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This study aims to analyze the effect of cognitive load and social value orientation on managers’ preferences when they face with two types of restructuring choices in financially distressed firms: the first belonging to the family of organizational restructuring (massive layoffs) and the second to the family of financial restructuring (debt increases).

The authors investigate experimentally the impact of managers’ cognitive load and social value orientation on the decision to restructure leveraged buyout (LBO) firms in financial distress by using either massive layoffs or debt increases.

By investigating the impact of managers’ cognitive load and social value orientation on the restructuring decision of an LBO firm in financial distress, the research reveals that, on average, cognitively loaded managers prefer massive layoffs over increased debt levels. The massive layoffs seemingly provide a relatively easier way to avoid conflict with influential, residual claimants. In contrast, social value–oriented managers actively avoid massive layoffs and prefer to increase debt.

These results imply that the performance mechanisms emphasized to improve agency relations, for example, in LBOs, have their own limitations during periods of financial distress. This study shows that one of these limits is related to cognitive distortions and personality traits.

In this research, the originality lies in understanding how managers’ internal factors affect their restructuring decision-making, in the case of LBO firms in financial distress.

We investigate whether active involvement of private equity firms in their portfolio companies during the holding period of a later-stage private equity investment is related to increased levels in operating performance of these companies. Our analysis of unique survey data on 267 European buyouts and secondary performance data on 29 portfolio companies using partial least squares structural equation modeling indicates that private equity firms, that is, their board representatives, can increase operating performance not only by monitoring the behavior of top managers of portfolio companies, but also by becoming involved in strategic decisions and supporting top managers through the provision of strategic resources. Strategic resources, in particular expertise and networks, provided by private equity firm representatives in the form of financial and strategic involvement are associated with increases in the financial performance and competitive prospects of portfolio companies. Operational involvement, however, is not related to changes in operating performance. In addition to empirical insights into the different types of involvement and their effects, this chapter contributes to the buyout literature by providing support for the suggested broadening of the theoretical discussion beyond the dominant perspective of agency theory through developing and testing a complementary resource-based view of involvement. This allows taking into account not only the monitoring, but also the more entrepreneurial supporting element of involvement by private equity firms.

This case and its companion, UVA-F-1560, were awarded the 2012 Wachovia Award for Excellence in Teaching Materials - Innovative Case. In November 2006, Alec Berg, a successful hedge fund manager, must decide whether to invest in the initial public offering (IPO) of the Hertz Corporation. The IPO followed a leveraged buyout (LBO) of Hertz that was completed in December 2005 by three prominent private equity firms that had combined to purchase Hertz from the Ford Motor Company for $14.9 billion. The LBO sponsors had borrowed an additional $1 billion on top of the buyout financing to pay themselves a special dividend in June 2006. This loan would be repaid with the IPO proceeds and any remaining proceeds from the IPO would go to the sponsors. The IPO generated widespread criticism with respect to the speed with which the IPO was conducted and the payment of special dividends. In the face of this criticism, the demand for the Hertz IPO weakened, and the offer price was reduced from the initial file price range of $16–$18 to just $15. Berg must assess whether at $15 per share, Hertz offers an attractive investment for this fund. The case provides the necessary information for students to analyze the sponsors' returns on their investment in Hertz and the attractiveness of the $15 offer price to public shareholders. The case also offers an opportunity for students to discuss the controversy surrounding the payment of special dividends and the claim that private equity sponsors invest with a long-term perspective that creates value for the company.

In February 1991, the managers of this multinational specialty publishing company proposed to take the company private in a leveraged buyout (LBO). In addition to the ordinarily interesting features of the typical LBO, this transaction was the first to be denominated in ECUs and one of the few in which the managers provided all the equity financing. The tasks for the student are to value the company and evaluate the attractiveness of the transaction from the standpoints of seller, senior lender, mezzanine lender, and equity investor/manager. The case can be used to (1) exercise students' skills in valuing a highly leveraged company, (2) illustrate how deal structuring can mitigate potential agency problems, and (3) explore the problems and possible solutions associated with financing a global firm.

This case considers the buyout of Panera Bread from the perspective of a private equity fund. In early 2017, KLG Managing Director Tom Denning is considering a leveraged buyout of Panera Bread, a rapidly growing fast-casual restaurant company. A surprising Bloomberg News story signals that the deal process is broadening and KLG will have to act quickly if it hopes to buy Panera Bread. Students assume the role of Tom Denning as he prepares an investment recommendation for KLG's investment committee. In doing so, students are required to consider a very large and expensive investment. Students are challenged to create an investment recommendation by performing due diligence, determining additional questions to ask, and pricing a buyout bid that incorporates an optimal capital structure and meets KLG's return requirements. The Panera Bread case is designed to give students insight into the private equity investment process.

This paper reviews economic studies on the effects of various aspects of finance on labour market outcomes.

The paper is a systematic literature review that reviews the weight of the evidence on the relationships between specific elements of finance and labour outcomes. The review is divided into three major sections: (1) job quantity and job quality; (2) distributional effects; and (3) resilience and adaptability.

Finance interacts with labour market institutions to jointly determine labour outcomes. Firm financial structures influence their labour practices – highly leveraged firms show greater employment volatility during cyclical fluctuations, and leverage strengthens firm bargaining power in labour negotiations. Bank deregulation has mixed impacts on labour depending upon the state of prior bank regulations and labour markets. Leveraged buyouts tend to dampen acquired-firm job growth as they pursue labour productivity gains. The shareholder value movement may contribute to short-termism among corporate managers, which can divert funds away from firm capital accumulation toward financial markets, and crowd out productive investment. Declining wage shares of national income in most OECD countries since 1990 may be driven in part by financial globalisation. The financial sector contributes to rising income concentration near the top of the distribution in developed countries. The availability of finance is associated with increased reallocation of labour, which may either enhance or impede productivity growth. Finally, rising interest rate environments and homeowners with mortgage balances that exceed their home's value may reduce labour mobility rates.

This review contributes to the understanding of the effects of finance on labour by reviewing and synthesising a large volume of literature.

This paper aims to examine whether investment efficiency improves after publicly‐traded firms are taken private.

The analysis uses univariate comparisons and regression analysis of panel data.

Before going private, firms' investment ratios and investment opportunities are similar to investment ratios and investment opportunities of peer firms. However, after going private, the investment ratios significantly decrease to levels significantly below the investment ratios of peer firms. Additionally, investment becomes less sensitive to investment opportunities and more sensitive to operating profits and cash holdings. Finally, cash becomes more sensitive to cash‐flow after going private. These results suggest that firms become more financially constrained, under‐invest relative to their industry peers, and invest less efficiently after going private.

Improvements in investment efficiency are often cited as a contributing factor to the value gains associated with going‐private transactions. However, whether investment efficiency improves when firms go private remains unanswered by prior research. In theory, investment efficiency should improve if private firms are shielded from the market pressure for short‐term earnings and better able to invest for long‐term value creation. Conversely, it is possible that the high levels of debt associated with these transactions impose financial constraints that reduce investment efficiency. The results of this study suggest that investment efficiency does not improve after going private.

In January 2012, Ellen Kullman, CEO and chairman of DuPont, must decide whether to retain or sell the company's Performance Coatings (DPC) division. This is an introductory case on valuing a leveraged buyout. The case focuses on a publicly listed corporation's decision to divest a large division and asks students to compare the division's value if it remains under DuPont's control or is sold to an outside party. The transaction size of approximately $4 billion is too large for potential strategic buyers in the industry, making private equity (PE) firms the most likely bidders. The case provides a base-case adjusted present value (APV) model of DPC as a stand-alone company and gives students specific assignments to adjust it to reflect the division's potential value under PE ownership (e.g., EBITDA growth, multiple arbitrage, and increased leverage).

The case is designed to illustrate and discuss the differences between a public company's valuation based on unlevered free cash flows and a PE sponsor's valuation based on residual (levered) cash flows.

This case has been successfully taught in a second-year elective course covering entrepreneurial finance and private equity and in an advanced undergraduate course on corporate finance. It is appropriate for use in classes on private equity, advanced corporate finance, or deal valuation.

In fraudulent conveyance cases, plaintiffs allege that by entering into a complex leverage transaction, such as an LBO, a firm’s former owners ensured its subsequent collapse. Proving that the transaction rendered the firm insolvent may allow debtors (or their proxies) to claw back transfers made to former shareholders and others as part of the transaction.

Courts have recently questioned the robustness of the solvency evidence traditionally provided in such cases, claiming that traditional expert analyses (e.g., a discounted flow analysis) may suffer from hindsight (and other forms of) bias, and thus not reflect an accurate view of the firm’s insolvency prospects at the time of the challenged transfers. To address the issue, courts have recently suggested that experts should consider market evidence, such as the firm’s stock, bond, or credit default swap prices at the time of the challenged transaction. We review market-evidence-based approaches for determination of solvency in fraudulent conveyance cases.

We compare different methods of solvency determination that rely on market data. We discuss the pros and cons of these methods and illustrate the use of credit default swap spreads with a numerical example. Finally, we highlight the limitations of these methods.

If securities trade in efficient markets in which security prices quickly impound all available information, then such security prices provide an objective assessment of investors’ views of the firm’s future insolvency prospects at the time of challenged transfer, given contemporaneously available information. As we explain, using market data to analyze fraudulent conveyance claims or assess a firm’s solvency prospects is not as straightforward as some courts argue. To do so, an expert must first pick a particular credit risk model from a host of choices which links the market evidence (or security price) to the likelihood of future default. Then, to implement his chosen model, the expert must estimate various parameter input values at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer. In this connection, it is important to note that each credit risk model rests on particular assumptions, and there are typically several ways in which a model’s key parameters may be empirically estimated. Such choices critically affect any conclusion about a firm’s future default prospects as of the date of an alleged fraudulent conveyance.

Simply using market evidence does not necessarily eliminate the question of bias in any analysis. The reliability of a plaintiff’s claims regarding fraudulent conveyance will depend on the reasonableness of the analysis used to tie the observed market evidence at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer to default prospects of the firm.

There is a large body of literature in financial economics that examines the relationship between market data and the prospects of a firm’s future default. However, there is surprisingly little research tying that literature to the analysis of fraudulent conveyance claims. Our paper, in part, attempts to do so. We show that while market-based methods use the information contained in market prices, this information must be supplemented with assumptions and the conclusions of these methods critically depend on the assumption made.

The Beringer Wine Estates Company has been expanding its market share in the premium segment of the wine industry in the 1990's. After operating as a wholly owned subsidiary of the giant Nestlé food company for almost a quarter of a century, the firm was sold in 1996 to new owners, in a leveraged buyout. For the next year and a half, management and the new owners restructured the firm and expanded through internal growth and strategic acquisitions. With a heavy debt load from the LBO, it seemed prudent for management to consider a significant rebalancing of its capital structure. By paying off a portion of its debt and enhancing the equity account, the firm would achieve greater financial flexibility which could enhance its growth rate and business options. Finally, a publicly held common stock would provide management with another “currency” to be used for enhancing its growth rate and overall corporate valuation. With the equity markets in turmoil, significant strategic decisions had to be made quickly. Should the IPO be completed, with the district possibility of a less than successful after market price performance and these implications for pursuing external growth initiatives? A variety of alternative courses of action and their implications for the financial health of the Beringer Company and the financial wealth of Beringer stockholders are integral components of this case.