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The purpose of this paper is to study likelihood ratio order for mixture and its components via their Glaser’s functions for weighted distributions. So, some theoretical examples using exponential family and their mixtures are presented.

First, Glaser’s functions of mixture and its components for weighted distributions in different scenarios are computed. Then by them the likelihood ratio order is investigated between mixture and its components.

The authors find conditions for weight functions under which the mixture random variable is between of its components in likelihood ratio order.

Results are obtained for weight function in general. It is well known that the some special weights are order statistics, up and down records, hazard rate, reversed hazard rate, moment generating function, etc. So, the results are valid for all of them.

This paper aims to consider the effects of a merger on technology adoption and welfare in the presence of passive cross ownership. Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare. The results are important for antitrust policies and suggest that the antitrust authorities may not need to be too concerned about mergers in industries with cross ownership.

Game-theoretic analysis.

Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is original.

In this paper, the author introduces a degenerate exponential integral function and further studies some of its analytical properties. The new function is a generalization of the classical exponential integral function and the properties established are analogous to those satisfied by the classical function.

The methods adopted in establishing the results are theoretical in nature.

A degenerate exponential integral function which is a generalization of the classical exponential integral function has been introduced and its properties investigated. Upon taking some limits, the established results reduce to results involving the classical exponential integral function.

The results obtained in this paper are new and have the potential of inspiring further research on the subject.

In this paper we look at patents as alternative to trade secrets. We disentangle the disclosure motive for patent protection from the traditional reward motive by adjusting the level of patent protection so as to make the innovator just indifferent between patenting and keeping the innovation secret. Thus, we keep the reward (expected profits) to the innovator fixed and focus on ex post efficiency. When duplication is not feasible and secrecy only entails the risk of public disclosure (a leakage), patents and secrets are perfect substitutes. Yet, a distinctive features of trade secret protection is that it allows for independent creation. The duplicative efforts to reproduce a concealed innovation make patents and secrets imperfect substitutes. If such duplicative efforts are actually exerted under secrecy, patents provide the pre-specified incentive to innovate at least social cost. If, however, the threat of duplication induces the innovator to preemptively license her trade secret, and such licensing agreements allow the innovator to appropriate all the saved duplication costs, then secrets can reward innovative activity more efficiently than patents. Thus, the issue of whether patents are socially preferable to secrets boils down to an assessment of the prevalence and the efficiency of trade secret licensing. The available empirical evidence suggests that licensing of trade secret information is limited and so hints at the superiority of patents.

The purpose of this paper is to present the optimal double sampling attribute plan using the weighted Poisson distribution.

For the given AQL and LQL, sum of producer’s and consumer’s risks have been attained. Based on the weighted Poisson distribution, the sum of these risks has been optimized.

In the final inspection, the producer and the consumer represent the same party. So, the sum these two risks should be minimized. In this paper, the sum of risks has been tabulated using the weighted Poisson distribution for different operating ratios. These tabulated values are comparatively less than the sum of risks derived using Poisson distribution.

The sampling plan presented in this paper is particularly useful for testing the quality of finished products in shop floor situations.

This paper aims to explore the design of management teams when the critical task facing individual managers is monitoring the performance of worker teams and producing performance measures under uncertain information environments.

The authors use a multi-agent LEN framework – linear contract, exponential utility and normal density – to model the incentive provision and organizational design.

The main lesson is that the use of performance measures under uncertainty is greatly affected by the potential for free-riding in the very monitoring activities which generate the measures to begin with. Accordingly, the value of having a management team, that is the incremental benefit of having a second manager, depends on the monitoring technology. Of particular importance are the potential free-riding in monitoring effort among multiple managers and synergies gained from having more than one manager, such as correlation among the performance measures produced or improvement due to splitting workers pool into separate groups for each manager to monitor separately.

The paper pushes this line of research further by explicitly modeling the endogenous process of signal generation within a rich economic environment. In this environment, number of workers being evaluated and number of managers who produce the signals are both endogenous. Furthermore, both workers and managers are subject to moral hazard problem. In particular, the managers suffer from potential free-riding problems but may benefit from synergistic forces due to team monitoring.