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There exist long-term fluctuations in the process of capital accumulation. The economic long wave is an essential part of research into non-mainstream western economics. After the Second World War, the capitalist world experienced the fourth long wave of expansion and then entered into a downward phase of the long wave in the 1970s. Regarding to whether a new long wave of expansion took place in the 1980s, left-wing scholars hold different viewpoints. The purpose of this paper is to focus on this issue.

First, based on the review of the long wave history, this paper discusses three kinds of long wave theories with significant influence and puts forward the theoretical framework of analyzing the long wave of capitalist economy. Next, under the guidance of this theoretical framework and in combination with the actual development and evolution of the capitalist economy, the issue of whether the fifth long wave of the capitalist economy began to emerge in the 1980s is discussed deeply.

This paper argues that, from the early 1980s to 2007, the US-dominated developed countries experienced a new long wave of expansion driven by the information technology revolution, the adjustment of the neoliberalism system and the economic globalization. However, the financial-economic crisis of 2008–2009 led to a new phase of long wave downswing.

This paper does not agree with the single-factor analysis of the intrinsic formation mechanism of economic long wave and sticks to the multi-factor analysis centering on the fluctuation of accumulation rate. It is pointed out that the evolution of the long wave of capitalist economy depends on the combined influence of technology, institutions and market. The study of the long wave of the economy will help us to correctly understand the historical stage and characteristics of the current world capitalist economy in the long-term fluctuations, so that we can make an appropriate and positive response.

This article traces the history of a continuous tradition of Marxian stage theory from the beginning of the twentieth century until the present day. The resolution of the first crisis of Marxism was found in the work of Hilferding on finance capital, Bukharin on the world economy and Lenin on imperialism as a new stage of capitalism. Hilferding's, Bukarin's and Lenin's analysis was carried into the post–World War II era through the work of Sweezy and Mandel. A second wave of Marxian stage theorizing emerged with the end of the post–World War II expansion. Mandel's long wave theory (LWT), the Social Structure of Accumulation Framework (SSAF), and the Regulation Approach (RA) analyzed the stagflationary crises as the end of a long wave of growth. This long wave was underpinned by the emergence of a postwar stage of capitalism, which was analogous to the reorganization brought about by monopoly capital at the turn of the century. These new schools were reluctant to predict the non-resolution of the current crisis, thus opening up the possibility of further stages of capitalism in the future. This elevated Lenin's theory of the highest stage to a general theory of capitalist stages. The last decade has seen a substantial convergence in the three perspectives. In general, this convergence has reaffirmed the importance of Hilferding's, Bukarin's and Lenin's (HBL's) initial contributions to the stage theoretic tradition. The article concludes with some thoughts on the necessity of stage theory for understanding of the current period of globalization.

The Australian unemployment rate has fallen to its lowest level since 1989, and looks likely to fall further, perhaps even reaching the rate of 5 per cent, widely regarded as “full employment”. However, this relatively favourable outcome has been achieved only after a cyclical expansion so long and robust that it has been widely regarded as “miraculous”. It is important, therefore, to consider whether recent reductions in unemployment will be maintained when the current expansion ends, and whether alternative policies could produce stronger and more sustainable growth in employment.

The aim is to integrate the dynamics of asset accumulation for open economies with the conflict theory of wage and price formation. This synthesis allows us to assess the results obtained in the mainstream asset market models based on an atomistic view of the economy, analyse the influence of market power in product and labour markets on aggregate economic activity, and to investigate new sources of potential instability.

Whether they support long-term growth companies, entrepreneurial firms or turnarounds, top teams need to make bold strategic investment choices in times of boom, bust or pandemic. This paper aims to discuss firm strategies, as evidenced by their investment choices, over a 21-year period during which they led firms committed to growth through times of crisis and disruption.

The starting point for this research is Fortune magazine’s 100 Fastest Growing Companies, published in 2018 and updated in 2019. The list is based on the magazine’s ranking of the world’s top three-year performers in revenues, profits and stock returns for the four quarters preceding publication. Inclusion on the list is all about growth, not starting size (the smallest and not renown). The classification of firms by industry sector follows Fortune’s nomenclature. Comparing these firms with industry peers in the same period, the authors look at Fortune’s 100 Fastest-Growing Companies of 2018 from the vantage point of their financials from 1999 to 2017, years that included the tech boom and bust, the mortgage meltdown and the Great Recession. This period also saw a relatively long expansion which was, paradoxically, punctuated by a trade war with China and recession fears that have impacted spending for growth. Only 32 of Fortune’s 2018 list made it to Fortune’s 100 Fastest Growing Companies of 2019. The authors call them the Persistent 32 and examine their investment and performance metrics from 2018 through 2020.

The Persistent 32 – companies that have survived multiple recessions, including the COVID-19 recession, and continue to grow – have lessons to teach, although there is no silver bullet or secret formula, even within the same industry. It was found that in the group of 32, the average company lifespan is 28.75 years and astute, decisive leadership matters. Companies that persist make unique, strategic resource choices. They postpone expenditures on marketing and sales, fixed assets or R&D or all three depending on their needs, rather than fit with industry. They continue to invest in future growth. Their people are not expendable: employee retention during a recession has been a familiar strategy for the top growers covered in this investigation throughout the period (1999–2020). They cut cost of goods and services produced (COGS). The Persistent 32, loathing the idea of cutting COGS in the face of earlier recessions or recessionary threats, are cutting expenses other than personnel expenditures now. Amazon, Nvidia, Stamps.com, Lam Research, Supernus Pharmaceuticals all continue to rein in costs while simultaneously reinvesting in growth. They communicate their concerns and plans to their constituents. These companies retained and grew headcount while communicating their safety program as well as work-from-home and social-distancing strategies to employees, customers, shareholders and elected officials during the COVID-19 recession of 2020. They plan for supply disruptions. All have already articulated their plans for supply disruptions or alternative sources. Both the Federal Government and semiconductor companies are looking to jump-start the development of new chip factories in the USA as concern grows about reliance on Asia as a source of critical technology. They sense, seize, transform. David Teece’s dynamic capabilities framework is still the best way to turn every black swan event into an opportunity for business based on newly immediate needs. They work remotely. Businesses that are growing despite the recession are already committed to remote work. Join them and take the high anxiety out of work for both employees and customers.

The starting point for our research was Fortune magazine’s 100 Fastest Growing Companies, published in 2018 and updated in 2019. The list is based on the magazine’s ranking of the world’s top three-year performers in revenues, profits and stock returns for the four quarters preceding publication. Only 32 of Fortune’s 2018 list made it to Fortune’s 100 Fastest Growing Companies of 2019. The authors call them the Persistent 32 and examine their investment and performance metrics from 2018 through 2020. They sought answers to three questions: First, do the fastest growing firms invest heavily in their businesses during recessions? The authors looked at the 100 fastest growing companies from 1999 to 2017 and then the Persistent 32 from 2018 to 2020. Second, what happened to the investments and performance of the Persistent 32 during the pandemic and recession that began in the first quarter of 2020? Where did they invest or curtail investment, what plans did they make around COVID-19 and what headcount decisions did they make? Third, do growth-committed firms follow different investment strategies that can be categorized based on spending patterns?

Companies that can survive and grow through the hardest of times have lessons to teach, although there is no silver bullet or secret formula, even within the same industry.

Employee retention during a recession has been a familiar strategy for the top growers covered in this investigation throughout the period (1999–2020). This strategy is not generally common among US firms. Indeed, it says something about the growth prospects of these firms and their dependence on talent and need to leverage their prior investment in recruiting and training employees.

What is important about this topic? Whatever the industry, trying times call for top teams to try harder, identify priorities, spend to achieve them, manage stakeholder expectations and protect and build their access to top talent. The authors can help with the last four: they set up a structure for analyzing firm spending and performance metrics, based on Gulati and others writing for business practitioners; they comb the evidence for spending and performance shifts in good times and bad from 1999 to 2020; they categorize firm strategies by spending patterns versus industry; they examine the findings for insights; and finally, the authors identify key actions that set still growing firms apart.

The discussion in this paper addresses issues that should become part of the current politically popular debate about reindustrializing America. Why is there a perceived need to reindustrialize? Why are innovation and productivity‐faltering? I believe it is because old technologies are now being pushed beyond their level of maximum contribution, and because the radically new technologies of the future have not yet found their proper places in the fabric of society.

Outlines previous research on capacity planning and considers how the underlying ideas can be applied to higher education institutions (HEIs). Illustrates the components of operational and capacity plans for an HEI, pointing out the differences from and similarities to the manufacturing and service sectors; and discusses various components of the capacity plan (e.g. classroom utilization, enrolment, scheduling etc.) in more detail. Believes that this approach to resources would improve on the present US system where external pressures (e.g. politicians, donors etc.) rather than need may determine expansion, but recognizes the practical barriers to this and calls for further research.

This paper studies one of the most paradoxical facts of the Spanish economic growth during the period 1982–2007: high growth of investment and aggregate demand accompanied by the stagnation of labor productivity, especially from 1994.

The authors propose two hypotheses: first, that the productive structure neutralized the mechanisms that link investment with productivity, essentially due to the low capital efficiency of the job-creating sectors (JCs); and consequently, investment drove production almost exclusively through employment, generating a trade-off between employment and productivity.

The econometric results find evidence in favor of both hypotheses applying a time-series methodology (ARIMA) to EU KLEMS data for a period of 25 years and 25 industries of the Spanish economy.

The first contribution of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the phenomenon from a perspective that combines elements of productive supply and aggregate demand, representing a novel contribution to the specialized literature. In addition, the authors show how the Kaldor-Verdoorn law could be neutralized due to employment creation (Okun's law) and the presence of a productivity-employment trade-off.

The aim of the paper is to discuss developments in non-residential real estate in Greece.

Given the lack of existing literature, the authors start by discussing at length the data sources available, and analyzing the stylized facts of non-residential real estate activity in Greece. Finally, the authors examine the degree of covariation (using the index of concordance methodology) between non-residential real estate and the business cycle.

The results indicate that the structure of non-residential sector is highly fragmented into various sub-categories and at the initial stages of its developments, it was strongly affected by the preparations for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. Finally, despite its small share of total GDP, non-residential real estate exhibits a significant degree of covariation with the business cycle.

The extracted information may be a useful resource for those interested in the developments in non-residential real estate in Greece and the covariation of key variables with the business cycle.

The paper constitutes a systematic research approach for the role of non-residential real estate in the Greek economic activity.