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Book part
Publication date: 1 December 2004

M.Ameziane Lasfer

I test empirically the hypothesis that the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the severity of the agency problems and the amount of information needed to…

Abstract

I test empirically the hypothesis that the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the severity of the agency problems and the amount of information needed to monitor. I show that in high growth firms, where the agency conflicts are low and managers are likely to reveal more information to get advice, boards are more independent but less likely to monitor, while in low growth firms, boards are less likely to be independent, but the relationship between firm value and board independence is strong. Overall, boards become more independent but monitor less as firms’ growth opportunities increase, suggesting that managers trade off the amount of information released to the board to get a better advice and to mitigate the monitoring role of the board.

Details

Corporate Governance
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-76231-133-0

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Book part
Publication date: 1 December 2004

Abstract

Details

Corporate Governance
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-76231-133-0

To view the access options for this content please click here
Book part
Publication date: 1 December 2004

Abstract

Details

Corporate Governance
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-76231-133-0

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 1 February 2003

Steven Graham and Wendy L. Pirie

The fact that stocks going ex‐dividend decline in price by less than the dividend amount is theoretically attributed to the differential taxation of dividend and capital…

Abstract

The fact that stocks going ex‐dividend decline in price by less than the dividend amount is theoretically attributed to the differential taxation of dividend and capital gains or the differential taxation of investor groups. NYSE, Amex and Toronto Stock Exchange listed stocks, and stocks interlisted on these three exchanges, are examined to infer the tax jurisdiction of the marginal investor. The stock price changes relative to the dividends are consistent with a tax clientele effect. Further, the stock price changes are plausible given the tax rates. Ex‐dividend day behavior is different for non‐interlisted stocks on all three exchanges, suggesting each exchange has a different tax clientele. Canadian firms interlisted on US exchanges exhibit ex‐dividend day behavior consistent with the appropriate US exchange’s non‐interlisted stocks, suggesting that the marginal investors in these stocks are American.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 29 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

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