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This paper explores which fundamental aspects of US insurance firms are significant factors in determining whether a firm will be a target or acquirer firm.

By focusing on 251 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals (119 target firms and 132 acquirer firms) over the period between 1990 and 2019, multinomial logistic regression results identify the determinants associated with becoming targets or acquirers.

US insurance firms are more likely to become targets if they are smaller, have lower cash holdings, are non-life, and do not have environmental, social and governance (ESG) scores. Insurance firms are more likely to be acquirers if they have higher profitability, higher cash flow and higher intangibles, and if they are non-life and do not have ESG scores. Moreover, the likelihood of becoming an acquirer decreases in times of global financial crises (GFCs) as compared to non-GFC times.

This paper is the first to utilize multi-period multinomial logistic regression analysis to investigate the determinants of selection decisions of M&A targets and acquirers in the US insurance industry.

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) typically accelerate target top management team (TMT) executive departures. Market discipline and Relative Standing are two major and competing economic and sociological explanations for this phenomenon which lack a satisfactory theoretical integration. To fill this gap in the literature, we model the M&A market as a complex adaptive system composed of TMTs which rid themselves of executives via self-organized critical processes, generating M&A market-level properties that are emergent, or not easily explained with reference to the individual TMTs. The observation of an emergent power law distribution in target TMT executive retention rates for M&A activities in the United States supports our interpretation.

This paper aims to test the extent to which downward bias due to a floating-point exception in probability of informed trading (PIN) estimates obtained using the Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (EHO; 2002) method is remedied using the Yan and Zhang (YZ; 2012) method. The paper also aims to test the sample-size sensitivity of EHO PIN and identify PIN determinants for acquirers and targets in the biotech sector.

EHO and YZ PIN performances are compared for US biotech acquirers and targets around their mergers and acquisition (M&A) announcements. The sampling method of Kryzanowski and Lazrak (2007) is used to assess sample-size sensitivity of announcement window EHO PIN estimates. Cross-sectional regressions are estimated to identify PIN determinants.

EHO and YZ PIN are not significantly different. EHO PIN exhibits significant sample-size sensitivity. Information leakage prior to M&A announcements is strongly affected by some firm characteristics. Significant determinants of PIN behavior around M&A announcements include insider and institutional holdings and research and development (R&D) expense.

Findings imply that PIN partially reflects the activities of insiders and other informed investors about takeover intentions. Subsequent research can examine PIN behavior around pre-announcement rumors for M&As in the same or other industries and for potential targets that are peers of the M&A targets.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate in the empirical finance literature on whether PIN measures informed trading by examining its behavior and the importance of some methodological issues associated with its use in examining market behavior around M&A announcements.

It is hard to accurately price a merger or acquisition, primarily as there are psychological factors that impact such pricing. As a result, it is hard for traditional financial models to accurately undertake valuations for merger or acquisition transactions. The purpose of this paper is to develop a two‐person merger and acquisition (M&A) game theoretic model that will analyse if the offer price provided by an acquirer should be equal to the mid‐point of the acquirer's offer and the target's bid price. It will also analyse if the acquirer will do better by being risk taking or risk averse and if the target will do better by optimistic or pessimistic in this model.

This paper analyses how an incomplete information game with prospect theory can be used to value M&A transaction more accurately by considering the impact of psychological factors on pricing.

It is found that acquirers do not always have to increase the offer price in order to successfully purchase the target firm. Based on the behavioural type of the acquirer and target, it could be possible that the acquirer could even lower the offer and the target firm would still be willing to successfully complete the M&A transaction.

The original aspect of this paper is that it links behavioural types to M&A valuation and the success of M&A transactions. Such a model has not been developed before and it shows that M&A transactions are not always completed by the acquirer increasing their offer price.

This study investigates the extent to which structural equivalence between acquiring and target firms is associated with post-merger and acquisition (M&A) performance—a relationship that is proposed to be moderated by industry-level vertical relatedness between acquiring and target firms.

Applying social network analysis and regression, this study analyzes a buyer–supplier relationship network dataset of 279 M&A deals completed between 2010 and 2017 to test the hypotheses. Structural equivalence is measured as the proportion of common customers and suppliers between an acquiring firm and a target firm.

Supporting a view about the importance of supply chains in explaining M&As outcomes, the results suggest that the structural equivalence in the supplier network is positively associated with post-M&A firm performance. The results also show that the effect of the structural equivalence in the customer network is moderated by vertical relatedness between two merging firms (i.e. structural equivalence contributes to post-M&A performance when vertical industry relatedness is high).

This study contributes to the M&A and supply network literature by investigating the performance implications of structural equivalence in supplier and customer networks, demonstrating the importance of taking a supply chain view when explaining M&As outcomes. Specifically, the authors suggest considering structural equivalence as a new type of relatedness between merging firms (i.e. relatedness in network resources in explaining post-M&A performance). It also indicates how industry-level vertical resource relatedness, which is about relatedness in internal resources between the two firms, could interact with firm-level network resource relatedness, which is about relatedness in external supply chain resources between the two firms, in affecting post-M&A performance.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of open innovation, especially focusing on technological M&A, on subsequent innovation and changes to the firm’s core technological portfolio.

The study suggests three types of core technological areas, based on prior focus and experience in technological categories. These are 1) the existing core area, in which the acquirer firm retains its knowledge and expertise, 2) the enhanced core area, where knowledge and expertise in the acquirer firm’s insufficient areas are strengthened, and 3) the new core area, i.e. new knowledge fields in which the acquirer firm ventures into. The study then analyzes the effects of two key knowledge characteristics of the target firm, similarity and complementarity, on post-M&A innovation outcomes in each of the three core technological areas.

The results confirm that while none of the investigated knowledge characteristics of the target firm is advantageous for post-M&A innovation outcomes in existing core areas, similarity of the target firm does facilitate post-M&A innovation outcomes in enhanced core areas. Moreover, the results confirm that complementarity of the target firm is beneficial for post-M&A innovation outcomes in new core areas.

The study explains the reconfiguration mechanism of a firm’s core technological portfolio. It also suggests an extended framework to analyze innovation outcomes in more detail. Moreover, the study helps to explain why most M&As result in failure.

This paper aims to empirically analyze the success of European bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by an analysis of the shareholder value implications of stock market reactions to announced and canceled M&As in the period from 1999 to 2015.

The analysis of a sample of 467 announced and 54 canceled European bank M&As is conducted using event study methodology. The determinants of the shareholder value creations in M&A are observed in cross-sectional regressions. The likelihood of M&As being canceled is estimated in logit regressions.

The paper finds that European bank M&As have not been successful in terms of shareholder value creation for acquiring banks, whereas targets experienced significant value gains. Abnormal returns for bidders and targets exhibit the same characteristics upon the announcement of M&As that are canceled at a later date, whereas the results for transaction cancelations deviate. Targets experience negative abnormal returns at a larger size than upon the transaction announcement. The findings for bidders are striking, as they destroy shareholder value upon the transaction cancelation, also, consequently they suffer twice. In particular, banks with higher profitability, higher efficiency and lower liquidity experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement dates. Negative abnormal returns prior to the transaction announcement and provision for loan losses increase significantly the likelihood of M&A cancelation.

This paper contributes to the literature expanding existing analyses to the shareholder value implications of canceled European bank M&As in a 17-year long time period. The findings reveal the destructive characteristics of canceled bank M&As and provide innovative insights into European capital market reaction to canceled M&As.

There is little known globally on the association among the independent shareholder, board size and merger and acquisition (M&A) performance. This paper addresses the global issue about cross-border M&A in banking sector, particularly exploring the role of difference in the independent shareholder and board size between acquirer and target banks on synergy gains based on the international study.

Based on cross-border bank M&As data on 59 deals from 1995 to 2009, we initially apply social network analysis techniques to explore the country connectedness of the acquirer-target banks in cross-border M&As. Ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors is further used to investigate synergy gains within the difference in the degree of bank independent shareholder and board sizes between the acquirer and target banks.

Our results indicate that the acquiring banks are generally interconnected with the targeted banks and that some of acquiring banks are clearly concentrated in Asian countries including China, Hong Kong, and Philippines. Moreover, we find that cross-border M&As with larger difference in independent shareholders between the bidder and target bank would result in higher synergy gains in all cases of takeover premiums on 1 day, 1 week and 4 weeks. In addition, financial differences between the bidder and target banks have a significant impact on synergetic gains, a topic not explored in previous studies. There is no evidence that institutional and governance differences between bidder and target bank have significant cross-border impacts on takeover premiums with respect to 1 day, 1 week and 4 weeks, respectively.

This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the international issue about the role of difference in the degree of bank independent shareholder and board sizes between acquirer and target banks on synergy gains. Based on bank cross-border M&As data on 59 deals from 1995 to 2009, we initially apply social network analysis to explore the country connectedness of acquirer-target bank in cross-border M&As, while ten ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors is used to investigate synergy gains within the difference in the degree of bank independent shareholder and board sizes between acquirer and target banks.

In this chapter, the authors draw insights from the literature on institutional distance and examine whether firms engaging in cross-border acquisitions overcome the liability of foreignness by using external advisors. Specifically, the authors argue that acquiring and target firms may alleviate heightened information asymmetries and transaction costs by leveraging the information-production and uncertainty-reduction roles of M&A advisors. Using a global sample of cross-border M&As from 2001 to 2020, the results suggest that institutional distance triggers both acquirers and targets to use M&A advisors. Among the four types of institutional distance the authors examined, cultural distance – and to a lesser extent administrative distance – greatly contributes to the use of various types of advisors in cross-border deals. Interestingly, although both parties in the transaction rely on advisors to overcome distance barriers, acquiring firms appear to hire advisors more often than target firms.

In M&A markets, acquirers face a hold-up problem of losing the value of investments they make in due diligence, negotiations, and post-acquisition planning if targets would pursue the options of waiting for better offers or selling to an alternative bidder. This chapter extends information economics to the literature on M&A contracting by arguing that such contracting problems are more likely to occur for targets with better outside options created by the information available on their resources and prospects. We also argue that acquirers address these contracting problems by using termination payment provisions to safeguard their investments. While previous research in corporate strategy and finance has suggested that certain factors can facilitate an acquisition by reducing a focal acquirer’s risk of adverse selection (e.g., signals, certifications), we note that these same factors can make the target attractive to other potential bidders and can exacerbate the risk of hold-up, thereby leading acquirers to use termination payment provisions as contractual safeguards.