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This paper reports a new experimental test of the notion that behavior switches from risk averse to risk seeking when gains are “reflected” into the loss domain. We conduct a sequence of experiments that allows us to directly compare choices under reflected gains and losses where real and hypothetical payoffs range from several dollars to over $100. Lotteries with positive payoffs are transformed into lotteries over losses by multiplying all payoffs by –1, that is, by reflecting payoffs around zero. When we use hypothetical payments, more than half of the subjects who are risk averse for gains turn out to be risk seeking for losses. This reflection effect is diminished considerably with cash payoffs, where the modal choice pattern is to exhibit risk aversion for both gains and losses. However, we do observe a significant difference in risk attitudes between losses (where most subjects are approximately risk neutral) and gains (where most subjects are risk averse). Reflection rates are further reduced when payoffs are scaled up by a factor of 15 (for both real and hypothetical payoffs).

To raise the quality of regulatory capital, Basel III capital rules recognize unrealized gains and losses on all available-for-sale (AFS) securities in Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (CET1). However, by examining the correlations between U.S. GDP growth rate, interest rates and regulatory capital ratios computed using Basel III regulatory capital definition for six U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) since 2007, this chapter finds that Basel III regulatory capital will enhance the pro-cyclicality of Basel III leverage ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio and their sensitivity to long-term interest rates. Therefore, Basel III capital standards may have significant implications for bank supervision and bank capital risk management in the near future. As banks will hold more high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) as required by Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), the weight of unrealized gains and losses arising from fair value accounting will increase in Basel III Tier 1 capital base, the consequent increase of pro-cyclicality in a bank’s regulatory capital ratios may distort the true picture of bank capital adequacy. If an expected loss approach (EL) is used as the provisioning model, such capital risk may be increased further. Moreover, as U.S. monetary policy has started tapering quantitative easing, long-term interest rates will increase inevitably. This may increase the negative impact of unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities on bank capital. As a result, it may be difficult for banks to maintain appropriate capital ratios to meet regulatory requirements and support business activities.

We take Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) seriously by rigorously estimating structural models using the full set of CPT parameters. Much of the literature only estimates a subset of CPT parameters, or more simply assumes CPT parameter values from prior studies. Our data are from laboratory experiments with undergraduate students and MBA students facing substantial real incentives and losses. We also estimate structural models from Expected Utility Theory (EUT), Dual Theory (DT), Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU), and Disappointment Aversion (DA) for comparison. Our major finding is that a majority of individuals in our sample locally asset integrate. That is, they see a loss frame for what it is, a frame, and behave as if they evaluate the net payment rather than the gross loss when one is presented to them. This finding is devastating to the direct application of CPT to these data for those subjects. Support for CPT is greater when losses are covered out of an earned endowment rather than house money, but RDU is still the best single characterization of individual and pooled choices. Defenders of the CPT model claim, correctly, that the CPT model exists “because the data says it should.” In other words, the CPT model was borne from a wide range of stylized facts culled from parts of the cognitive psychology literature. If one is to take the CPT model seriously and rigorously then it needs to do a much better job of explaining the data than we see here.

This chapter investigates the difference between ultimatum games over gains and over losses. Although previous research in decision making has found that individuals treat losses and gains differently, losses have not previously been investigated in strategic situations. In the field, however, the problem of negotiating over losses is as unavoidable and problematic as the problem of negotiating over gains. In addition, data on how we bargain over losses can shed some theoretical light on fairness preferences. Two experiments use within-subject designs, the first in the U.S. and the second in the U.S., China and Japan. We find that offers and demands are higher in losses than in gains, and that these results hold across the three countries. We adapt Bolton's (1991) model of fairness to explain the results. Specifically, we extend prospect theory's loss aversion to unfairness, suggesting that unfairness in losses looms larger than unfairness in gains.

Purpose – This chapter investigates the influence of bank loan underwriting practices on loan losses and identifies potential determinants of lending practices for five categories of loans: business, consumer, commercial real estate, home equity, and construction and land development loans.

Methodology/approach – Using data on the riskiness of lending practices obtained from the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) bank examiner surveys from January 1996 to March 2009, I fit a two-step treatment effects model to measure the effects of underwriting practices on loan losses, controlling for the potential endogeneity of lending practices.

Findings – In the selection step, I find that for business loans, the likelihood that bank management will adopt low-risk lending practices increases with bank financial performance and management quality hierarchical complexity and decreases with market competition. Results for the selection of lending practices for consumer loans and three categories of real estate loans are similar to those found for business loans but show weaker statistical relationships to all explanatory variables. In the loss determination step, I find that lower (higher) risk underwriting practices are generally associated with lower (higher) gross loan charge-offs (as percentage of gross loans and leases) for five categories of loans: business, consumer, commercial real estate, home equity, and construction and land development loans.

Originality/value of chapter – This is the first study to model the determinants of loan underwriting practices with the practices being characterized in terms of their risk to the bank. In addition, this is the first study to consider the effects of the riskiness of lending practices on loan losses, controlling for the endogeneity of practices.

Recent evidence on the impact of the crisis on developed countries shows that changes in income inequality and poverty have been relatively small in spite of the macroeconomic heterogeneity of the recession across different economies. However, when evaluating individual perceptions linked to the crisis any changes in the chances to scale up or lose ground in the income ladder are also crucial. Our aim in this paper is to analyze to what extent the recession has had an impact on individual equivalent incomes and, in particular, on the prevalence of downward mobility in two developed countries where job losses have been large. We find that income losses have increased, particularly in Spain, and while age and education are key determinants of the probability of experiencing an income loss in both countries, the presence of children only increases the probability of an income loss in Spain.