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In the mid-2000s, the operator of New York City’s mass transit network committed more than a half-billion dollars to military contractor Lockheed Martin for a security technology capable, in part, of inferring threats based on analysis of data streams, of developing response strategies, and taking automated action toward alerts and calamities in light of evolving circumstances. The project was a failure. This chapter explores the conceptualization and development of this technology – rooted in cybernetics – and compares its conceptual underpinnings with some situated problems of awareness, communication, coordination, and action in emergencies as they unfold in one of the busiest transport systems in the world, the New York subway. The author shows how the technology, with all the theatrical trappings of a “legitimate” security solution, was apparently conceived without a grounded understanding of actual use-cases, and the degree to which the complex interactions which give rise to subway emergency can be anticipated in – and therefore managed through – a technological system. As a case-study, the chapter illustrates the pitfalls of deploying technology against problems which are not well-defined in the first place, to the neglect of investments against much more fundamental problems – such as inadequate communication systems, and unstable relationships with emergency response agencies – which might offer guaranteed benefits, and indeed lay a firm groundwork for future deployment of more ambitious technology.

This study aims to examine a large, non-disclosed production contract awarded to Lockheed Corp. in the context of a trade-off between a contractually required non-disclosure clause and the need (as a publicly traded firm) to disclose material information to its shareholders. This production contract generated significant cash flows to the firm as evidenced by growth in its earnings. However, the existence of the production contract and its contribution to Lockheed’s earnings, was not disclosed by the firm to shareholders and potential investors while the production contract was being executed.

The authors examine the market reaction to several key contract events which were not disclosed at the time they occurred, in compliance with the contractually required non-disclosure clause.

A statistically significant stock price reaction around the time of the award of this non-public contract, indicative of trading by some capital market participants using non-public information was documented.

Because similar large non-public contracts funded by the government are common in the industrial economy, we conclude by discussing implications for organizational structure, firm’s cost of capital, equity-based compensation and market efficiency.

In a typical strategy course, growth strategies like mergers and acquisitions (corporate strategy) are introduced in the second half of the course. To analyze the case, students will use strategies such as Porter’s five forces and resource-based view and will discuss why firms pursue mergers as a growth strategy, along with sources of synergies and risks in mergers. Finance theory used includes analyzing a given discounted cash flow analysis and perform a comparable multiples analysis to find the value of a merger target.

The industry and financial information in the case comes from publicly available sources, including company 10K reports, business press reports and publicly available industry reports. The information about Lockheed Martin’s strategy comes from interviews with Peter Clyne, former vice president for Lockheed Martin’s IS&GS division. He then held the same position for Leidos Holding Corp., after the IS&GS division was divested and incorporated into Leidos.

This case is an interdisciplinary case containing aspects of strategy and finance. Lockheed Martin made a strategic move in 2016, to divest its Information Systems & Global Strategies Division (IS&GS), which engaged in government consulting, primarily in the defense and aerospace industries. Lockheed wanted to reassess its decision to divest consulting, given the high growth rates expected in this business, particularly in cybersecurity consulting. On the other hand, if Lockheed decided to maintain its hardware focus, it wanted to expand its offerings. In addition to a strategy analysis, two possible target firms can be analyzed: Fortinet and Maxar.

This case raises a broad set of issues related to the evaluation of M&A transactions across two different industries and corporate strategy, as it relates to strategic fit of the potential targets and LM’s current capabilities. It is appropriate for the core course in strategy at the MBA or senior undergraduate level. It can also be assigned to specialized courses in Mergers and Acquisitions. It is not appropriate for a lower level strategy or finance course, as it requires students to have prior knowledge of basic finance valuation techniques.

Performance measurements or metrics are that which measure a company's performance and behavior, and are used to help an organization achieve and maintain success. Without the use of performance metrics, it is difficult to know whether or not the firm is meeting requirements or making desired improvements. During the course of this study with Lockheed Martin, the research team was tasked with determining the effectiveness of the site's existing performance metrics that are used to help an organization achieve and maintain success. Without the use of performance metrics, it is difficult to know whether or not the firm is meeting requirements or making desired improvements. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Research indicates that there are five key elements that influence the success of a performance metric. A standardized method of determining whether or not a metric has the right mix of these elements was created in the form of a metrics scorecard.

The scorecard survey was successful in revealing good metric use, as well as problematic metrics. In the quality department, the Document Rejects metric has been reworked and is no longer within the executive's metric deck. It was also recommended to add root cause analysis, and to quantify and track the cost of non-conformance and the overall cost of quality. In total, the number of site wide metrics has decreased from 75 to 50 metrics. The 50 remaining metrics are undergoing a continuous improvement process in conjunction with the use of the metric scorecard tool developed in this research.

The metrics scorecard should be used site-wide for an assessment of all metrics. The focus of this paper is on the metrics within the quality department.

Putting a quick and efficient metrics assessment technique in place was critical. With the leadership and participation of Lockheed Martin, this goal was accomplished.

This paper presents the process of metrics evaluation and the issues that were encountered during the process, including insights that would not have been easily documented without this mechanism. Lockheed Martin Company has used results from this research. Other industries could also apply the methods proposed here.

The Lockheed scandal was exposed during the 4 February 1976 hearings of the Sub-Committee on Multinational Corporations of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. These hearings revealed that Lockheed Aircraft Corporation paid illegal payments in several countries including Japan to promote the sale of its planes to prevent bankruptcy. The Securities Exchange Commission obtained documents showing that Lockheed paid more than US$10 million to Yoshio Kodama, a “fixer” and Lockheed's secret representative, and the Marubeni Corporation, which was Lockheed's agent in Japan since 1959. During the same hearings on 6 February, A. Carl Kotchian, vice president of Lockheed, informed the committee that a senior Japanese government official received US$2 million from Marubeni and that his company relied on Kenji Osano, a close associate of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, as an intermediary in its efforts to sell 21 Lockheed's L-1001 Tristar airbuses to All Nippon Airways (ANA) (Macdougall, 1988, pp. 193–195).

Emphasizes the importance now placed on maintainability of military aircraft by the US Department of Defense. Describes how Lockheed Martin have used Delmia simulation software to simplify and speed up routine maintenance tasks for the next‐generation joint strike fighter (JSF). Ergonomics and the use of realistic human models have played a key role in determining maintenance procedures.

Development of the Lockheed supersonic transport has followed the basic philosophy that an advance in air travel in terms of speed and economics should be accompanied by similar advances in aeroplane safety and flying qualities. To achieve these objectives, Lockheed's SST design work has been concentrated for many years on the development of a fixed‐wing design. The present configuration—called a double delta—provides a simple high lift system with low wing loading, excellent low speed stability and control, and large favourable ground effects in landing, with inherent advances in operational simplicity and safety.

Lockheed‐Georgia's composite rudder for the Gulfstream III executive jet has completed a highly‐successful flight test programme, and Lockheed says it expects early U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification of the new rudder.

This paper aims to describe knowledge productivity coaches and the approach Lockheed Martin has taken to ensure that its employees have the knowledge and skills needed to utilize its information system modeled after Web 2.0 and Enterprise 2.0 concepts and technologies. This information system is branded Unity.

To train the employee population (∼140,000 employees) in using Unity, a small team of knowledge productivity coaches was formed, who in turn mentor and coach more than 100 Unity ambassadors. These ambassadors are responsible for helping employees to understand the Unity platform and to utilize its related tools. A multitude of learning options are offered including Collaboration Playbooks, unMeetings (informal lunch‐n‐learn sessions on a specific Unity topic), videos, quick, short jump‐start guides, one‐on‐one coaching sessions, and personal assistance in setting‐up key team and personal spaces within the Unity environment. While the system is in many ways intuitive, these ambassadors provide the “human” link to learning.

The adoption rate of Unity has increased exponentially. Unity spaces increased 51 percent during the rollout in the third quarter of 2009. Much of this growth can be attributed to knowledge productivity coaches and ambassadors providing the support employees need to utilize Unity to increase their performance and productivity.

This strategy of using knowledge productivity coaches and ambassadors can be repeated for any large system implementation in the future. The methods and processes can also be leveraged to save time and money for every new program utilizing the strategy. This paper details the strategy and processes for reuse.

In 1993, Lockheed Fort Worth—the manufacturing facility that produces the military's elite F‐16 fighter jet—was experiencing more workers' compensation claims than at any other time in its history.