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This paper makes attempt to test the firm‐level long‐term asset growth (LAG) effects in returns by examining the cross‐sectional relation between firm‐level LAG and subsequent abnormal stock returns. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether limits‐to‐arbitrage can explain this asset growth anomaly in Chinese stock market.

Empirical research was carried out.

The empirical results show that asset growth anomaly in A‐share stock market is significant and robust. The conclusion provides more evidence for the existence of asset growth anomaly. Additionally, arbitrage risk indicated by idiosyncratic risk cannot explain the anomaly, arbitrage risk indicated by accounting information transparency can partly explain the anomaly, and arbitrage cost proxied by Amihud's measure of illiquidity indicator can completely explain the asset growth anomaly in A‐share stock market.

The results of this paper imply that strengthening the disclosure of firm information and improving the liquidity of the market are important to improve the efficiency of the A‐share stock market.

The paper selects the sample of non‐financial listed companies in A‐share stock market to research the asset growth anomaly and investigates whether limits‐to‐arbitrage can explain this anomaly. This paper proves the existence of asset growth anomaly in A‐share stock market and is a good reference for further researches.

This paper examines the extent to which noise demand and limits of arbitrage affect the pricing of acquirer stocks both at the announcement period and over the longer horizon.

An event study approach was adopted to measure announcement-period cumulative abnormal returns. Long-horizon returns are measured using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), calendar time portfolios (CTPRs), and subsequent earnings announcement period abnormal returns. Main methodologies include ordinary least squared (OLS) regressions, Logit regressions, and portfolio analysis.

(1) Acquirer stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility (the proxy for the security level characteristic most directly associated with limits to arbitrage) earn higher announcement-period abnormal returns. (2) The return pattern reverses over the subsequent longer horizon, resembling news-driven transitory mispricing. (3) The mispricing is greater when deal and firm characteristics exacerbate the limits of arbitrage, and it weakens over time. (4) Transactions by higher idiosyncratic volatility acquirers are more likely to fail.

Limits of arbitrage theory have been tested mostly in information-free circumstances. The findings in this paper extend the supporting evidence for limits of arbitrage explaining mispricing beyond the boundaries of information-free circumstances.

This study documents that high book‐to‐market (value) and low book‐to‐market (glamour) stock prices react asymmetrically to both common and firm‐specific information. Specifically, we find that value stock prices exhibit a considerably slow adjustment to both common and firm‐specific information relative to glamour stocks. The results show that this pattern of diferential price adjustment between value and glamour stocks is mainly driven by the high arbitrage risk borne by value stocks. The evidence is consistent with the arbitrage risk hypothesis, predicting that idiosyncratic risk, a major impediment to arbitrage activity, amplifies the informational loss of value stocks as a result of arbitrageurs’ (informed investors) reduced participation in value stocks because of their inability to fully hedge idiosyncratic risk.

Following the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic, securities class plaintiffs can invoke the “rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market” [the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine] to prove classwide reliance. Although this requires plaintiffs to prove that the security traded in an informationally efficient market throughout the class period, Basic did not identify what constituted adequate proof of efficiency for reliance purposes.

Market efficiency cannot be presumed without proof because even large publicly traded stocks do not always trade in efficient markets, as documented in the economic literature that has grown significantly since Basic. For instance, during the recent global financial crisis, lack of liquidity limited arbitrage (the mechanism that renders markets efficient) and led to significant price distortions in many asset markets. Yet, lower courts following Basic have frequently granted class certification based on a mechanical review of some factors that are considered intuitive “proxies” of market efficiency (albeit incorrectly, according to recent studies and our own analysis). Such factors have little probative value and their review does not constitute the rigorous analysis demanded by the Supreme Court.

Instead, to invoke fraud-on-the-market, plaintiffs must first establish that the security traded in a weak-form efficient market (absent which a security cannot, as a logical matter, trade in a “semi-strong form” efficient market, the standard required for reliance purposes) using well-accepted tests. Only then do event study results, which are commonly used to demonstrate “cause and effect” (i.e., prove that the security’s price reacted quickly to news – a hallmark of a semi-strong form efficient market), have any merit. Even then, to claim classwide reliance, plaintiffs must prove such cause-and-effect relationship throughout the class period, not simply on selected disclosure dates identified in the complaint as plaintiffs often do.

These issues have policy implications because, once a class is certified, defendants frequently settle to avoid the magnified costs and risks associated with a trial, and the merits of the case (including the proper application of legal presumptions) are rarely examined at a trial.

This paper aims to examine the informational efficiency in retail credit markets to test whether behavioral biases (excessive optimism) by some participants in the banking industry might explain how credit booms are fueled by the banking sector.

This paper analyzes the conditions for the efficient market hypothesis approach to be extended to bank-based systems. A simple model of herding and limits of arbitrage that follows a three-step behavioral approach is presented (Shleifer, 2000). The model is based on duopolistic Cournot competition, where one bank is unbiased and the other is boundedly rational in terms of excessive optimism.

The paper shows why solely behavioral biases by participants in the banking industry explain how it feeds a credit bubble. According to the presented model, optimistic banks would lead the industry, while it would be rational for unbiased banks to herd under conditions that the authors derive. An important finding is the role of limits of arbitrage in the banking sector: there would be no incentives for rational banks to correct the misallocations of their biased competitors.

It might be a valid contribution to the current debate on macroprudential regulation. Should tests of rationality and correlated behavior provide evidence on the pervasiveness of behavioral biases in the banking industry suggested by our model, then banking regulation should account for it.

This paper introduces an alternative approach to analyze informational efficiency in the banking industry that, to the best of our knowledge, had not been raised so far. The model shows how behavioral biases might guide retail credit markets and why limits of arbitrage would be more pervasive in bank-based financial systems than in market-based ones.

This paper aims to examine the impact that monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) has on stock market returns by taking into account limits to arbitrage and the economic cycle.

Using four news-based MPU measures, regression models have been applied in this study over a sample period from January 1985 to March 2020. The limits to arbitrage have been considered by taking Russell 1000 Value, Russell 1000 Growth, Russell 2000 Value and Russell 2000 Growth indices, and business cycles were established following the National Bureau of Economic Research.

A negative MPU impact on stock returns has been found. In particular, the most subjective and difficult to arbitrate stocks have been more sensitive to MPU. However, it could not be concluded that MPU has a greater or lesser impact on stock returns depending on the economic cycle.

The findings obtained are particularly useful for monetary policymakers showing the importance and need for greater control over the transparency of their decisions to maintain the stability of financial markets. The findings obtained are also useful for investors when selecting their investment assets at times of the highest MPU.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is one of the few studies investigating the effect of MPU on stock market returns, and the first to analyse this relationship taking into account the economic cycle and limits to arbitrage.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether investors’ sentiment affects accruals anomaly across European countries.

The authors estimate the model using Fama–MacBeth regressions. The sample includes 54,572 firm-year observations for 4,787 European firms during the period 1994–2014.

The authors find that investors’ sentiment influences accruals mispricing across European countries. The effect is pronounced for stocks whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. The cross-country analysis provides evidence that sentiment influences accruals anomaly in countries with weaker outside shareholder rights, lower legal enforcement, lower equity market development, higher allowance of accrual accounting and in countries where herd-like behavior and overreaction behavior are strong.

The findings suggest the generalizability of the sentiment-accruals anomaly relation in European countries characterized by different cultural values, levels of economic development and legal tradition.

The findings suggest to caution individuals investors. These investors would be wise to take into account the impact of sentiment on the performance of their portfolio. They must keep in mind that periods of high optimism are accompanied by a high level of accruals and followed by low future stock returns.

The research supplements previous American studies by showing the significance of the level of sentiment in understanding the accruals anomaly in Europe. Hence, it is important for future studies to consider investor sentiment as an important time-series determinant of the accruals anomaly, particularly for stocks that are hard to value and difficult to arbitrage.

National cultures significantly explain cross-country differences in the relation between asset growth and stock returns. Motivated by the notion that managers in individualistic and low uncertainty-avoiding cultures have a higher tendency to overinvest, this study aims to show that the negative relation between asset growth and stock returns is stronger in countries with such cultural features. Once the researchers control for cultural dimensions, proxies associated with the q-theory, limits-to-arbitrage, corporate governance, investor protection and accounting quality provide no incremental power for the relation between asset growth and stock returns across countries. Evidence of this study highlights the importance of the overinvestment hypothesis in explaining the asset growth anomaly around the world.

This paper aims to highlight firms' profitability as an alternative channel by which changes in leverage could affect stock returns in an imperfect market setting. The author also analytically argues that the benefits of debt, if any, may accrue beyond the usual tax benefit channel.

The author used multivariate regression models based on firms' characteristics and the models' changes along with a two-stage least-square (2SLS) type procedure to estimate the impact of leverage changes on stock returns. The author controls for the varying arbitrage risk that is measured by forecasted idiosyncratic volatility of stock prices and overcome simultaneous or endogenous determination by using inter-temporal non-synchronous variation in leverage and control variables.

The author finds that increase in leverage increase (decrease) stock returns for firms with the gross operating profitability higher (lower) than the cost of debt. The author also finds that the variation in arbitrage risk does not substitute for the primary effect of leverage changes on stock returns.

The author's findings provide tacit support to the recent literature attempting to resolve the empirically puzzling pattern of the negative relationship between profitability and leverage. The findings suggest inclusion of profitability as a crucial asset-pricing factor in the contemporary empirical models.

The non-trivial role of profitability in determining the effect of leverage on firms' stock returns that may be useful to managers, credit analysts and policy makers to assess the impact of net profitability on any change in leverage and its ensuing consequences on firms' value.

The paper develops analytical insights into the marginal role of profitability in influencing the relationship between firms' financing decisions and firms' stock returns beyond the conventional mechanisms of tax benefits, bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry.

This paper identifies the “idiosyncratic basis”, the residual premia computed from stripping away the hypothetical cross-currency basis (CCB) from the cross-currency credit spread (CCCS) of eligible senior corporate dollar-denominated bonds relative to their hypothetical euro-denominated comparator of identical seniority, duration, credit risk and issuer. The adherence of the idiosyncratic basis to the no-arbitrage condition is subsequently evaluated through the application of an indicative market-neutral credit strategy that is designed to harvest the apparent static arbitrage opportunities. The success of the strategy, which systematically captures the idiosyncratic basis as it adheres to the no-arbitrage conditions, is validated retrospectively to frame the basis as an additional class of alternative risk premia (ARP), which investors can seek to optimise exposure to in a long-only context.