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What are the mechanisms through which Chinese municipal leaders overcome implementation breakdown? This study, through process tracing, archival work and semi-structured interviews, examines the implementation of three sub-municipal-level railway projects involving the same principals and agents over the same period of time.

The analysis was guided by the hypothesis that political coordination and the exercise of political and Party leadership played an indispensable role in the two cases of successful policy implementation, and its absence accounts for the case of implementation breakdown.

The principal finding is that an informal “strategic group” was created to “herd” cadres to overcome the problem of implementation. Herding here refers to the idea that Party leadership, through the use of moral persuasion, encourages cadres moving towards a desired common goal and direction.

This study is limited in the number of secondary resources (government documents and government and media releases) available to the field interviewees, which the author heavily relied on to complete the study.

Building on the conceptual work of “strategic groups” by Thomas Heberer, Anna Ahlers, and Gunter Schubert, this study makes an empirical contribution by tracing the process through which an informal strategic group exercises its power to overcome implementation breakdown.

Despite most studies on political ties focusing on the interpersonal relationships between firms and government officials, this study suggests that local party committees (LPCs) create special forms of political ties in China – i.e. organizational political ties. The purpose of this paper is to examine the influences that these organizational political ties have on Chinese firms’ innovative activities.

Drawing upon data based on a nationwide survey of Chinese firms in 2013, this study uses a structural equations model to examine the relationship between LPCs and firms’ innovations.

This study found that LPCs do affect firms’ innovations positively, including both radical innovations and incremental innovations.

By suggesting that LPCs are a form of political tie particular to China – i.e. an organizational political tie – this study’s findings may shed fresh light on the research into political ties in other emerging economies.

Compared to traditional political ties, maintaining the organizational political ties fostered by LPCs benefits firms’ innovations significantly in China, making them less costly and more stable.

This paper proposes that if a political system is more like to facilitate a unified government, to establish a strong executive body and to respond to the needs of the majority, financial reforms are more likely to emerge from the policymaking process and produce positive results. On the contrary, political systems that discourage those governing features are less likely to produce reforms. This chapter compares financial reform processes in China, Taiwan and New Zealand. All of them performed low level of financial reforms in the early 1980s but resulted in different situations later. In the mid-2000s, New Zealand heralded the most efficient and stable financial system; while Taiwan lagged behind and China performed the worst. Evidence showed that China’s authoritarian system may be the most superior in forming a unified government with a strong executive, but the policy priority often responds more to the interests of a small group of power elites; therefore the result of financial reform can be limited. Taiwan’s presidential system can produce greater financial reform when the ruling party controls both executive and legislative bodies, but legislative obstructions may occur under a divided government. New Zealand's Westminster system produces the most effective and efficient financial reform due to its unified government and a strong executive branch with consistent and stable supports from the New Zealand Parliament.

Despite an intensified anti-corruption campaign, China's economic growth and social transition continue to breed loopholes and opportunities for big corruption, leading to a money-oriented mentality and the collapse of ethical standards, and exposing the communist regime to greater risk of losing moral credibility and political trust. In Hong Kong, the setting up of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974 marked the advent of a new comprehensive strategy to eradicate corruption and to rebuild trust in government. The ICAC was not just an anti-corruption enforcement agency per se, but an institution spearheading and representing integrity and governance transformation. This chapter considers how mainland China can learn from Hong Kong's experience and use the fight against corruption as a major political strategy to win the hearts and minds of the population and reform governance in the absence of more fundamental constitutional reforms, in a situation similar to Hong Kong's colonial administration of the 1970s–1980s deploying administrative means to minimize a political crisis.

Due to environmental externalities, micro-enterprises with profit-seeking features do not develop sufficient motivation for environmental governance. In a fiscally decentralized system, local environmental protection authorities perform environmental supervision, and the intensity of the regulations that they implement has an important influence on corporate environmental governance. Based on the promotion tournament framework, this paper aims to discuss the driving mechanism of corporate environmental governance using turnover of environmental protection department directors (EPDDs) as an indicator.

Using samples of A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2007 to 2014, this paper examines the impact of EPDD turnover on corporate environmental governance and its underlying mechanism.

The results show that corporate environmental governance exhibits a political periodicity that changes with the turnover of the EPDD, and the periodicity remains after controlling for the influence of changes in provincial party secretary and governor. Internal mechanisms analysis indicates that, without financial independence, local environmental protection departments rely on increasing sewage charges, not environmental protection subsidies, to promote corporate environmental governance. Further, considering heterogeneity among officials, it finds that the younger a new EPDD is, the more pronounced the periodicity of corporate environmental governance. However, there is no significant difference between in-system and out-system turnover.

In general, this paper describes the mechanisms of corporate environmental governance from the perspective of political economics, and the results have implications for the potential improvement of the government’s environmental supervision functions and the development of ecological civilization in China.

This study explores labor relations management behaviors of administrators and Party organizations in resource-based state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China based on social exchange theory and embeddedness theory. It builds up a process model for managing collective labor conflicts in resource-based SOEs in the Chinese context.

A comparative case study is conducted using two resource-based SOEs with similar backgrounds but differing in effectiveness of the management of collective labor conflicts. Data are collected from interviews, archival sources and a one-month participatory investigation.

The administrators and Party organizations of resource-based SOEs manage collective labor conflicts by means of human resource practices (HRPs) and Party organizations' boundary-spanning behaviors (PBSBs), respectively; foremen and unions perform a mediation role, especially under circumstances where administrators employ high-performance HRPs and PBSBs are closely integrated with the production process. The marketization of the “new danwei system” exerts a “provocation effect” but does not necessarily lead to collective labor conflicts. The root cause of conflicts lies in the inherent defects of specific HRPs and PBSBs, as well as the absence of the Simmelian tie in the social exchange interaction of actors.

First, this study develops a new construct of PBSBs for enterprises' Party organizations and explores its underlying mechanisms, which enriches the range of actors studied in the context of Chinese labor relations; Second, the authors develop a new dimension called “exemplification” building on the existing three-dimensional structure of boundary-spanning behaviors, which expands boundary-spanning theory. Third, the findings that Simmelian tie structure could better maintain the stability of labor relationship in the mediation process of labor-capital conflict management enrich the social exchange theory from the perspective of structure. Finally, this study deepens the existing research on HRPs by proposing a new explanation for disputes.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the deleveraging impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on private firms with political connections, relative to those without political connections.

In this paper, taking the anti-corruption campaign employed from the end of 2012 as an exogenous shock, the authors design a quasi-experiment difference-in-difference approach to examine how the loss and failure of political connections impacts private firms’ debt financing.

The authors find that the loss and failure of political connections following the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress causes the yearly new debt ratios of treatment firms with political connections to decrease, relative to those of control firms without political connections. This outcome is more pronounced for provinces with more cadres excluded in the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress, which rendered politically connected firms susceptible to lose connections with central or provincial cadres. To explore the mechanism, the authors find that following the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress, politically connected firms limit rent-seeking activities, whereas resource acquisition is weakened. The authors also find that the impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress on the debt financing of politically connected firms, relative to their counterparts, is more pronounced for groups with high levels of information asymmetry and for less explicit guarantee groups. Finally, politically connected firms are more likely to be dominated by internal funds in dealing with a loss of advantages in debt financing, compared with their counterparts without political connections.

The findings in this study suggest that the loss or failure of previous political connections following Xi’s anti-corruption campaign make politically connected firms lose the advantages in debt financing through the rent-seeking, resource acquisition, information asymmetry, implicit guarantee channels, which provide new evidence for research on the impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress on private firms’ financing behaviors via the loss or failure of existing political connections.

The findings in the study will have some inspiration for policy makers and entrepreneur.

This study provides new evidence on the different impacts of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on private firm’s debt financing between politically connected and unconnected firms.

China′s market‐oriented reforms have brought about fundamental changes not just to its economy, but also to urban governance. The reforms have significantly changed urban development from its previous pattern which was largely determined by decision makers within the central government. Reform measures have transformed the role, functions and processes of urban government and have made them a force to be reckoned with in the whole reform endeavour. Examines and analyses issues of administrative reform at the urban government level in ten years of economic reform since 1979. Looks at three aspects of the problem – the trend towards financial decentralization; institutional changes in local administration; and changes in the relationship between urban government and the local economy. Argues that there is an unfinished agenda of administrative reform that needs to be faced by the authorities concerned if the mighty endeavour of economic reform is to succeed.

The chapter uses a comparative case study design to address the mutations and trajectories of transparency in two organizations. We chose organizations that are similar in that they favor extensive forms of self-disclosure, but also different in terms of which sector they inhabit, audiences, and organization type: the Pirate Party of Germany and the lobby organization Epsilon. The findings, in close dialog with different threads in the transparency literature, unveil three crucial dimensions in which transparency regimes are likely to trigger unintended consequences: first, organizations have to cope with the tension between the disclosure of internal information on the one hand, and the need to appear consistent in public on the other. Second, transparency strategies can, however, turn into surveillance and trigger new forms of data ordering, sorting, and aggregating practices. Third, disclosure practices create and undermine complex hierarchies and power relations for organizational members. The comparison of the cases demonstrates that it is crucial to observe the practical implications and multiple trajectories of transparency practices.