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This study builds on a first study by Macdonald and Birdi (2019) that argues the concept of neutrality within library and information science (LIS) demands a sensitivity to context often omitted in existing literature. This study aims to develop the conceptual architecture of LIS neutrality in a way that is more conducive to reconciling the contextual nuance found in within the first study.

The approach taken develops LIS neutrality through a Wittgensteinian lens. Two distinct ideas are explored. First, Wittgenstein's notion of a “grammatical investigation” is used to map the varied contexts in which neutrality is used within professional practice. Liberal neutrality is explored as an analogy to lend plausibility to the concept's heterogeneity. Second, Wittgenstein's “family resemblance” develops the concept in a way that facilitates greater contextual understanding.

Three features of liberal neutrality literature: conceptual heterogeneity, distinct justifications for specific conceptions and the possibility that neutrality may operate with limited scope are applied to LIS neutrality. All three features successfully translate, leaving “latent conceptual space” to understand LIS neutrality as nuanced and multifaceted. Second, “family resemblance” also translates successfully, bringing its own pedagogical benefits.

This study's originality lies in its development of LIS neutrality using a descriptive Wittgensteinian lens. Understanding the concept via this paradigm may facilitate a more productive discussion of LIS neutrality and pave the way for a new, less polarised, normative response to it.

Post-Enlightenment liberalism faces a paradox: The liberal principle of legitimacy demands states justify their constitutional order in terms citizens can accept, but there is no uncontroversial comprehensive conception of justice on which to form the requisite consensus. Rawls resolves the paradox by embracing a pragmatism that abandons the concept of truth in the political forum to secure consensus and legitimacy. Philosophers have challenged the idea of justice without truth as incoherent, and social critics have attacked it as naïve. This chapter defends Rawls’s pragmatism against such critics and argues that the future of liberal constitutionalism may depend on its success.

Neutrality is a much debated value in library and information science (LIS). The “neutrality debate” is characterised by opinionated discussions in contrasting contexts. The purpose of this paper is to fill a gap in the literature by bringing these conceptions together holistically, with potential to deepen understanding of LIS neutrality.

First, a literature review identified conceptions of neutrality reported in the LIS literature. Second, seven phenomenographic interviews with LIS professionals were conducted across three professional sectors. To maximise variation, each sector comprised at least one interview with a professional of five or fewer years’ experience and one with ten or more years’ experience. Third, conceptions from the literature and interviews were compared for similarities and disparities.

In four conceptions, each were found in the literature and interviews. In the literature, these were labelled: “favourable”, “tacit value”, “social institutions” and “value-laden profession”, whilst in interviews they were labelled: “core value”, “subservient”, “ambivalent”, and “hidden values”. The study’s main finding notes the “ambivalent” conception in interviews is not captured by a largely polarised literature, which oversimplifies neutrality’s complexity. To accommodate this complexity, it is suggested that future research should look to reconcile perceptions from either side of the “neutral non-neutral divide” through an inclusive normative framework.

This study’s value lies in its descriptive methodology, which brings LIS neutrality together in a holistic framework. This framework brings a contextual awareness to LIS neutrality lacking in previous research. This awareness has the potential to change the tone of the LIS neutrality debate.

While liberals agree that the best society is one that supports the equal exercise of personal liberty, there is little agreement among them on what policies best achieve this end. Conflicts within liberalism over the place of socially derived goals vis-à-vis personal liberty and autonomy create tension and skew public discourse on policy alternatives. In this article, I characterize the debate among dominant strands of liberal ideology and consider the effort of Charles Taylor to resolve these tensions. Finding his resolution unsatisfying, I explore the alternative conception offered by American pragmatism. I argue that liberal theories fail because they fall prey to the problem of principles-they attempt to justify axiomatic thinking rather than perpetuate society and culture. Pragmatism provides a justification for liberal public discourse as the best mechanism for constructing, evaluating and revising policies that support cultural adaptation to social, economic and technological contingencies.

Rights constitute a familiar feature of the liberal discourse of judging. This chapter seeks to recast this discourse away from the language of rights by considering two cases where liberals often invoke it: abortion and same-sex marriage. I argue that the presence of rights in American constitutional discourse exacerbates the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review. We do better to recast the language of judging from an emphasis on protecting rights to an emphasis on making sure that the demos acts on publicly justifiable reasons. In doing so, I proffer a novel analysis of liberal theory's extant commitment to public reason, one that conceptualizes public reason as representing the scope of state power.

Switzerland with its seven million inhabitants, of which 20,1 % (BfS 2001) are non‐Swiss citizens, ranks among the top seven nations with respect of income per capita. Due to its wealth as well as its small size, the travel intensity of Switzerland is comparably high. Because it always had a tradition of neutrality and liberal political positions, freedom of travel was guaranteed for generations. Since Switzerland hasn't been drawn into World War 2, the emergence of the new dynamic of travel took place early in the fifties. Switzerland therefore is a kind of very developed travel market. According to the WTO statistics, Switzerland ranks among the top tourist buyer countries (cp. WTO 2001). The Institute of Public Services and Tourism at the University of St.Callen (former Institute for Transport and Tourism) has been conducting a survey on the travel behaviour of Swiss customers for more then thirty years (cp. Bieger & Laesser 2002). On a regular base of every second to third year, a representative consumer panels of 2000 households is interviewed by written questionnaires. The Swiss travel market proves a high validity in comparisons with the official Swiss statistical figures for travel, with one small limit: The number of travels intensity is underestimated due to the fact that people tend to undervalue the number of travels to their usual destinations like second homes. The goal of this contribution is to give an overview on the travel behaviour of Swiss customers as example for a well developed country. This will be done in two parts. Part 1 is featuring some descriptive main results, concerning the development and structure of the overall travellers. Part 2 consists of two papers, done by Ph.D students in a seminar taught by the authors of this contribution at the University of St. Gallen. These two articles give a deeper insight into some aspects of travel behaviour.

Working on the assumption that civility is the core value of R.G. Collingwood's political philosophy, the paper aims to examine the capacity of civility to curb economic excess in the absence of distributive justice.

The paper investigates the economic and political writings of Collingwood to see if they can be made to yield restraints on economic excess when based on civility alone. Comparisons are drawn between Collingwood and modern liberal philosophers such as John Rawls in order to identify where Collingwood stands on key concepts in the argument. Contrasts are established with Hobbes and Ruskin on the issues at stake, so clarifying what can be drawn from Collingwood on the specific topic under discussion.

The paper concludes that there is theoretical scope within Collingwood's political writings for a curb on economic excess in the absence of a concept of distributive justice, even though this takes a different form from the approach of modern liberals such as John Rawls.

It is shown that Collingwood's economic writings are relevant to modern discussions of social justice even when it is civility and not justice that is Collingwood's main focus.

In this chapter, I suggest that Connecticut’s and other states’ recent discontinuation of civil unions in the name of marriage “equality” marginalizes and demeans marriage – rejecting people who may nonetheless wish to codify their intimate partnerships – for purposes of legal “incidents,” including rights and privileges, like hospital visitation rights, testimonial privilege, inheritance rights, etc. In doing so, I also call for a rejuvenation of the practice of granting civil union licenses in these states.