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A growing volume of family firm literature has argued that the preservation of family socioemotional wealth takes precedence over the pursuit of financial goals. The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework that builds knowledge regarding the two-way relationship between socioemotional and financial forms of wealth, to develop a more complete theory of wealth concerns that may inform family firm decision-making.

The authors conceptually examine contingencies affecting the relationship between financial and socioemotional wealth (in both causal directions).

The authors predict when one form of wealth (socioemotional/financial) is likely to dominate the other (financial/socioemotional) in the family firm’s strategic decisions.

The paper advances knowledge on the two-way relationship between socioemotional and financial forms of wealth providing a platform for further development in the nascent field of family business research, including our understanding of family firm decisions regarding control and influence over the family business, environmental policy, altruism toward family members, R&D, accounting choices and corporate diversification.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an extension of the behavioral agency model (BAM) by focusing on the moderating role of CEO gender on the relationship between CEO stock options and risk “systematic vs idiosyncratic” and the performance consequences “positive vs negative” of these option incentives.

Data on CEO’s stock option portfolios are collected from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) ExecuComp. This paper uses a panel data analysis for matched samples of CEOs in S&P’s 1,500 listed firms over the period 2006-2013.

The results indicate a more conservative, risk-averse posture in the case of female CEOs than for male CEOs when they are compensated with stock options for idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk. The results also confirm that female CEOs in low systematic risk contexts, although more conservative, take more prudent risks that produce better long-term outcomes as compared to their male counterparts.

Important implications for the design of optimal CEO’s compensation packages emanate from this study. Findings provide useful tools for board of directors to design CEO’s pay packages that take into account the different risk behavior of male and female CEOs with the aim of enhancing firm performance.

This paper provides new evidence within the area of stock option-based compensation by focusing on the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risk when the effect of CEO stock option is analyzed and performance implications of awarding options to male and female CEOs.

El objetivo de este trabajo es proporcionar una extensión del modelo comportamental de agencia o Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) centrada en el papel moderador del género del CEO en la relación entre la retribución basada en opciones o stock options y los niveles de riesgo –sistemático e idiosincrático– y en las consecuencias –positivas o negativas– sobre el resultado de la empresa.

Los datos sobre stock options de CEOs se recopilan de la base de datos Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp. Este estudio utiliza un análisis de datos de panel para muestras emparejadas de empresas incluidas en S&P 1500 durante el período 2006-2013.

Los resultados indican una postura más conservadora de las mujeres CEO en términos de niveles de riesgo idiosincrático en comparación con la llevada a cabo por los CEOs hombres cuando se les retribuye con stock options. Los resultados también confirman que las mujeres CEO en contextos de riesgo sistemático bajo, aunque más conservadoras, asumen riesgos “de mayor calidad” que producen mejores resultados a largo plazo en comparación con sus homólogos masculinos.

Importantes implicaciones para el diseño de paquetes de retribución óptimos para el CEO emanan de este estudio. Los resultados mostrados proporcionan herramientas útiles para el Consejo de Administración a la hora de diseñar paquetes de retribución para CEOs. Se deben tener en cuenta los diferentes comportamientos relacionados con la asunción de riesgos de CEOs hombres y mujeres con el objetivo de mejorar el resultado de la empresa.

Esta investigación proporciona nueva evidencia dentro del área de la retribución basada en stock options al centrarse tanto en la distinción de riesgos (sistemático e idiosincrático) como en las implicaciones sobre el resultado de la empresa de las stock options dadas como parte de su retribución a hombres y mujeres que ocupan la posición de CEO.

Palabras clave Modelo comportamental de agencia, Opciones sobre acciones, Género, Riesgo sistemático, Riesgo idiosincrático, Resultado

Artículo de investigación

O objetivo deste artigo é fornecer uma extensão da perspectiva do Modelo de Agência Comportamental (BAM) focada nas opções de ações examinando as influências e consequências do desempenho do CEO, considerando a distinção entre risco sistemático e idiossincrático sobre o efeito das opções de ações. em comportamento de risco.

Os dados sobre portfólios de opções de ações do CEO são coletados do Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp. Este documento utiliza uma análise de dados em painel para amostras correspondentes de empresas listadas no S&P 1500 no período 2006-2013.

Os resultados indicam uma postura mais conservadora, avessa ao risco, no caso de CEOs do sexo feminino do que para CEOs do sexo masculino, quando eles são compensados com opções de ações para o risco idiossincrático (específico da empresa). Os resultados também confirmam que as CEOs do sexo feminino em contextos de baixo risco sistemático, embora mais conservadoras, assumem riscos mais prudentes que produzem melhores resultados a longo prazo, em comparação com os seus homólogos masculinos.

Implicações importantes para o projeto de pacotes de remuneração de CEOs ideais emanam deste estudo. Os resultados fornecem ferramentas úteis para o conselho de diretores, a fim de projetar pacotes de remuneração do CEO que levem em conta o comportamento de risco diferente dos CEOs do sexo feminino e masculino, com o objetivo de melhorar o desempenho da empresa.

Este documento fornece novas evidências dentro da área de remuneração baseada em opções de ações, concentrando-se tanto no tipo de risco como determinante do seu efeito de risco quanto nas implicações de desempenho da concessão de opções a CEOs do sexo feminino e masculino.

Palavras-chave Modelo de agência comportamental, Opções de ações, Gênero, risco sistemático, Risco idiossincrático, Atuação

Artigo de pesquisa

This is a short commentary on Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment.”

Using insights from prior studies on executive compensation, the author’s commentary presents a critical evaluation of “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […].” In addition, the author offers potential avenues for further research.

The paper “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” is well executed and makes several significant contributions to the management and executive compensation literature. Particularly, noteworthy are the use of advanced quantitative methods, the use of power law distributions to explain chief executive officer (CEO) pay outcomes, the focus on pay-for-performance and the role of justice in CEO outcomes. The author’s commentary in the present paper discusses the measurement of CEO pay and performance, poses alternative estimation methods to explore the pay-for-performance link and offers thoughts on justice theory in the context of CEO pay.

The authors’ findings may be briefly stated as CEO pay is better described by a power law distribution than a normal distribution, CEO pay is not linked to firm performance and the patterns of CEO pay does not conform to patterns of distributive justice. Overall, the authors provide an important way to evaluate CEO pay outcomes. Thy set the stage for new avenues of research.

CEO pay is a highly controversial subject in the domain of corporate governance. This paper offers boards of directors and policymakers a method to better understand the success or failure of boardroom pay policies.

CEO pay is an important social measure.

The authors’ paper is original by offering a method for determining over and underpayment of CEOs. The author in the present paper makes suggestions on how one might extend the research.

Objetivo – Este es un comentario sobre el trabajo de Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle y Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Utilizando las ideas de la literatura previa sobre retribución de ejecutivos, mi comentario presenta una evaluación crítica del artículo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […]”. Además, esbozo algunas ideas para la investigación futura.

Resultados – El artículo “Dos lados de la injusticia de la retribución de los CEO” está bien desarrollado y realiza varias contribuciones significativas a las literaturas de gestión y retribución de ejecutivos. En particular, son de señalar: a) el uso de métodos cuantitativos avanzados, b) el uso de la distribución de ley de poder para explicar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO, c) el foco en el pago por resultados, d) el papel de la justicia en el rendimiento del CEO. Mi comentario a) discute las medidas de retribución y rendimiento del CEO, b) propone métodos de estimación alternativos para la relación entre retribución y rendimiento y c) ofrece ideas en torno a la teoría de la justicia en el contexto de la retribución del CEO.

Implicaciones – Los resultados de los autores pueden resumirse así: a) La retribución de los CEO se describe mejor como una distribución de ley de poder que como una distribución normal, b) la retribución del CEO y el rendimiento empresarial no están conectados, c) los patrones de retribución del CEO no concuerdan con los patrones de justicia distributiva. En general, los autores proporcionan un importante método para evaluar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO y fomentar la investigación futura.

Implicaciones prácticas – La retribución del CEO es un tema muy controvertido en el ámbito del gobierno corporativo. Este artículo proporciona a los consejos de administración y a los decisores públicos un método para entender mejor el éxito o fracaso de las prácticas retributivas en los consejos de administración.

Originalidad/valor – El trabajo de los autores es original al ofrecer un método para determinar la sobre o la infra retribución de los CEO. Yo apunto algunas sugerencias sobre cómo puede extenderse esta investigación.

Objetivo – Este é um breve comentário a Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Metodologia – Usando conhecimentos de estudos anteriores em compensação executiva, o meu comentário apresenta uma avaliação crítica de “Two sides of CEO pay injustice:….”. Adicionalmente, ofereço potenciais avenidas para investigação futura.

Resultados – O artigo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” está bem feito e apresenta diversas contribuições importantes à literature sobre compensação executiva e de gestores. Em particular, são de salientar: a) o uso de métodos quantitativos avançados b) o uso de distribuições da lei de potência para explicar os resultados do pagamento a CEOs c) O enfoque no pagamento pela performance d) o papel da justiça nos resultados para o CEO. O meu comentário a) discute a medida de pagamento ao CEO e do desempenho b) Propõe métodos alternativos de estimação para explorar a ligação pagamento ao desempenho e c) Apresenta argumentos da teoria da justiça no contexto da compensação do CEO.

Implicações – Os resultados dos autores podem resumir-se como: a) Compensação do CEO é mais bem descrita por uma distribuição da lei de potência que por uma distribuição normal b) Compensação do CEO não está ligada à performance da empresa c) Os padrões da compensação do CEO não se conformam com justiça distributiva. Em geral, os autores fornecem uma forma importante de avaliar a compensação do CEO. Apresentam por isso novas vias para investigação futura.

Implicações práticas – Compensação do CEO é um tópico controverso do domínio da governança corporativa. Este artigo oferece aos Conselhos de Administração e decisores politicos um método para melhor perceber o sucesso ou insucesso das políticas de pagamento aos membros das Administrações.

Originalidade/valor – O artigo é original e oferece um método para determinar sobre ou sub compensação do CEO. Faço sugestões de como se pode estender a investigação.

The control role of the Board of Directors is aimed at monitoring the decisions and actions undertaken by managers in order to protect stockholders’ interests. Considerable theoretical and empirical research has analyzed whether directors’ behavior is consistent with their fiduciary responsibility, but this research has reported inconsistent findings. This paper offers a comprehensive review of both theoretical and empirical literature on the control role of the board and suggests several guidelines for future research.

Research has demonstrated that family businesses limit the goal of maximizing profits in exchange for maintaining control of the company and passing control to future generations. However, these decisions are not always shared by the stakeholders who are outside the family context, making tensions arise within the company that may affect profitability and the share prices of the family business. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the internal tensions in family businesses in the value-added (VA) distribution, and whether these tensions harm their performance as a result of the restrictions under which these companies operate.

A factor analysis has been used to measure the tension that results from VA distribution of a sample of 105 Spanish listed firms for the 2005-2012 period. A regression analysis has been used to study the impact of this tension on their share prices.

Results show that being a family business has a positive effect on the business tension factor and that returns and share prices are inversely related to tension factors. Thus, the authors conclude that the decision to maintain control over the family business threatens profitability and share prices.

An analysis of distribution of VA in family businesses sheds light on whether or not the management in its decisions preserves its socioemotional wealth (SEW) generating tensions among its economic agents, affecting its profitability and continuity. This knowledge is important for company stakeholders and future investors.

This is the first study in which the value-added statement is used to analyse how the management style of firms, and especially family businesses, are seeking to preserve their SEW and internal tensions generated by them.

Se ha investigado que las empresas familiares limitan el objetivo de maximización del beneficio a cambio de mantener el control de la empresa y de transmitir ese control a futuras generaciones. Sin embargo, no siempre esas decisiones son compartidas por los accionistas que se encuentran fuera del contexto familiar, es entonces cuando surgirán tensiones en el interior de la empresa que podrán afectar a la rentabilidad y a la cotización en bolsa de la empresa familiar. Nuestro objetivo es analizar las tensiones internas que sufren las empresas familiares en la distribución del valor añadido y si estas perjudican sus resultados por las restricciones en las que basan su funcionamiento.

Se ha realizado un análisis factorial para medir la tensión que resulta de la distribución del VA en una muestra de 105 empresas españolas cotizadas durante el periodo 2005-2012. Un análisis de regresión ha sido utilizado para estudiar el impacto de esta tensión sobre los precios de sus acciones.

Los resultados muestran que ser empresa familiar ejerce un efecto positivo en el factor tensión empresarial y que, tanto la rentabilidad, como el precio de las acciones, están inversamente relacionados con los factores de tensión. Por ello concluimos que la decisión de mantener el control en las empresas familiares pone en riesgo la rentabilidad y cotización de las acciones.

Un análisis de la distribución del VA en las empresas familiares arroja luz sobre si la dirección, mediante sus decisiones, preserva o no su riqueza socioemocional generando tensiones entre los agentes económicos, afectando a su rentabilidad y continuidad. Este conocimiento es importante para los grupos de interés de la empresa así como para futuros inversores.

Este es el primer estudio en que el Estado del Valor Añadido es utilizado para analizar el estilo de gestión de las empresas, y especialmente como las empresas familiares tratan de preservar su riqueza socioemocional, y las tensiones internas generadas por ello.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) perspective in general, and the contribution by Martin and Gomez-Mejia (this issue) in particular. The aim is also to address recent calls to incorporate more micro-level theorizing in the development of the SEW perspective and to embrace the rich, real-world environment in which this phenomenon takes place. Focus is particularly on the SEW dimension that is related to the ability to exercise family control over a business.

The approach is conceptual and introduces symbolic interactionism, a theory from micro-sociology and socio-psychology, to the SEW literature within the family business field. The paper draws on a previously published study by the author and relies on the centrality of the notion of socio-symbolic ownership in family firms.

The concepts of socio-symbolic ownership and the process of enacting ownership underline how family and non-family actors interpret and act upon specific guiding values and interests that constitute SEW at a micro level in each family firm. Socio-symbolic ownership and the guiding values and interests that the ownership is based on allow scholars to capture SEW differences among family firms, as the specific values and interests typically vary between family firms.

An approach is outlined that helps scholars to develop a more process-sensitive theory of SEW. Studying how and why actors engage in the social interactions, symbolic relations and interpretations that constitute the decision-making gives a better understanding of the important micro-foundations of SEW, and of the heterogeneity of family firms.

In this paper, the authors present an empirical framework that incorporates different factors of the impact of COVID-19 on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in La Rioja, Spain, in relation to the value chain, gender and family business and allows the evaluation of these impacts on the SMEs' outcomes.

The authors conduct exploratory research based on phone interviews with 329 business managers from SMEs in La Rioja (Spain), from June 1 to June 30 2021, using ordinary least squares linear regression and matching procedures to test the study hypotheses.

The results show that the impact of COVID-19 related to primary activities in adding value, such as inbound logistics, operations and marketing, have a positive influence on innovation outcomes in SMEs, as do female managers. Family SMEs present poorer innovation outcomes.

At the organizational level, this paper may be of interest to management, and at the national and regional levels to policymakers, since it could help to develop policies that support SMEs' sourcing, operations and marketing in order to prepare for potential value chain disruptions. Additionally, this research may help decision-makers to foster and promote innovation in SMEs as a way of ensuring their resilience.

In this paper, the authors provide novel evidence about the effect of COVID-19 in SMEs. Moreover, it has been shown that the COVID-19 pandemic has triggered the redefinition of supply chains at the organizational level.

This study aims to identify the mediating role of cooperation agreements in the relationship between family involvement in international firms and their level of international commitment.

The study focuses on Spanish international wine and olive oil companies that have varying levels of family involvement. The final sample consists of 263 companies. SmartPLS was used to perform the analysis.

A higher level of family involvement in business implies greater difficulties with cooperation agreements. Additionally, family involvement is negatively associated with the firm’s level of international commitment, and the perceived difficulties of cooperation agreements mediate this relationship.

This study is of interest to business managers with different levels of family involvement. The study clarifies their perceptions of cooperation agreements and international business commitment. Managers of firms with a high level of family involvement should emphasize the multiple benefits of cooperation agreements for international strategy performance rather than the drawbacks of cooperation. Additionally, through cooperation, companies can learn about destination markets, which may help them to focus their resources effectively in those markets.

This study contributes to the literature on the internationalization strategies of family businesses. This study is the first to address the mediating role of cooperation agreements in the relationship between family involvement and international commitment.

A survey of returned expatriate managers in an American multinational found that their assignments to subsidiary companies overseas had been an enjoyable experience for most of them. But only 35 per cent of the sample felt satisfied with the repatriation process into the US. Reasons included difficulty in readjusting to US life and culture, to the head office organisation and their own changed status, and to the career development ladder, where they felt their career opportunities were limited. It is suggested that measures to prevent these problems occurring could include a guarantee of a satisfactory job on return, an arrangement to maintain the expatriate's home, regular visits to the US, and planned support and training before and after the assignment from experienced senior personnel.