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Article
Publication date: 1 April 2008

Fanny Caranikas‐Walker, Sanjay Goel, Luis R. Gómez‐Mejía, Robert L. Cardy and Arden Grabke Rundell

The empirical support for agency theory explanations for the great variance in CEO pay has been equivocal. Drawing from the performance appraisal literature, we…

Abstract

The empirical support for agency theory explanations for the great variance in CEO pay has been equivocal. Drawing from the performance appraisal literature, we hypothesize that boards of directors incorporate human judgment into the evaluation and reward of CEO performance in order to balance managerial risk with agency costs. We test Baysinger and Hoskisson’s (1990) proposition that insider‐dominated corporate boards rely on subjective performance evaluation to reward the CEO, and we argue that R&D intensity influences this relationship. Using a sample of Fortune firms, findings support our contention that human judgment is important in evaluating and rewarding CEO performance.

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Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management, vol. 6 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1536-5433

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Article
Publication date: 21 November 2016

Martin Larraza-Kintana

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Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management, vol. 14 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1536-5433

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Article
Publication date: 9 April 2018

Herman Aguinis, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Geoffrey P. Martin and Harry Joo

The purpose of the study is to set a research agenda so that future conceptual and empirical research can improve the understanding of why CEO pay and CEO performance are…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of the study is to set a research agenda so that future conceptual and empirical research can improve the understanding of why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper compiles and adds to many of the explanations provided by this special issue’s nine commentaries regarding why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled. These explanations were grouped into two categories: economic (e.g. marginal productivity theory, agency theory and behavioral agency model) and social-institutional-psychological (e.g. CEO individual differences and characteristics and CEO-organization interactions). Moreover, new analyses based on additional data were conducted to examine measurement-related explanations for the observed pay-performance decoupling.

Findings

Results based on alternative measures of pay and performance confirmed, once again, the existence of pay-performance decoupling.

Research limitations/implications

This paper will stimulate research pitting theoretical explanations against each other to understand their relative validity in different contexts.

Practical implications

The paper informs ongoing efforts to link CEO pay to performance.

Social implications

The paper also revisits the decoupling of CEO pay and firm performance from a normative and value-based perspective (i.e. regarding whether pay and performance should be related).

Originality/value

The paper clarifies that the articles in this special issue largely concluded that CEO pay is decoupled from CEO performance.

Objetivo – El objetivo es proponer una ageda de investigación de forma que la futura investigación conceptual y empírica pueda mejorar la comprensión sobre por qué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO no están conectados.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – El artículo compila y añade a la mayoría de las explicaciones proporcionados por los nueve comentarios publicados en este número especial acerca de porqué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO están desconectados. Estas explicaciones se agrupan en dos categorías: económicas (e.g. teoría de la productividad marginal, teoría de agencia, modelo de agencia comportamental) y socio-institucional-psicológicas (e.g. diferencias y características individuales del CEO, interacción CEO-organización). Además, se llevan a cabo nuevos análisis sobre datos adicionales para examinar algunas explicaciones relativas a la medición para la falta de conexión entre retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Resultados – Los resultados basados en medidas alternativas de retribución y rendimiento confirman, una vez más, la existencia de una desconexión entre ambas magnitudes.

Limitaciones/implicaciones – Este artículo estimulará a investigación contraponiendo diferentes explicaciones teóricas para entender su validez relativa en diferentes contextos.

Implicaciones prácticas – El artículo informa sobre los esfuerzos actuals para relacionar la retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Implicaciones sociales – El artículo revisa la desconexión entre la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO desde una perspectiva normativa y de valor (i.e. sobre si la retribución y el rendimiento deben estar conectados).

Originalidad/valor – El artículo clarifica que los artículos en este número especial concluyen que la retribución del CEO está desconectada de su rendimiento.

Objetivo

O objetivo é estabelecer uma agenda de investigação para que futuros estudos conceptuais ou empíricos possam melhorar a compreensão do porquê de a compensação do CEO e o desempenho do CEO estarem dissociados.

Metodologia – O artigo compila e acrescenta às muitas explicações fornecidas pelos oito comentários deste número especial sobre as razões da dissociação da compensação e do desempenho do CEO. Estas explicações agrupam-se em duas categorias: económicas (eg., teoria da produtividade marginal, teoria da agência, modelo da agência comportamental) e Socio-institucional-psicológicas (eg., características e diferenças individuais do CEO, interações CEO-Organização). Além disso, conduziram-se novas análises baseadas em dados para examinar explicações baseadas em medições para a dissociação pagamento-desempenho.

Resultados – Resultados baseados em medidas alternativas de pagamento e desempenho confirmaram, uma vez mais, a existência da dissociação entre pagamento e performance.

Limitações/implicações – Este artigo estimula investigação que contraponha diferentes explicações teóricas, para perceber a sua validade relativa em diferentes contextos.

Implicações práticas – O artigo dá informação sobre esforços em curso para ligar a compensação do CEO ao desempenho.

Implicações sociais – O artigo revisita a dissociação do pagamento e desempenho da empresa Numa perspectiva normative e baseada em valores (ie, sobre se a compensação e a performance devem estar relacionadas).

Originalidade/valor – O paper clarifica que os artigos neste número especial basicamente concluiram que a compensação do CEO está dissociala do desempenho do CEO.

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Article
Publication date: 9 April 2018

Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey P. Martin, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Ernest H. O’Boyle and Harry Joo

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

Design/methodology/approach

Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised.

Findings

In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners.

Implications

The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories.

Practical implications

Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers.

Originality/value

Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

Objetivo – El objetivo de nuestro estudio fue examinar si los directores ejecutivos (CEOs) merecen la remuneración monetaria que reciben.

Metodología – En lugar de utilizar el enfoque tradicional que asume que la distribución del rendimiento de CEOs sigue la curva normal (con la mayoría de CEOs agrupados en torno a la media y relativamente poca variación), adoptamos un enfoque diferente basado en la ley de potencia. Incluimos 22 industrias y N = 4.158 combinaciones de CEO-firma para análisis basados en Tobin’s Q y N = 5.091 para análisis basado en la rentabilidad de los activos. En cuanto a la remuneracion, medimos distribuciones basadas en la remuneración total y tres componentes del pago completo a los CEOs: salario, bonos, y el valor de las opciones ejercitadas.

Resultados – 86% de las distribuciones de rendimiento de CEOs y el 91% de las distribuciones de pago de los CEO se aproximan mejor a una distribución de ley de potencia que a una distribución normal. Esto indica que una minoría de los CEOs produce un valor muy superior para sus empresas (es decir, el rendimiento CEO) y una minoría de los CEOs apropia valor superior para sí mismos (es decir, pago de los CEO). Sin embargo, encontramos muy poco solapamiento entre aquellos CEOs que se desempeñan mejor y los CEOs que ganan más.

Implicaciones – Nuestros hallazgos usando una conceptualización y metodología novedosas ponen en relieve que a muchos CEOs se les paga demasiado y que a muchos no se les paga suficiente (en comparación con su desempeño). Los resultados sugieren una violación de los principios de justicia distributiva y no apoyan la hipótesis de “contratación eficiente,” y tienen implicaciones para para la teoría de la agencia, de la equidad, de la justicia, y de la distribución de riesgos.

Implicaciones prácticas – Los resultados destacan las prácticas erróneas con respecto a la distribución de compensación a CEOs que se basan en los niveles medios de rendimiento en una industria. Estas prácticas llevan a no pagar suficiente a los directivos “estrella” y pagar demasiado a los directivos con desempeño medio.

Originalidad/valor – Los resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación entre desempeño y compensación de CEOs y que los que se desempeñan mejor no son los que reciben más pago, y viceversa. Estas diferencias son mucho más grandes de que lo que se creía anteriormente.

Objetivo – O objetivo do nosso estudo foi examinar se os CEOs merecem a compensação monetária que recebem.

Metodologia – Em vez de utilizar a abordagem tradicional que assume que a distribuição do desempenho do CEO segue a curva normal (com a maioria dos CEOs agrupados em torno da média e relativamente pouca variação), adotamos uma abordagem diferente com base num enfoque inovador da lei de potência. Incluímos 22 indústrias e N = 4.158 combinações de CEO-empresa para análise baseada no Q de Tobin e N = 5091 para análise baseado na rentabilidade dos ativos. Em relação à compensação, medimos as distribuições de CEO com base no total de compensação e três componentes do pagamento total dos CEOs: salário, bônus e o valor das opções exercidas.

Resultados – 86% do desempenho do CEO e 91% das distribuições de pagamento do CEO correspondem a uma lei de potência melhor do que uma distribuição normal, indicando que uma minoria de CEOs está produzindo valor superior para suas empresas (ou seja, desempenho do CEO) e uma minoria de CEOs se apropriando do valor superior para si próprios (isto é, o salário do CEO). Mas, também encontramos pouca sobreposição entre CEOs que tem os melhores desempenhos e os CEOs que tem as maiores ganancias.

Implicações – Nossas descobertas lançam nova luz sobre o merecimento do pagamento do CEO, usando uma nova lente conceitual e metodológica que destaca o excessivo e o baixo pagamento sistemático. Os resultados sugerem uma violação da justiça distributiva e não apoiam a hipótese da contratação eficiente, e tem implicações para a teoria da agência, teoria da igualdade, teoria da justiça e distribuição de riscos.

Implicações práticas – Os resultados destacam práticas errôneas quando se tenta benchmark de remuneração do CEO baseado em níveis médios de desempenho em uma indústria, porque essas práticas levam a não pagar o suficiente aos CEOs “estrela” e pagar em excesso CEOs com desempenho médio.

Originalidade/valor – Os resultados oferecem novas perspectivas sobre a relação entre desempenho e retribuição dos CEOs e que os que desempenham melhor não são os que recebem um pagamento maior, e vice-versa. Estas diferenças são muito maiores do que se pensava anteriormente.

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Book part
Publication date: 12 July 2011

Cristina Cruz, Shainaz Firfiray and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia

This chapter takes a socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective to explain the adoption of human resource (HR) practices in family-controlled firms. Previous studies on human…

Abstract

This chapter takes a socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective to explain the adoption of human resource (HR) practices in family-controlled firms. Previous studies on human resource management (HRM) in family firms have focused only on a small range of HR practices and have rarely utilized strong conceptual frameworks. As a result, these studies have overlooked important factors that contribute to the distinctiveness of HRM in these organizations. Based on ample evidence that shows family businesses' preference for non-economically motivated objectives collectively labeled as SEW, we propose that the presence of SEW influences HR practices in family firms.

Consequently, we reexamine existing empirical evidence of the determinants of HRM in family-controlled firms under the SEW approach. We also reinterpret existing theoretical models of family-controlled firms and their implications for HRM under the SEW umbrella. Our final goal is to establish an integrated framework through a set of sound propositions on HRM in family businesses. By integrating the literature, we aim to fill theoretical gaps in our understanding of the determinants of HR practices in the family business context and direct future research in this area.

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Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-85724-554-0

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Article
Publication date: 24 April 2018

Veronica H. Villena, Guanyi Lu, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and Elena Revilla

Supply chain managers (SC managers) may make less than optimal decisions for the firm when facing compensation and employment risks. The purpose of this paper is to study…

Abstract

Purpose

Supply chain managers (SC managers) may make less than optimal decisions for the firm when facing compensation and employment risks. The purpose of this paper is to study two relevant factors (target setting and strategic importance of the supply chain function) that may drive SC managers to perceive more or less risk to their welfare.

Design/methodology/approach

The study combines survey data from 133 firms with secondary data in order to reduce source bias and enhance the validity of results. The authors also conducted interviews with supply chain and human resources managers.

Findings

The results show that top managers can alter SC managers’ perceived risks. Ambitious targets drive compensation risk but not employment risk. The supply chain function’s strategic importance, on the other hand, decreases employment risk but increases compensation risk.

Research limitations/implications

The authors emphasize two ways that the top management team (TMT) influences SC managers’ perceived personal welfare but acknowledge that there may be others factors. Due to the topic sensitivity, the authors could not collect data on all variables (e.g. individual characteristics) that may affect risk perception. The findings are based on Spanish firms and may not be generalized to other contexts.

Practical implications

This research proposes three suggestions. First, compensation and employment risks should be considered separately when designing compensation and evaluation systems. Second, appropriate performance targets may put compensation risk in a reasonable range that is neither too high to prevent risky-yet-beneficial decisions nor too low to allow nonfeasance. Third, escalating the supply chain’s strategic importance effectively offsets employment risk.

Originality/value

Scholars have repeatedly shown the negative outcomes of SC managers’ perceived compensation and employment risks. Yet, little attention has been given to their antecedents. The study explores two relevant antecedents and provides integrative empirical evidence regarding actions top leaders can take to manage SC managers’ perceived risk and subsequently enhance firm performance.

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International Journal of Operations & Production Management, vol. 38 no. 8
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0144-3577

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Article
Publication date: 1 July 2005

Bartolomé Dey´‐Tortella, Luis R. Gomez‐Mejía, Julio O. de Castro and Robert M. Wiseman

Agency theoretic models have been used in the past to justify the use of stock options as an effective incentive alignment mechanism to create a common fate between…

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834

Abstract

Agency theoretic models have been used in the past to justify the use of stock options as an effective incentive alignment mechanism to create a common fate between principals and agents. In this paper, we use behavioral theory to reach the opposite conclusion – namely, that the design characteristics of the typical stock option plan foster perverse incentives for loss‐averse agents, leading to decisions with detrimental consequences for principals. We also consider alternative stock option designs and other equity‐based executive compensation plans and argue that they may suffer from the same problems as traditional stock option plans – namely, that loss‐averse executives will try to protect the endowed value of that equity through self‐serving decisions that do not enhance shareholder wealth.

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Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management, vol. 3 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1536-5433

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Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management, vol. 9 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1536-5433

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Article
Publication date: 1 March 2000

Basu Sharma and Aaliya Fayyaz

This paper proposes a hegemonic power hypothesis to examine the determinants of CEO compensation by drawing on insights from the field of international relations. It then…

Abstract

This paper proposes a hegemonic power hypothesis to examine the determinants of CEO compensation by drawing on insights from the field of international relations. It then reports results of an empirical test of this hypothesis. The results indicate a limited support for the hegemonic power hypothesis, indicating the importance of a cross‐disciplinary perspective in studying the determinants of CEO compensation.

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International Journal of Commerce and Management, vol. 10 no. 3/4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1056-9219

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Article
Publication date: 1 April 1990

Luis R. Gomez‐Mejia

This study suggests that while gender differencesin work values exist (as measured by task‐oriented,contextual and job involvement scales),the magnitude and significance…

Abstract

This study suggests that while gender differences in work values exist (as measured by task‐oriented, contextual and job involvement scales), the magnitude and significance of the observed differences between men and women decrease as occupation and length of socialisation are partialled out.

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International Journal of Manpower, vol. 11 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0143-7720

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