverty reduction and sustainable development. Taken together, these factors and practices mean that the Beijing Consensus best serves the staircase of a nation's pathway to indigenous development, when compared with the Washington Consensus. Such a comprehensive meta‐narrative that builds alliances and creates a foundation for enlightened and effective politics of development aid will “unleash”, empower and protect the full potential of Africa.
In an earlier issue of this journal we compared international experiences in manpower planning at the national level. We offered a matrix of planning approaches (Figure…
In an earlier issue of this journal we compared international experiences in manpower planning at the national level. We offered a matrix of planning approaches (Figure 1), a typology of the politico‐economic systems in which such planning has occurred (not repeated here) and a conceptual framework classifying the objectives and approaches of various countries by stage of economic development (Figure 2). We promised a subsequent article drawing lessons from planning experience which might contribute to improving the international manpower planning process. This, belatedly, is that follow‐up article. In it we review the status of manpower planning in developed, newly industrialising and labour‐short, less developed countries (LDCs). Then we report criticisms which have been levelled at national manpower planning in labour‐surplus LDCs, explain what we see to be the reasons for what has been criticised, identify lessons and make recommendations which we believe will skirt many of the problems identified.