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This paper aims to highlight firms' profitability as an alternative channel by which changes in leverage could affect stock returns in an imperfect market setting. The author also analytically argues that the benefits of debt, if any, may accrue beyond the usual tax benefit channel.

The author used multivariate regression models based on firms' characteristics and the models' changes along with a two-stage least-square (2SLS) type procedure to estimate the impact of leverage changes on stock returns. The author controls for the varying arbitrage risk that is measured by forecasted idiosyncratic volatility of stock prices and overcome simultaneous or endogenous determination by using inter-temporal non-synchronous variation in leverage and control variables.

The author finds that increase in leverage increase (decrease) stock returns for firms with the gross operating profitability higher (lower) than the cost of debt. The author also finds that the variation in arbitrage risk does not substitute for the primary effect of leverage changes on stock returns.

The author's findings provide tacit support to the recent literature attempting to resolve the empirically puzzling pattern of the negative relationship between profitability and leverage. The findings suggest inclusion of profitability as a crucial asset-pricing factor in the contemporary empirical models.

The non-trivial role of profitability in determining the effect of leverage on firms' stock returns that may be useful to managers, credit analysts and policy makers to assess the impact of net profitability on any change in leverage and its ensuing consequences on firms' value.

The paper develops analytical insights into the marginal role of profitability in influencing the relationship between firms' financing decisions and firms' stock returns beyond the conventional mechanisms of tax benefits, bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate dividend policy on the capital structure in the Korean stock market. To distinctly discern the voluntariness of changes in corporate dividend policy, we analyze companies that, following a substantial increase, do not reduce dividends for the subsequent two years or, after a significant decrease, do not raise dividends for the following two years. Our empirical findings indicate that companies that increase dividends experience a significant decrease in both book and market leverage, even after controlling for variables such as target leverage ratios. This result suggests that a large increase in dividends can effectively reduce information asymmetry, leading to a lower cost of equity. On the contrary, after a decrease in dividends, both book leverage and market leverage significantly increase, revealing a symmetric relationship between dividend policy and capital structure. In conclusion, large dividend increases in Korean companies not only reduce information asymmetry but also lower the cost of equity capital, resulting in observable changes in the leverage ratio.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of capital structure changes by target firms on the outcome and ex post performance of firms targeted by proxy contests.

The influence is examined by using predictions of control‐driven model developed by Harris and Raviv and signaling theory of debt in capital structure.

The results are consistent with the predictions of both control‐driven model and signaling theory. Significant differences are found between two groups of target firms – management victory targets and dissident victory targets. Specifically: management victory targets feature proxy contests that are accompanied by leverage increasing changes in target firms' capital structure; the same group also realizes better long‐run stock performance compared to dissident victory targets; and the long‐run abnormal stock performance of management victory targets is significantly positively related to the increases in leverage in the capital structure during proxy contest period.

This paper is the first to directly address the relationship between leverage change and the outcome and long‐run performance of proxy contest targets, thus confirming both the defensive and the signaling role of debt on firm's capital structure decision.

This chapter differentiates the effect of solicited credit ratings (SCRs) and unsolicited credit ratings (UCRs) on bank leverage decision before and after the credit rating change. We find that banks with UCRs issue less debt relative to equity when the credit rating changes are approaching. Such findings are also prominent when bank credit rating moves from investment grade to speculative grade. After credit rating upgrades (downgrades), banks with unsolicited (solicited) credit ratings are inclined to issue more (less) debt relative to equity than those with solicited (unsolicited) credit ratings. We conclude that SCR and UCR changes lead to significantly different effects on bank leverage decision.

The hospital industry is again experiencing a wave of consolidation as formerly independent hospitals are acquired by multihospital systems. The effects of these consolidations on operating costs and care quality have been researched extensively. However, in addition to these benefits, many hospitals also hope that joining a multihospital system will improve their access to capital. Improved access to capital could be a particularly important benefit for independent, not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals because these hospitals face capital constraints since they lack access to publicly issued equity. Despite being an often-cited benefit of system membership, access to capital has received little attention from researchers. We draw on financial theory to identify several mechanisms through which system membership might improve access to capital for acquired NFP hospitals. We develop and test hypotheses using data from an earlier period of hospital consolidation during which hospitals were even more financially constrained than they are at present. Using propensity score matched control hospitals, we examine changes in leverage that occurred after independent hospitals joined multihospital systems. We find evidence that system membership allows under-leveraged hospitals to increase their debt holdings, suggesting that system membership may help NFP hospitals attain an optimal capital structure.

The purpose of this study is to present theory and empirical evidence on whether changes in leverage are systematically associated with changes in the CEO's risk incentives over time.Design/methodology/approach – A model is developed to explain the dynamic relationship between leverage and managers’ risk incentives, and empirically tested with data on executive stock option grants. The model relies on the observation that the risk sensitivity of a call option does not monotonically increase or decrease in the value of the underlying stock.Findings – It is found that changes in the CEO's risk incentives are not systematically correlated with changes in the firm's leverage over time.Research limitations/implications – The near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage, and therefore executives’ incentives to take equity risk are not correlated with firm leverage.Practical implications – For reasonable parameter values, this risk incentive‐maximizing stock price lies very close to the option's exercise price. This finding provides evidence that stock options plans granted approximately at‐the‐money encourage maximum risk‐taking by managers in a dynamic setting.Originality/value – This paper develops theory and evidence to explain why executive stock options are usually granted at‐the‐money.

The authors examine the impact of asymmetric information on firm's financing decisions, the feedback effect of changes in capital structure on the level of asymmetric information, and the speed of adjustments in capital structure on its target leverage.

The authors extract the data on 280 non-financial firms listed in the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from the DataStream. The authors implement the generalized method of moments (GMM), complemented by the fixed effect model (FEM) to estimate the model coefficients.

The authors find that asymmetric information significantly affects the financing decisions; and that on average, firms adjust 26% of the total debt toward their target capital structure. The negative effect from the difference between the observed and target changes in leverage on asymmetric information confirms that capital structure changes act as a signal for future profitability and helps the management to lower its level of asymmetric information.

The findings offer fresh insight into the effect of asymmetric information on financing decisions, as well as the speed of adjustment of capital structure toward its target leverage, in the context of the firms working in emerging markets like Pakistan. To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the impact of asymmetric information on financing decisions that incorporate firm's age, size and the global financial crises 2007–2008. The authors construct an asymmetric information index using both accounting and finance measures of asymmetry.

This paper tests how changes in information asymmetry and agency variables affect changes in debt policy. Unlike previous studies that examine levels of variables to explain what may determine debt policy, we calculate yearly changes in variables to provide a stronger test of causal relations. By examining changes in agency and information variables, we are able to identify factors that cause firms to change their optimal capital structure. We find institutional ownership has become a substitute for debt financing due to increased shareholder activism. In addition, we find support for Jensen's free cash flow theory, mixed support for informational asymmetry, and no support for Jensen and Meckling's agency model.

University campuses behave as complex systems, and sustainability in higher education is best seen as an emergent quality that arises from interactions both within an institution and between the institution and the environmental and social contexts in which it operates. A framework for strategically prioritizing campus sustainability work is needed. This paper seeks to address these issues.

First, a conceptual model is developed for understanding institutions of higher education as systems. Second, a leverage points framework is applied to experiences at the University of Vermont in order to evaluate campus sustainability efforts. Finally, real‐world examples are used to analyze and prioritize campus sustainability leverage points for advancing organizational change.

This systems thinking approach identifies key leverage points for actions to improve sustainability on campus. The leverage points framework is found to be valuable for: evaluating the potential of individual programs or actions to produce system‐wide change; coordinating individual programs into a strategic effort to improve the system; and making connections between campus and the surrounding social and environmental contexts. Advancing campus sustainability is found to be strengthened by particular ways of thinking and an organizational culture committed to continuous improvements and learning improved ways of doing business based on environmental and social, as well as institutional, benefits.

Campus sustainability workers must develop a prioritization process for evaluating which ideas to move forward on first. Systems thinking can cultivate our ability to consciously redesign and work with the systems that are in place, to intentionally pursue organizational improvements, and to plan and coordinate sustainability programs with potential for big changes.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the post-merger integration duration on acquiring firms’ leverage behavior before and after a merger, using a dynamic model in which full merger benefits cannot be consumed at the instant of a merger, but rather after a pre-specified post-merger integration period.

This paper presents a dynamic model and empirical tests that describe the impact of the post-merger integration period on the capital structure dynamics of the acquiring and target firms before a merger and during the post-merger integration period. By incorporating costs associated with the post-merger integration period, the model can provide new implications for the leverage behavior around the merger.

The model generates new implications related to acquiring firms’ leverage dynamics along with method of payment choice. Specifically, the model indicates that the post-merger integration duration is negatively associated with the market leverage of newly-merged firms at the time of merger completion and during the integration period. Further, acquirer managers are more likely to use equity to finance a merger when the integration duration is likely to be lengthy.

This is the first model in the literature that assumes that both the acquiring and the target firms can change their capital structure overtime, which allows us to analyze both the financing structure and the merger timing. Previous empirical studies also ignore the integration period in the analysis of the method of payment choice and leverage behavior around mergers. In the tests reported in this paper, the authors control for the factors mentioned above and demonstrate that the expected integration duration is not subsumed by those variables implying that it has its own power in explaining the choice of leverage and merger financing method.