Search results

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 had far-reaching consequences for the global economy, triggering widespread economic turmoil. We use the event-study method to investigate whether investors priced the effect of significant events before the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in European and Asia-Pacific banks. Abnormal returns on the event days range from −4.32% to 5.03% in Europe and −5.13% to 6.57% in Asia-Pacific countries. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008, abnormal returns averaged the lowest at −4.32% in Europe and −5.13% in Asia-Pacific countries. The significant abnormal returns show that Lehman Brothers' collapse was a turning point, and investors paid attention to the precrisis events as warning signs of the oncoming crisis.

This chapter discusses the challenges and opportunities that exist in the realm of management and business education. The author provides an in-depth analysis of the history and development of management education, highlighting the changes and evolution that have occurred over time. Furthermore, the author discusses the dominant paradigm that has shaped management education and the issues that have arisen as a result. Specifically, the author identifies the problems that have contributed to financial crises and business failures, demonstrating the inadequacies of the current approach. Finally, the author argues for the need to revolutionize the current management education system. This involves a significant departure from the traditional methods of teaching and learning, and instead emphasizes the development of critical thinking skills, problem-solving abilities and adaptability in a rapidly changing business landscape. This chapter challenges the current state of management education and offers a compelling call to action for reform. By addressing the issues that have plagued the field and proposing innovative solutions, the author aims to pave the way for a more responsible management education system.

Due to its high leverage nature, a bank suffers vitally from the credit risk it inherently bears. As a result, managing credit is the ultimate responsibility of a bank. In this chapter, we examine how efficiently banks manage their credit risk via a powerful tool used widely in the decision/management science area called data envelopment analysis (DEA). Among various existing versions, our DEA is a two-stage, dynamic model that captures how each bank performs relative to its peer banks in terms of value creation and credit risk control. Using data from the largest 22 banks in the United States over the period of 1996 till 2013, we have identified leading banks such as First Bank systems and Bank of New York Mellon before and after mergers and acquisitions, respectively. With the goal of preventing financial crises such as the one that occurred in 2008, a conceptual model of credit risk reduction and management (CRR&M) is proposed in the final section of this study. Discussions on strategy formulations at both the individual bank level and the national level are provided. With the help of our two-stage DEA-based decision support systems and CRR&M-driven strategies, policy/decision-makers in a banking sector can identify improvement opportunities regarding value creation and risk mitigation. The effective tool and procedures presented in this work will help banks worldwide manage the unknown and become more resilient to potential credit crises in the 21st century.

When organizations engage in misconduct, social control agents play a crucial role in sanctioning them to show the enforcement of societal norms and reduce the risk of future deviance. We study the interaction between the government and the media, two key social control agents, in the evaluation organizational misconduct. While past work has focused on the influence of the media on the government, we theorize the influence of the government on the media. The government is a social control agent with supreme formal authority to punish misconduct, and thus its actions are of particular interest to the media as they form evaluations of misbehaving organizations. However, the government, tied by conflicting demands, sometimes turns a blind eye to misconduct and supports misbehaving organizations for the greater societal good, instead of punishing them. How is the media’s perception of misbehaving organizations affected by such government actions? We explore this question by looking at the case of the 2008 government bailout of investment banks in the United States, after those were caught red-handed for their involvement in the sub-prime financial crisis. Carrying out a content analysis of newspaper reporting (2007–2011), we show that the negative perception of investment banks and their misconduct is attenuated when they receive government support. Our work contributes to the emerging literature on the social construction of organizational misconduct and illuminates the interaction between government and media in the evaluation of behavior as organizational misconduct.

Scandal is the disruptive publicity of alleged misconduct and it is important for organizations because of its severe consequences. Distinguishing between single-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct by a single actor, and multiple-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct of a similar type by multiple actors, we develop a framework for studying scandal dynamics that draws a distinction between how scandals start (single-actor or multiple-actor) and how they end (single-actor or multiple-actor). We focus specifically on spillover scandals (from single to multiple actors) and scapegoating scandals (from multiple to single actors) and identify several mechanisms that affect the likelihood of these two important types of scandals. We conclude by developing a research agenda that builds upon the central contribution of our framework: the distinction between single- and multiple-organization scandals and the transitions that result in spillovers and scapegoating.

Systems thinking calls for a shift of our mindset from seeing just parts to seeing the whole reality in its structured dynamic unity and interconnectedness. Systems thinking fosters a sensibility to see subtle connections between components and parts of reality, especially the free enterprise capitalist system (FECS). It enables us to see ourselves as active participants or partners of FECS and not mere induced factors of its production–distribution–consumption processes. Systems thinking seeks to identify the economic “structures” that underlie complex situations in FECS that bring about high versus low leveraged changes. A system is strengthened and reinforced by feedback of reciprocal exchanges that makes the system alive, transparent, human, and humanizing.

In Part I, we explore basic laws or patterns of behaviors as understood by systems thinking; in Part II we examine the basic archetypes or structured behaviors of systems thinking; in both parts we strive to see reality through the lens of critical thinking to help us understand patterns and structures of behavior among systems and their component parts. In conclusion, we argue for compatibility and complementarity of critical thinking and systems thinking to identify and resolve management problems created by our flawed thinking, and sedimented by our wanton assumptions, presumptions, suppositions and presuppositions, biases, and prejudices. Such thinking will also identify unnecessary economic and political structures of the self-serving policies we create, which imprison us.

The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between banks' ownership structure and their risk-taking behavior as well as the impact of banking regulation on banks' approach to taking risk, after the 2008 financial crisis.

The empirical analysis considers a sample of listed banks from European Union (EU) countries, over the period of 2011–2016 and uses the generalized least squared (GLS) random effect (RE) method, following Baltagi and Wu (1999) and Pathan (2009).

The authors find that the structure of the board of directors can influence bank risk behavior but not the ownership concentration. No significant relation was found between the influence of the regulatory environment and bank risk, i.e., stricter regulation has no effect on risk taking by banks.

The paper contributes to the literature in risk measures and banks' corporate governance. It also considers the impact of regulatory framework on banks' risk-taking behavior. The aim of this empirical analysis was to examine in greater detail these subjects and the dynamics between them after the significant structural changes in the macroeconomic environment and in the financial system, particularly with regards the regulatory and supervisory framework following the 2008 financial crisis, using data from European Union countries.

Midway through construction, a hotel developer realised that costs had risen too much to be feasible for equity capital. They repositioned the asset as a ResiTel wherein each suite would be sold as a condominium unit to retail buyers. This called for setting up two separate entities: one (PropCo) for asset management and the other (LeaseCo) for operating the hotel. Unit owners would earn a regular share of hotel income. The lenders protected additional sale-risk by more conservative loan terms. The developer must analyse the feasibility of the repositioned asset.