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The paper uses 101 years of Chilean and international financial assets returns to investigate mean-variance optimal portfolio allocations. The key conclusion is that the share of international unhedged investments is substantial even in minimum risk portfolios (20%), unless the period 1980–2002 is assumed to be drawn from a different distribution and previous history is disregarded. In addition to that, the paper finds that mean-variance optimal investors would have generated substantial demand for an asset replicating the return profile of an efficient pay-as-you-go pension scheme. Labour income and departures from log-normality of returns might, however, affect the latter conclusion.

We examine the effect of firm ownership status on three environmentally relevant variables: energy efficiency, toxic emissions, and spending on pollution abatement. Prior research has demonstrated that public firms invest less than private firms and suggests this difference is due pressure from investors to strongly favor short over long-term earnings. We extend this logic to other firm behavior, examining whether publicly owned facilities invest in energy efficiency and pollution reduction differently than privately owned facilities. Using data from the US Census of Manufactures from 1980 to 2009, information on pollution from the Environmental Protection Agency Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and pollution abatement spending from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey, we find that facilities switching to public ownership are less energy efficient and spend less on pollution abatement than their privately owned counterparts. However, we also find that facilities switching to public ownership have lower toxic emissions than other facilities. We also examine how different sources of external pressures alter these results and find that increased regulatory scrutiny is correlated with increased energy efficiency, toxic emissions, and abatement spending. More concentrated institutional ownership in public firms is associated with lower energy efficiency as is a greater brand focus. These latter results are broadly consistent with the idea that publicly owned firms respond to pressures from investors with a reduced focus on environmentally relevant variables. However, since facilities switching to public ownership have lower toxic emissions, this suggests that there are two competing pressures in publicly owned facilities: cost pressures, consistent with lowered energy efficiency, and public perceptions, consistent with lower toxic emissions, particularly since TRI data became available. In this sense, the combination of ownership and transparency of information appears to influence how firms prioritize different stakeholders.

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.

This chapter aims to determine whether diversification benefits accrue from adding emerging market hedge funds (EMHFs) to an emerging market bond/equity portfolio, and subsequently whether the type of exposure hedge funds provide is justified by their fees. We use multivariate cointegration analysis to show that the advantages of adding hedge funds to balanced portfolios are limited for the three regions of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, as well as for the entire global emerging market universe. In summary, we find that emerging market hedge funds are generally redundant for diversifying long-only emerging market investment portfolios with long-term investment horizons. This result also holds when we extend our sample by the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 and allow for structural breaks according to the Gregory-Hansen (1996) test. Hence, even during the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, when risk diversification was most needed, long-term comovements between hedge funds and traditional assets is, with the exception of the Eastern European region, not disrupted. Because EMHF returns are heavily influenced by the emerging market equity and bond markets, we conclude that the “alpha fees” charged by EMHFs may not always be appropriate for the three main regions under consideration. This also holds, however, to a lesser extent, for a global diversification among hedge funds and traditional assets in emerging markets.

Mergers and acquisitions strategies are not risk-free, potential problems in achieving success include integration difficulties, inadequate evaluation of target, inability to achieve synergy, and complexity. Such strategies can fail for many reasons including inadequate evaluation of targets or inadequate pre-decision control mechanisms. Mergers and acquisitions are reviewed in this chapter as strategic investment decision-making perspective. Established financial analyses remain important in appraising investment choices, despite their limiting assumptions and their recognised shortcomings in capturing strategic project dimensions. However, managers balance these economic analyses with less-structured, strategic analyses underpinned by informed judgement. The fact that empirical studies reveal a continued reliance on judgement by investment decision-makers does not mean that rational economic analysis is a futile exercise. What studies of practice do seem to suggest is that the theory and practice of strategic investment decision-making need to take into account both economically rational and intuitive decision processes. Reflecting on the research evidence, we conclude that strategic investment appraisal will be best supported by approaches that (i) couple sound economic analysis with the development of managerial judgement and (ii) take account of the broader decision-making context within which both economic and strategic analyses are used.

The 2008–2009 financial crisis has renewed concerns about managerial short-termism and its negative effects. Based on intertemporal choice theory, this chapter aims to identify the role that performance measurement and compensation systems can play in orienting managers toward building long-term performance potential in addition to achieving short-term results.

The findings suggest that certain types of measures used – in particular broader, more inclusive financial indicators, risk-adjusted measures, and key nonfinancial value drivers – as well as the timing of measurement and payment of rewards can lead to reduced time discounting and a lower devaluation of the future, and consequently to a prioritized managerial attention focus on long-term company goals.

This chapter contributes to a better understanding of the institutional determinants of managerial long-term orientation and the influence of organizational systems on goal prioritization in managerial intertemporal choice processes.

The findings have practical relevance for the design of incentive systems that aim to place an emphasis on ensuring long-term value creation.

Systems that guide managerial behavior toward the long term can help to increase economic and societal sustainability.

Despite the emergence of more integrated performance measurement approaches, time horizon has not been in the main focus of research in the field yet. This review provides a first structured overview of the temporal effects of different elements of performance measurement and compensation systems.