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The purpose of this paper is to examine the available judicial precedence using both the United Arab Emirates and UK laws to bring up a much broader understanding of wrongful and fraudulent trading concepts and provide a critical analysis of potential personal liabilities of directors in the UK and UAE jurisdictions for the acts of fraud and mismanagement.

This paper seeks to understand corporate fraud from the aspect of trading. It will take an in-depth look into wrongful trading and fraudulent trading in the UAE and UK jurisdictions while analyzing the punishment for the same. The study will also look at famous cases for the same while seeking to understand the mitigation measures undertaken in various nations across the world.

The author studies the contents and provisions of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, truly the concepts of wrongful trading and fraudulent trading are not explicitly mentioned in the UAE Law, but the said terms associated with “lifting of corporate veil” are notionally existent under the UAE Federal Law No2/2015, otherwise known as Companies Law (Articles 84 and 162-1), and under the UAE Bankruptcy Law (Federal Decree Law No. 9 of 2016), which provides legislation governing trading while the company is insolvent.

In the current paper, the author is keen to examine the available judicial precedence to bring up a much broader understanding of the mentioned concepts and provide a critical analysis of potential personal liabilities of directors in the UK and UAE jurisdictions for the acts of fraud and mismanagement.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

This study aims to document the variation in director attendance rates around the world and investigate the influence of cross-country differences in law and infrastructure on director attendance practices.

Director attendance data are hand-collected from company annual reports and are related to differences in shareholder rights, director liability and transportation and telecommunications infrastructure across countries.

Using a hand-collected data set of 4,344 directorships from 33 countries, the results indicate that director attendance is significantly lower in emerging markets and is positively related to the extent of shareholder rights and the quality of telecommunications infrastructure.

For policymakers and shareholders, the findings of this study indicate that there is substantial variation in director attendance practices around the world. Across all markets, director attendance is higher when the telecommunications infrastructure better enables the potential for virtual attendance, thereby allowing directors to participate in meetings when they cannot be physically present. In emerging markets, director attendance is also higher where there is a stronger emphasis on shareholder rights, highlighting an avenue for improved director attendance by strengthening shareholder involvement in major corporate decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the liability of directors and senior officers within organisations (primarily companies but partnerships and sole traderships are considered where appropriate) and primarily focus on workplace settings.

Desk‐based research was carried out.

The scope of the paper is confined to two major aspects of the criminal law – that of manslaughter, both statutory and at common law and also touches on the range of health and safety offences available to the courts. In terms of manslaughter, under the common law, it is gross negligence that is considered.

The paper does not attempt an analysis of forms of civil liability but does reflect on the broader relationship between responsibility of directors and company law. The debate over the responsibility of those in leading positions following death or injury to members of the workforce remains a live and problematic one. It is clearly linked to wider considerations of corporate responsibility.

On the one hand, those advocates of a system targeting erring directors in a direct fashion see utilisation of the criminal law (apportioning the full weight of public opprobrium), as the most effective way of improving safety for the workforce. By contrast the opposing view is that senior personnel rarely set out to kill or injure those who work for them and that a better way forward is to consider systemic failings running across an organisation. Linked to this is the notion that placing too much responsibility on companies and the senior personnel at their helm is a disincentive to the entrepreneurial spirit that allows business to flourish.

Money laundering (ML) is one of the greatest challenges, the global community faces today. Corporate entities such as financial institutions (FIs) are most susceptible to facilitate and launder money. The paper raises the following question: Who is to bear the burden of liability? Either a corporation or an individual, thus this paper examines liability issues in a corporate setting particularly financial institutions, which arise from regulatory noncompliance or failure to oversight in the context of ML.

The study is legal doctrinal mainly based on case laws, legislation and research articles.

Firstly, this study provides how the concept of liability in a corporate setting in UK and USA has drifted from its traditional “duty to care” standard to a new “duty to oversight” and “Responsible Corporate Officer” concepts resulting a shift in corporate to individual liability. Secondly, in the context of anti-ML violations in FIs, imposition of corporate or personal liability solely may not effectively deter ML and may create conflicts between management and shareholders.

The paper can be a source to explore the issue of ML liability for regulatory noncompliance based on UK, USA and Pakistan law.

This paper demonstrates that the imposition of either corporate or personal liability may create dilemma either for shareholders or management; however, a “combine or collective liability” approach carries potential to retard ML activities in FIs and balancing the harm-penalties incurred upon a corporation while addressing shareholders concerns.

New Zealand’s 1993 Companies Act defines reckless trading as when a director/manager induces a “substantial risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors”. The definition contrasts with international common and statutory law that holds managers personally liable only under circumstances of moral failing. It also allows for managers to be found liable for bad investments during the continued existence of a firm. Replacing the standard of moral failing with a standard of objective risk evaluation and allowing culpability beyond bankruptcy proceedings extends liability in a way that indirectly taxes corporations. This extension of liability stands contrary to the evolutionary development of the corporation as based on an efficient redistribution of property rights. It biases investment towards lower risk, lower yield ventures, and is expected to decrease New Zealand’s innovation‐driven economic growth

The aim of this paper is to seek to examine the operation of S.37 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 in the context of the debate about director's duties for health and safety. It goes on to consider whether its increased use is indicative of an inclination on the part of regulators to more readily target senior officers within companies.

This is a conceptual paper.

The section has received much attention in recent years because unlike the bulk of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 from which it derives, it imposes no positive duties. Its use arises via a secondary duty and only comes into operation following proof of organisational fault. However, this indirect duty is imposed typically against directors and the section is therefore of great interest as part of a wider debate on the imposition of liability at board level.

Drawing on an a review of leading cases and the initial findings from analysis of the response to a Freedom of Information request made to the Health and Safety Executive in February 2012, the use of the section will be placed under the spotlight and considered in the context of other linked statutes.

This paper aims to investigate how bank governance can be altered to reduce risk taking and engender greater financial stability.

The paper reviews existing bank governance arrangements, contemporary challenges and alternative reforms.

It is argued that recent reforms are incomplete. Greater countervailing incentives for bank managers and shareholders are required. This prompts an inquiry into the merits and demerits of four types of reform: changes to executive compensation arrangements; the introduction of a liability standard for directors; the removal of limited liability for bank shareholders; and a criminal offence for managers.

Discussion illumines several problems with the current approach to bank governance and provides insights that can help direct future reform.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether firm-specific litigation risk affects independent director conservatism in the oversight of financial reporting.

This study considers the enactment of Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the main US stock exchanges' corresponding corporate governance regulations in 2002–2003 as an exogenous shock event to increase board independence. OLS regressions with fixed effects are conducted to test the hypothesis.

Changes in discretionary accruals from the pre-event year (2001) to the post-event year (2004) are more negatively associated with an exogenous increase in board independence for firms with high litigation risk than for firms with low litigation risk.

The results suggest that independent directors are more conservative in overseeing financial reporting when they face higher litigation risk, consistent with the notion that they are still concerned about liability risk although they seldom have to pay damages or legal fees out of their own pockets.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) on corporate governance and firm performance, with a specific focus on investment efficiency.

Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from the period 2007 to 2020, this study uses Ordinary Least Squares regressions to investigate the research questions, as well as moderating and mediating effects. Additionally, alternative measures of investment efficiency are used, and the Heckman two-stage model and propensity score matching model are used to demonstrate the consistency of the findings and to mitigate the risk of endogeneity.

The findings of this study suggest that purchasing D&O insurance has a detrimental impact on corporate investment efficiency, particularly in the context of over-investment activities; robust internal governance mechanisms, exemplified by a higher shareholding ratio of the top shareholder and enhanced internal control quality, alleviate this negative effect; and financing constraints act as a mediating factor in the association between D&O insurance and investment efficiency.

Corporate investment efficiency is of significant importance for both national macroeconomic growth and micro-enterprise development. Notably, the prevalence of D&O insurance among Chinese firms is progressively increasing, thus exerting a growing influence. This study contributes to the existing literature on D&O insurance and corporate investment efficiency, providing valuable insights into the economic impact of D&O insurance on Chinese firms. The empirical evidence presented herein facilitates future reforms and adjustments.