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Reasonable risk sharing is the key to the smooth implementation of infrastructure public-private partnership (PPP) projects and the optimization of benefit distribution among the participants. This study aims to explore the risk redistribution ratio between the government and the private sector under different degree of fairness concern.

Renegotiation is a mechanism to provide flexibility and make up for incompleteness of PPP contracts. However, the threshold value of risk redistribution ratio and negotiation cost are not explicitly considered in previous studies. In addition, these studies do not consider the influence of the fairness concern psychology on the negotiation process. To address these gaps, based on risk-income equilibrium analysis, this paper established the bargaining optimization model of PPP projects renegotiation considering the fairness concerns of the negotiating parties. Furthermore, this study analyzed the influence of fairness concern degree on negotiation thresholds, negotiation results, and negotiation incomes under three scenarios.

The results showed that excessive focus on the fairness of incomes may exclude the risk redistribution ratio that is most beneficial to project incomes from the negotiation threshold. Moreover, the increase in the fairness concerns of negotiating parties can reduce the negotiation success period, but the net income may not necessarily be improved.

The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new risk renegotiation methodology based on the risk-income equilibrium analysis, which is helpful to develop risk management strategies in the construction field. The research results can provide government with reference about renegotiation in decision making and provide theoretical support for the practice of PPP renegotiation.