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Current antitrust doctrine seemingly accepts average variable cost as one possible boundary between competitive and predatory pricing. Certain authors contend, however, that equally efficient rivals can sometimes be excluded from a market even when a dominant firm prices above its own average variable cost. A model is developed to test for predatory conduct in one such case. This model is applied to the reconstituted lemon juice industry. It shows that under certain conditions, even prices above average variable cost can be exclusionary.

The purpose of this research is to analyze the ability of agrifood systems to construct “customized competitiveness” strategies that can allow firms to meet the specific and constantly changing demands of foreign markets.

The research performs a comparative analysis of three case studies of agrifood systems in Argentina: lemon, pork, and dairy products. The authors obtained primary data from 79 semi-structured interviews with key persons in each agrifood system carried out online between March 2020 and February 2021. Secondary data was obtained from databases, academic studies, and reports from business associations and public agencies.

The authors find wide disparities in the development of customized competitiveness strategies between the studied agrifood systems (higher in lemon, lower in dairy products, and incipient in pork). The authors attribute the disparity to the varying degrees in which these systems are capable of coordinating their own actions and their interactions with State agencies.

The paper provides comparative evidence about the role of private coordination in the ability of agrifood systems to construct customized competitiveness strategies.

Platform certification constitutes an effective mechanism for managing the lemon problem concerning food e-commerce. This work aims to evaluate the market effect of platform certification and analyzes its correction mechanism for lemon problem combined with reputation mechanism.

Utilizing the Gold Seller certification of Taobao.com to serve as an illustration, the authors conducted an empirical study based on the sales data of hairy crabs among 2,239 sample sites over six points in time from October to December 2019, systematically examining the market effect of food e-commerce platform certification along with the interaction between food e-commerce platform certification and reputation mechanisms, followed by a heterogeneity test by product price.

This study finds that sellers with platform certification can significantly increase their sales. The market effect of platform certification is more easily observed in the low-price product market. In addition, platform certification and reputation mechanisms have complementary effects. In a low-price product market, the complementary effect of platform certification and product reputation diminishes, while the complementary effect of platform certification and seller reputation disappears.

This study explores the market effect of food e-commerce platform certification, reveals the market effect of certification mechanism when multiple signaling mechanisms exist simultaneously and conducts an empirical test based on real market data. It provides a better comprehension of how platform certifications work in food e-commerce.

The purpose of this paper is to test whether bad real estate owners drive out good real estate owners from the online marketplace for offices.

This research is based on a statistical analysis of the advertisement of offices in Malmö CBD, collected weekly during a period of one year.

The hypothesis that the market for advertisement of office properties is a lemons market cannot be rejected. The result that owners who have appeared in court more than once in the last two years being more inclined to advertise supports this.

The research in this paper is limited to the Malmö CBD office market.

It provides an insight in how the online marketplace for offices works as a marketplace and how quality signals influences advertisement.

This paper is a direct test of Akerlof’s classical lemon model.

A major transformation in retail logistics over the few years is backed by enormous improvements in internet technologies. It is now easy for e-retailers to entertain delivery progression, or consumers can share use-experience with future customers and thereby reducing information asymmetry. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of different signals on consumer behavior in the presence of information asymmetry, in the context of online group buying (OGB) markets in China.

Based on the lemon market theory (LMT) and signaling theory, the study develops a research model of the OGB consumers’ context in China, which is validated using data from an online survey. A total of 528 responses are used for data analysis applying structural equation modeling technique.

The findings of the study show that perceived vendor quality (PVQ) and perceived product quality (PPQ) have significantly positive effects on intention to purchase from OGB websites. PVQ is associated with perceived reputation and perceived trustworthiness (PT) of vendor, and the determinants of PPQ are quality assurance information of products, and information about mer-chants. Further, PT has a mediating effect, while asymmetry of information has a moderating effect.

The research model is valid as a generic OGB model that can be investigated in other contexts to understand the generalizability of the findings. Future research is needed to incorporate additional relevant factors (e.g. price, advertising activity/investments) that may help increase the acceptability of the model to a wide range of e-commerce contexts. Two of the control variables (gender and prior internet experience) were found to be significant; this could be further examined in future studies to determine the relative impact on each causal relationship.

Whereas prior studies in the domain of consumer service proposed different signaling mechanisms that were believed to eliminate information asymmetry from a market, the study sheds light on the effectiveness of the signals in the OGB context. This is a unique effort that applies and extends LMT and signaling theory in OGB context by theorizing the associated dimensions and their causal effects.

In order to ensure the continuing expansion and success of electronic commerce, the issue of how to assess product quality of items sold over the Internet must be addressed. The formal literature of microeconomics presents a conceptual framework for this assessment that is applied in the case study presented in this paper. The type of transaction studied is online auction transactions conducted through the popular web site, eBay. Quality issues, as well as other sources of buyer dissatisfaction with electronic purchases, are addressed on eBay through a bulletin board style feedback system by which members of the eBay community may report on various aspects of their eBay transactions. eBay publishes the feedback ratings of each seller as a part of its listing of any item for sale and also disciplines sellers that accumulate too much negative feedback. This would seem to provide buyers with some degree of protection from sellers who are unscrupulous in their claims regarding product quality. The empirical work presented here examines the effectiveness of this system using logistic and ordinary least squares regression, and concludes that at least key aspects of the system offer adequate incentives to sellers to provide accurate representations to buyers regarding the quality of their merchandise.

In this chapter, the authors conduct a robustness study for the classic experimental results of Lynch, Miller, Plott, and Porter (1986, 1991). The authors find strong support for the original hypotheses in an updated experimental marketplace, consisting of dichotomous product qualities, non-binding signals of product quality, fixed seller identifiers, and an end-point design of deliberate ambiguity. The authors show that fixed identifiers alone are not sufficient devices to support efficient outcomes in these updated market conditions.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the “evaluation deadlock” or “stasis” diagnosed by many authors. The explanation relies on a thought experiment.

The paper is conceptual and builds on a thought experiment inspired by qualitative research such as interviews with communication consultants in Sweden. It makes use of principal–agent theory and Akerlof’s theory of lemon markets.

A plausible explanation for the evaluation stasis requires consideration of practitioners’ self-interest as businesspeople. The deadlock is explained by an anomaly in practitioner populations and passive or active but covert resistance. If the long-time neglect of measurement and evaluation has led to expectation inflation and overpromising, even well-performing actors might shy away from rigorous measurement and evaluation practices in their own mandates, since they fear being measured against promotional, not realistic standards. At the same time, on the level of industry discourse, these practitioners would still advocate for measurement and evaluation in principle, so as to avoid the suspicion of underperformance.

The paper suggests an explanation for further empirical investigation. It does not attempt to demonstrate anything else than that the suggestion is plausible and that it warrants further investigation.

The scientific community engaged in the measurement and evaluation debate appears puzzled by the discrepancy between practitioners’ words and actions. The authors hope that the paper contributes to a more realistic and thus more constructive dialogue between practitioners and academics in the measurement and evaluation debate.

Inspired by Alvesson and Spicer’s concept of functional stupidity, the paper argues that attempts to explain the evaluation stasis have been marked by circumspection and narrowness. At present, explanations for the evaluation stasis tend to focus on lack of knowledge or inadequate systems or frameworks. The paper offers a more comprehensive explanation.

The case for compulsory minimum standards in those cases where the consumer cannot readily assess the quality before purchase is examined. The most common justifications are reduction in search, reduction in risk for the consumer and monopoly profits for producers. The factors relevant to an appraisal are identified. It is shown that generalised conclusions are not possible because of the wide range of market conditions. It would appear likely that in many markets minimum standards which remove dangerous or useless items are cost effective, though basic consumer protection legislation does this for most products. They are also appropriate where costs are public rather than private. Increased levels of minimum standards are progressively less cost‐effective. Labelling can often be a superior alternative.

Grounded in lemon market theory, this paper aims to examine the influence of corporate governance (CG) on stock market liquidity in Bangladesh, where stock market manipulation because of speculative trading is a common concern.

This study is based on a sample of 2,420 firm-year observations covering all non-financial firms in Bangladesh from 1996 to 2011.

This study’s results show a significant relationship between governance and liquidity within firms over time. In particular, within firms, when governance quality increases, liquidity significantly improves. For instance, a rise in the governance quality by one standard deviation decreases the illiquidity ratio by 55.97%. The results are unlikely to be confounded by endogeneity.

The results have important policy implications for security regulators, investors, traders and managers. The results support the current regulatory trend of strengthening CG practices in the listed firms in Bangladesh.

This study contributes to the understanding of the role of effective firm-level CG on stock liquidity in the context of an emerging country. Consistent with prior research mostly conducted in the advanced economies, it provides further empirical support that higher CG quality reduces the information asymmetry problem and enhances stock liquidity even in a speculative market.