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Existing studies show that firms may have an incentive to use share repurchases opportunistically, thereby taking advantage of market participants’ confirmation bias that share repurchase is a signal of undervaluation. This study aims to investigate whether signaling costs and accounting transparency can serve as tools to identify opportunistic share repurchases.

The authors measure signaling costs by using two share repurchase methods (direct and indirect share repurchase) with different share repurchase costs, and measure accounting transparency using the history of earnings timeliness. The authors further measure long-term performance following share repurchases using operating performance and stock returns. Lastly, the authors compare the long-term performances between the groups defined by share repurchase method and earnings timeliness level.

The authors find that indirect share repurchase firms with a history of poor earnings timeliness experience unfavorable long-term performance, while other share repurchase firms do not. This finding reinforces the view that some share repurchases may be driven by managerial opportunism. In particular, when firms with a history of poor earnings-reporting behavior choose a low-cost repurchase method, their share repurchases may be motivated by managerial opportunism.

The findings suggest that past earnings timeliness and the signaling costs of a repurchase together are useful predictors of false signaling. Moreover, they suggest that investors can – at least in part – predict opportunistic share repurchases by using signaling costs and accounting transparency.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between the two types of long-term incentives (stock options/stock ownership) for the chief executive officers and a firm’s long-term performance. Even though the two types of incentives are designed to improve long-term performance, the degrees of impact on long-term performance differ. Based on behavioral agency theory, this study theoretically and empirically examines the role of a firm’s exploration on the above relationship.

This study used three archival sources to obtain data on stock options, stock ownership, patents and exploration, financial measures, and others. Based on a sample of 1,963 firms in various industries from 1995 to 2006, this study tested the moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s performance.

This study reveals the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s long-term performance: a positive moderating effect on the relationship between stock options and performance and a negative moderating effect on the relationship between stock ownership and performance. In addition, empirical evidence was added on the inverted U-shaped relationship between stock ownership and a firm’s long-term performance.

There is little research on a firm’s internal characteristics that strengthen or weaken the effects of stock options and stock ownership on firm performance. This study demonstrates the differential moderating effects of exploration on the relationship between stock options/stock ownership and long-term performance. Such effects of exploration come from the different risk features of stock options and stock ownership. The key implication is that stock options could be more effective than stock ownership to enhance a firm’s long-term performance when a firm has a strong exploration orientation.

This paper aims to investigate the causes of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals that acquiring firms pay excess premium beyond the market-expected level and examine the relation between the announcement return and long-term performance of the acquiring firms.

Based on a sample of 1,767 US firms’ M&A deals from 2000 to 2014, the authors use the expectation model used by Ang and Ismail (2015) to measure normal offer premium in an M&A deal. They conduct the standard event study methodology to observe the market reaction for acquiring companies on the announcement day. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used for the main explanatory variable so as to find the impact of the premium paid on the long-term performance of the acquirer.

First, acquiring firms are faced with negative market returns when acquiring firms pay excess premiums. Second, poor long-term performance of the acquiring firms is observed if acquiring firms pay excess premium. Finally, the negative relation between excess premium and acquiring firms’ long-term performance weakens, as the sample period becomes longer.

The hypotheses and results of the empirical study are as follows. First, the acquirer’s market reaction on the announcement day is negative when it pays an excess offer premium. This is because the market perceives the premium to be greater than the value of the deal, which damages the value of the market, as it is not perceived as a proxy for future synergy. Second, the acquirer’s long-term performance is low when it pays the excess offer premium. It is the same result as the acquirer’s market reaction on the announcement day. This shows that the excess premium does not result in either a short-term positive reaction or a long-term profit for the acquiring shareholders. However, it is found that the relationship between the excess premium and the long-term performance of the acquirer decreases with time. This is because the long-term performance of the acquirer is more affected by management and other events after the deal.

The authors divide the total premium paid into the normal offer premium and the excess premium, and their focus is on the excess premium part. The main contribution of this paper is that it analyzes how the excess premium affects the market reaction on the announcement day and the long-term performance of acquiring firms.

This research paper aims to investigate detailed relationships between market selection and product positioning decisions and their associated short- and long-term product performance outcomes in the context of the music category: a cultural goods industry with high amounts of product introductions. Market selection decisions are defined by the size, competitiveness and age of market subcategories within an overall product category. Positioning decisions include where a product’s attributes are located spatially in the category (periphery versus the market center), whether a product resides within a single subcategory or spans multiple ones and what brand strategy (single versus co-branding) is used.

Data are from multiple sources for the US music industry (aka product category) from 1958 to 2019 to empirically test the hypotheses: genres (rock, blues, etc.) correspond to subcategories; artists to brands; and songs to products. Regression analyses are used.

A complex set of nuanced results are generated and reported, finding that key marketing decisions drive short-term new product success differently and frequently in opposing ways than long-term success. Launching into very new, well-established or very competitive markets leads to the strongest long-term success, despite less attractive short-run prospects. Positioning a product away from the market center and spanning subcategories similarly poses short-run challenges, but long-run returns. Brand collaborations have reverse effects. Short-run product success is found, overall, to be difficult to predict even with strong data inputs, which has substantial implications for how firms should manage portfolios of products in cultural goods industries. Long-run product success is considerably more predictable after short-run success is observed and accounted for.

While managers and firms in cultural goods industries have long relied on intuition to manage market selection and product positioning decisions, this research tests the hypothesis that objective data inputs and empirical modeling can better predict short- and long-run success of launched products. Specific insights on which song characteristics may be associated with success are found – as are more generalizable, industry-level results. In addition, by distinguishing between short- and long-run success, a more complete picture on how key decisions holistically affect product performance emerges. Many market selection and product positioning decisions have differential impacts across these two frames of reference.

Factors associated with the use of long‐term plans in management compensation contracts and the choice between earnings‐based performance plans and market‐based long‐term plans are examined. Results indicate the firms using long‐term plans are large, have diffuse ownership and more long‐term growth. Furthermore, performance plans are more likely to be used when stock‐return variability is high relative to earnings variability. Firms using performance plans are also larger and have more diffuse ownership than firms with market‐based plans alone. Overall, the evidence is consistent with long‐term plans serving as incentive alignment mechanisms.

Contrary to popular belief, managing short‐term performance differs significantly from managing long‐term performance. It is not an extension of short‐term performance over a longer‐term time frame. This paper examines the steps of managing performance from the context of organisational factors. The analysis indicates a dramatic picture as the improvement of short and long‐term performance is driven by distinctly different attributes of strategy, leadership, culture and organisational capability. The difference in all cases indicates that attributes that are perceived as “internally orientated” are associated with improving short‐term performance, whereas attributes that are commonly perceived as “externally orientated” are associated with improving long‐term performance. These findings will be helpful to managers focusing on improving their firm's performance in the short or long term and enable them to focus on the attributes of each of the factors examined that help the achievement of the performance targets set.

Mainstream literature on long‐term performance of initial public offerings focuses on long‐term underperformance. Because underperformance is an anomalous phenomenon, many authors search for explanations based on financial market imperfections. More recently, however, the attention shifts from underperformance to long‐term performance in general. This induces the search for other than financial market imperfections in explaining under‐ or outperformance. This article presents the idea that in many companies the preparation for the IPO and the IPO itself may bring organizational change. It searches for IPO‐related organizational change in The Netherlands with interviews of Dutch corporate officers. The research shows that an IPO primarily changes financial management and financial reporting, but that other types of organizational change may also be relevant. Moreover, long‐term stock market performance was on average higher in companies where IPO‐related organizational changes were reported than in companies where the changes were not reported.

Long‐term performance contracts are awarded to top management in order to provide incentives to maximize shareholder value. We test the incentive hypothesis using 350 firms, one half of which has adopted long‐term performance plans over the period 1971–80. The analysis uses performance indicators such as earnings per share (EPS), rate of return on assets (ROA), rate of return on equity (ROE), rate of return on investment (ROI), and stock returns (ASR). In addition to using a control group of firms that did not adopt plans, the test period consists of a control period (six years prior to plan adoption) and a test period (six years following plan adoption). The results support the incentive hypothesis in that all performance indicators for the test firms improved compared to prior performance, but the performance of test firms in the period subsequent to plan adoption when compared to the control firms was not significantly different.

In competitive environments, explicitly seeking institutional changes to adopt a new technology, rather than exploiting current resources, can harm more than help organizations’ efforts to achieve their performance goals. However, institutionally embedded organizations often respond to the introduction of industry disruptive technology in counterproductive ways. This paper aims to study the paradox of embedded agency in competitive environments and explore the diffusion of new occupations associated with data analytics.

This study uses the context of the Major League Baseball where the digital platform, PITCHf/x, implemented during 2006 and 2007 seasons facilitated the professional baseball clubs to create occupations for data analytics.

This study found that long-term low performance of organizations resulted in creating occupations for a new technology and deploying professionals to them and the public media’s negative tenor mediated the relationship between the signal of institutional inefficiency and such a boundary work in a competitive environment.

This research enriches our understanding of the early disperse of a new occupation in the times of the emergence of digital platform by exploring the temporal attributes of organizational performance and the role of public media as the antecedents to embedded agency.

This study tests the relationship between financial leverage and a firm's operational and financial short term responses to poor performance, based on Jensen's (1989) argument that higher predistress leverage increases a firm's incentive to respond more quickly to poor performance. This research is conducted on a sample of 45 poorly performing New Zealand firms between 1985 and 1994. The results indicate that higher leverage increases the probability of firms taking action in the short term. In particular, the evidence suggests that the probability of asset sales is positively associated with long‐term leverage, in addition to its relationship with the firm's stock return. Increased probability of management replacement is related to higher levels of short‐term leverage and surprisingly, the probability of dividend cuts decrease with higher levels of total and short‐term leverage. Poorly performing firms with higher leverage also appear to cut asset levels and dividends more aggressively than those with lower leverage levels.