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The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not industry membership can explain the leverage of Shanghai listed firms prior to the 2007 financial crisis. In view of the central role that manufacturing industry played in China's rise as a global economic power, the authors are particularly interested in whether or not manufacturing is a special case.

The paper undertakes a comparative study of leverage differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing industry firms on both a cross-section and time-series basis. This is supplemented by a pooled regression analysis that models the factors determining leverage on an industry-by-industry basis.

The authors find that leverage levels differ across industries because of industry-based differences in financial characteristics. It is also found that, despite playing a leading role in China's economic development, there is no evidence to suggest that manufacturing is a special case. Across all sectors borrowing-power-related variables were identified as being important determinants of leverage and, contrary to the expectations, factors relating to profitability were largely insignificant.

The trade off and pecking order capital structure theories found to be commonly applicable to firms in the western business environment do not appear to adequately explain capital structure in China.

The paper identify evidence to suggest that China needs to be treated as a “special case” in the context of capital structure theory due to the unique cultural and business environment.

We propose that in addition to its resources and capabilities, a firm’s capital structure and financial health will act as an important determinant of its attractiveness as an alliance partner. Alliances with leveraged firms are prone to unplanned termination due to financial distress, which puts at risk the value embedded in the collaboration. As a result, ceteris paribus, highly leveraged firms will be viewed as less desirable partners in the market for interfirm collaboration when compared to low leverage firms. In support of this proposition, we find that when forming an alliance firms tend to partner with other firms with similar levels of leverage: low-leverage firms partner with other low-leverage firms while high-leverage firms partner with other high-leverage firms, as well as with lower quality ones. Furthermore, we show that alliances with highly leveraged firms are more likely to involve equity participation as a form of ex post protection, especially when they involve partners with relatively lower leverage. Finally, we show that leverage is negatively related to the intensity of alliance activity, suggesting that firms also maintain lower leverage in their capital structure in order to attract potential partners. Overall our results imply that financial policies regarding capital structure have an important role to play in alliancing activity.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of national culture on leverage speed of adjustment (SOA) across countries.

We use a partial adjustment model to estimate the impact of national culture (assessed using Hofstede's six cultural dimensions) on leverage SOA.

We find that culture does significantly affect the degree to which firms deviate from target debt level and the speed of adjustment (SOA) of leverage. High power distance, individualism and masculinity are associated with a slower SOA, while high long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance and indulgence result in a faster SOA. Additionally, cultural characteristics affect leverage SOA differently when firms are underlevered versus overlevered and when firms have small versus large deviations from the target level of debt. We suggest that these effects can be explained by agency motives.

The results of the study are based on available information for firms from 53 countries.

This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to examine the impact of national cultural traits on leverage SOA in international settings.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of interest rates on the size and the maturity choice of a syndicated bank loan. In addition, it attempts to determine the long‐run impact of a syndicated loan on the borrower's capital structure.

The paper uses a sample of 6,903 syndicated bank loans in the USA, covering the period 1984‐2004. First, all syndicated loans are categorized into two groups: loans in periods of increasing interest rates, and loans in periods of decreasing rates. Then, non‐parametric tests are performed to compare the characteristics of the two groups, including the proceeds from the loans, and robust regressions are used to examine the impact of the interest rates on the maturity choice. Finally, robust regressions are employed to examine the long‐run impact of the interest rates on the borrowers' leverage ratios.

On the whole, the results reject the market timing theory of capital structure for syndicated bank loans. Firms in the two groups borrow in similar amounts, and in the long run, the difference between the two groups' leverage ratios is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, firms tend to choose longer maturities when the interest rates are low compared to the rates two or three years ago.

To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study that links debt market conditions to the leverage ratios of firms that borrow in the syndicated bank loan market. In other words, this is the first study that tests the market timing theory of capital structure for syndicated bank loans.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.

To empirically analyze the influence of the voting stake on leverage, a large sample of 814 exchange-listed firms is applied. The baseline regression analysis is complemented by several robustness tests and a difference-in-difference regression analysis to mitigate endogeneity concerns.

The authors find a negative relationship between the voting stake of the largest shareholder and leverage, consistent with the notion that large, undiversified shareholders have the incentive to reduce risk. Additionally, results reveal that family control has a positive moderating effect, indicating that the negative relationship is less pronounced for family controlled firms.

The authors contribute to the research by suggesting ownership concentration as another determinant of capital structure. Further, the authors add to the literature by showing how the association between ownership concentration and leverage is moderated by family control and that the identity of the largest shareholder is of great importance.

The paper provides important insights to the current debate on the proposal of the European Commission to reintroduce shares with multiple votes as part of the Listing Act. The authors expect the regulation to exacerbate the concentration of voting rights, which results in lower leverage and thus limits corporate growth.

The authors differentiate from previous studies by focusing the largest shareholders' voting stake, instead of using the ownership stake, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on leverage.

The authors point out that the existing research confuses the operational liabilities formed based on the “transaction” relationship with the financial liabilities formed based on the “investment” relationship, which not only exaggerates the value of leverage but also underestimates the level of protection that companies provide for creditors alone. That is, the confusion of concepts not only triggers the problem of leverage misestimate but also triggers the short-term financial risk misestimate. The performance of “nominal leverage” and “nominal short-term solvency” based on total assets calculation cannot reflect the real leverage level and the real short-term financial risk of enterprises.

To distinguish the concepts of “assets” and “capital” and rationalize the relationship between “transactions” and “investments”, authors systematically design the “real leverage” indicators and “real short-term solvency” indicators, and measure the degree of misestimate of leverage and short-term financial risk indicators by traditional research. On this basis, this paper describes and analyses the trends of leveraged misestimate and short-term financial risk misestimate of listed companies in China and analyses which companies have more serious leverage misestimate. And it helps readers to form an objective understanding of the leveraged misestimate and short-term financial risk misestimate of listed companies in China.

Firstly, the overall high level of leverage of listed companies in China in the traditional sense is largely because of the misestimate of indicators. And this kind of misestimate is more serious among firms that have advantages in trading, such as state-owned enterprises and firms with higher market shares. Secondly, for most firms with normal solvency, traditional research systematically overestimated the negative impact of “nominal leverage” on financial risk indicators (represented by short-term solvency). The overestimation is significant in firms with serious leverage misestimate. Thirdly, indicators’ misestimate of the traditional research makes the banks cannot make effective credit decisions according to the firm's “real leverage” and “real short-term solvency”.

Firstly, clarify the differences between the concepts of “assets” and “capital”, and clarify the level of “real leverage” of listed companies in China, which is conducive to the process of “de-leveraging”. Secondly, revise the problem of misestimate of related indicators, so that financial institutions can clearly identify the true profitability and real risk level of the entity domain, and thus improve the effectiveness of credit decisions.

A significant number of Chinese companies are listed overseas. The authors aim to examine whether overseas locations affect their financing decision, specifically their capital structure choice.

Most of the Chinese overseas listed companies are listed in the USA and Hong Kong. As the institutional quality of the USA is better than Hong Kong, the authors, therefore, choose to build the hypotheses from the “law and finance” literature. Specifically, the authors argue that the better institutional environment of the USA can mitigate the information asymmetry problem and the agency problem of financing via equity. Consequently, firms listed in the USA will rely more on equity and have lower leverage ratio. The difference in leverage ratio of US listed and Hong Kong listed companies should be larger when the marginal benefit of better information environment is larger.

Referring to various data sources, the authors construct a comprehensive list of overseas listed companies in the USA and Hong Kong. The authors collect the accounting and stock performance information from Datastream/Worldscope and the equity offering data from Global New Issue database. The empirical findings provide strong support of the hypotheses: the leverage is 15 percent lower for US listed companies than the Hong Kong listed companies; the results are stronger when the firms face more severe information asymmetry problem; the stock price reacts less negatively for seasoned equity offering in the USA than in Hong Kong.

Most of the Chinese companies decided to be listed overseas because they cannot be listed in the Mainland Chinese stock exchanges. One of the most important motivation is to access to external capital to support firm growth. As the main channel of external financing in the overseas markets is equity since debt is still mainly domestically based, one implication of this paper is that Chinese companies can gain better access to external capital in the USA than in Hong Kong and relax their financial constraint.

There are a considerable number of Chinese companies listed in the overseas markets. Many successful and famous companies are among them. However, almost no research has been done based on them. This paper documents some very important phenomenon of this market. The authors wish that more studies will be conducted. In addition, the study also complements the existing studies on how institutional environment affects corporate financial behavior.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the structure of both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation affects the overall risk of a firm. The author focuses on the interplay between CEO and non-CEO executive compensation structure.

The author uses a hand-collected pension-database that employs both OLS and two-stage least squares regressions to determine the effects of inside debt on default risk using the distance-to-default framework. The database consists of 8,965 executive-year data points from 272 firms.

This paper accomplishes three major objectives: first, the author presents a significant extension of Sundaram and Yermack (2007) by including non-CEO executives; the author demonstrates how the differences in inside debt between CEO and non-CEO executives are directly related to firm risk; and that funding these pensions via a Rabbi Trust eliminates most of the risk-shifting effects. Firms with the lowest compensation leverage gap between CEO and non-CEO executives were most likely to observe the agency costs associated with high executive leverage. When compensation leverage structures were substantially different, or the pension was pre-funded, these effects are neutralized.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, the first paper addresses the effects of Rabbi Trusts on risk-shifting behavior between both CEOs and non-CEO executives. Further, the author extends Sundaram and Yermack (2007) using a hand-collected database six times larger than the original paper. By focusing on the “leverage gap” between CEOs and non-CEO executives, the author presents unique evidence that underlines the risk dynamics between CEOs and their boards.

Leveraged exchange traded funds (ETFs) have become increasingly popular since their introduction in 2006. In recent years, options on leveraged ETFs have been promoted as a means of enhancing returns and reducing risk. The purpose of this paper is to examine the interchangeability of S & P 500 ETF options with leveraged S & P 500 ETF options and to what extent these options allow investors to manage their risk exposure.

With increasing liquidity for these fund’s options, simple option strategies such as covered calls and protective puts can be implemented. This study derives call-call and put-put parity between options on the underlying index and the associated leveraged ETFs. The paper examines comparative measures of return and risk on the underlying indices, along with covered call and protective put positions.

Using the formulations derived, this study shows options on non-leveraged ETFs or on the underlying index can be substituted for leveraged ETF options. Empirical results suggest substituting options on leveraged ETFs with options on the underlying index or index ETF give comparable results, but can differ as the realized leverage ratio over time differs from projected values.

This study is the first to the authors’ knowledge that investigates option strategies on leveraged and inverse ETFs of equity indices. It is also the first to derive call-call and put-put parity relations between options on ETFs and related leveraged and inverse ETFs. The results contribute to securities issuance, investment strategies, and option parity relations.

This paper aims to highlight firms' profitability as an alternative channel by which changes in leverage could affect stock returns in an imperfect market setting. The author also analytically argues that the benefits of debt, if any, may accrue beyond the usual tax benefit channel.

The author used multivariate regression models based on firms' characteristics and the models' changes along with a two-stage least-square (2SLS) type procedure to estimate the impact of leverage changes on stock returns. The author controls for the varying arbitrage risk that is measured by forecasted idiosyncratic volatility of stock prices and overcome simultaneous or endogenous determination by using inter-temporal non-synchronous variation in leverage and control variables.

The author finds that increase in leverage increase (decrease) stock returns for firms with the gross operating profitability higher (lower) than the cost of debt. The author also finds that the variation in arbitrage risk does not substitute for the primary effect of leverage changes on stock returns.

The author's findings provide tacit support to the recent literature attempting to resolve the empirically puzzling pattern of the negative relationship between profitability and leverage. The findings suggest inclusion of profitability as a crucial asset-pricing factor in the contemporary empirical models.

The non-trivial role of profitability in determining the effect of leverage on firms' stock returns that may be useful to managers, credit analysts and policy makers to assess the impact of net profitability on any change in leverage and its ensuing consequences on firms' value.

The paper develops analytical insights into the marginal role of profitability in influencing the relationship between firms' financing decisions and firms' stock returns beyond the conventional mechanisms of tax benefits, bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry.