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This paper traces how in Britain and Germany, for-profit and non-profit businesses coevolved with political-economic institutions. Starting in the late eighteenth century, Britain embraced the logic of liberal capitalism, although the path was not smooth. Over the same period, German states balanced both liberal and social-welfare ideals. Social-welfare ideals did not gain support in Britain until the start the twentieth century. The market logic embodied by for-profit businesses was more congruent with liberal capitalism than with social-welfare capitalism, so business corporations thrived more in Britain than in Germany. Yet in both countries, the growing number and power of for-profit businesses created problems for farmers, workers, and small producers. They sought to solve their problems by launching non-profit businesses – co-operatives, mutual-aid societies, and credit co-operatives – combining the ideals of community, enterprise, and self-help. British non-profits gained support from authorities by emphasizing their self-help and enterprise ideals, which were congruent with liberal capitalism, over the community idea, which was not. In contrast, German non-profits gained support by emphasizing all three ideals, as two were congruent with liberal capitalism and all three with social-welfare capitalism. Our analysis reveals how the success of different forms of business, embodying different institutional logics, depends on prevailing political-economic logics. It also shows how the existence and technical success of various organizational forms shapes elites’ perceptions and through them, societal-level logics of capitalism.

While scholars have developed increasingly well-developed accounts of institutional change, little attention has been paid to how change is resisted and, in particular, how efforts to marketize fail. We draw on the institutional logics perspective to guide analysis of an empirical case of the failed attempt by the Dutch state to marketize childcare organizations and create a market for childcare. We document that even though the existence of logics that were antithetical to the market logic did not catalyze organized collective resistance to marketization, the market logic never took root, and marketization has even been rolled back. We argue that the failure to create a childcare market in the Netherlands was caused by individual-level cognitive dissonance that cumulated into profound field-level ambivalence that undermined efforts to implement market practices. We develop several propositions that could usefully guide future research on how cognitive dissonance might underlie the failure to construct markets. By theorizing failure to change a field, we contribute to the limited body of work that has looked at failed attempts to change institutions, arguing for more attention to individual-field cross-level dynamics.

Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) increasingly view social entrepreneurship as means to expand their mission scope while simultaneously diversifying revenue streams and strengthening financial foundations. However, the pursuit of social entrepreneurial ventures often incites a tug-of-war phenomenon between the deep-rooted social welfare logic of the parent NPO and a newly evolving commercial logic at the subsidiary social enterprise (SSE). The present study seeks to understand how NPOs navigate such logic conflicts as they strive to become more entrepreneurial. Based upon case studies of two NPOs, we found divergence in organizational identity, legitimacy, and mission/vision between parent nonprofits and their SSEs as they struggled with a defining question: Are we a program or are we a business? Our research indicates that organizations reconcile such cognitive dissonance through four distinct processes: connecting, variegating, separating, and augmenting social welfare and commercial logic spheres. We, thus, contribute to the social entrepreneurship and nonprofit management literatures by illustrating ways in which noncommercial organizations may address issues of logic divergence when engaging in revenue-generating commercial activities.

Scholars increasingly recognize the centrality of legal ideas and language to the political vision that inspires American conservatism. However, relevant studies have been limited to the discursive practices that motivate conservative activism at the grass-root level. Exploration of the legal discourses employed by prominent public officials thus carries significant scholarly potential. For example, this chapter's investigation of President Ronald Reagan reveals that his political vision was suffused with legal discourse. Reagan's legal discourse, moreover, has exerted constitutive effects both on American conservatism and on the form and substance of a great deal of contemporary American public policy.

A growing body of work suggests that welfare and punishment should be understood as alternative, yet interconnected ways of governing poor and marginalized populations. While there is considerable evidence of a punitive turn in welfare and penal institutions over the past half century, recent studies show that welfare and carceral institutions increasingly comanage millions of people caught at the intersection of the welfare and penal sectors. The growth of “mass supervision” and the expansion of the social services sector help explain the blurring of welfare and punishment in the United States in daily practice. We suggest that these developments complicate the idea of an institutional trade-off and contend that welfare and punishment are best understood along a continuum of state management in which poor and socially marginalized populations are subjected to varying degrees of support, surveillance, and sanction. In presenting the punishment–welfare continuum, we pay particular attention to the “murky middle” between the two spheres: an interinstitutional space that has emerged in the context of mass supervision and a social services–centric safety net. We show that people caught in the “murky middle” receive some social supports and services, but also face pervasive surveillance and control and must adapt to the tangle of obligations and requirements in ways that both extend punishment and limit their ability to successfully participate in mainstream institutions.

We bring together the institutional theory literature on institutional logics and the information systems (IS) literature that conceptualizes a relational view of affordances to explore the digital changes unfolding in the delivery of professional services. Through a qualitative inductive study of the development of an app led by a clinician manager in an Australian hospital, we investigate how multiple institutional logics shape the design of affordances when an organization develops new digital technologies for frontline professional work. Our findings show how a billing function was designed into the app by the development team over four episodes to afford potential physician users with billing usability, billing acceptability, billing authority and billing discretion. These affordances emerged as different elements of professional, state, managerial and market logics became activated, interpreted, evaluated, negotiated and designed into the digital technology through the team’s interactions with the clinician manager, a hybrid professional, during the app development process. Our findings contribute new insight to the affordance-based logics perspective by deepening understanding of the process through which multiple institutional logics play out in the design of affordances of digital technology. We also highlight the role of hybrid professionals in this digital transformation of frontline professional work.

This chapter proposes a novel nonnormative approach to evaluating quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of food security.

On the demand side, we consider the quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of the food security system, whose mechanisms should be evaluated by their impact on the quality of life of an endangered population. On the supply side, the motives of food aid donors and food security providers (directly and via policy mechanisms) are discussed in the context of the deservingness heuristic.

The model illustrates three problems with measuring food security-related quality of life: peoples’ different expectations, the different points at which people stand on their food security trajectory, and the potential for an evolving reference value of peoples’ expectations. The deservingness heuristic is the mechanism behind the domestic and international food security aid that occurs via evolutionary forces, or cultural, institutional, and ideological forces.

Food security is a problem that requires a humanistic approach rooted in the evolutionary process/development of the human race. Food security can be misused by the food aid/welfare recipients for their own purposes. Likewise, food security programs by food aid/welfare donors can be targeted unethically when used to achieve the ideological, institutional, and political goals of the donors. Differentiating between the behavioral causes of providing food security may be helpful in predicting whether aid/welfare will be provided to the needy at all.

Purpose – Although many have expressed concern over whether generous welfare policies discourage the employment of single mothers, scholars have rarely exploited cross-national variation in the generosity of social policies to assess this question. This is the case even though much previous scholarship has examined the effects of social policy on women's and mothers' labor force engagement. This chapter evaluates whether generous social policies have a disincentive effect on single-mother employment.

Methodology/approach – Using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), we conduct a cross-national, multilevel analysis of the effects of social policy generosity on single-mother employment in 17 affluent democracies.

Findings – We find high rates of single-mother employment – above 60 percent in 15 of the 17 countries and above 70 percent in 5 countries. We find little effect of social policy for employment, as our two measures of social policy are insignificant in almost all models. If there are welfare disincentives, they only appear significant for young single mothers, and this evidence is limited as well. We find contradictory evidence for the employment incentive for low-educated single mothers.

We determine that single-mother employment is largely driven by the same individual characteristics – educational attainment, age, and household composition – that drive employment in the general population, and among women and mothers.

Originality/value of chapter – To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few cross-national, multilevel tests of the welfare disincentive thesis for single-mother employment. We provide evidence that welfare generosity does not discourage single-mother employment.

This chapter presents the principal interpretations that took place in Denmark and Sweden regarding the discourse on ‘Diversity Management’. We organise our presentation around three major themes that are central to the local Scandinavian context: gender equality, migration and moral grounds. This chapter shows the important role of gender equality work practices and how these practices now tend to be progressively incorporated in a broad Diversity Management construct, possibly leading to a less radical stance. Moreover, the comparison between Denmark and Sweden reveals the political associations with Diversity Management and migration in Denmark, but not in Sweden. Our third contribution unveils the tensions between the value of equality, which remains strong in the Scandinavian welfare state model, and the actual practices of Diversity Management.

The analysis presented here is based upon interviews conducted with 34 women in Maryland in 1997, one year after the passage of the PRA of 1996, or welfare reform. To locate participants, I distributed fliers to educational and community centers asking for single women raising children and receiving aid who would be willing to share their experiences with welfare. I offered to compensate participants $15 for their time in participating in the interviews. After several initial interviewees were chosen from these sites, other respondents were located using an informal snowball sample.