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This case examines the causes and consequences of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy during one of the most fascinating weekends in financial history. It's about the commercial paper market, a major funding market served by Lehman Brothers, and the events that led to “breaking the buck” on money market funds. It also examines the CDS market where Lehman was such a big player, the potential impact that CDSs had on the crisis, and the notion and validity of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis.

The case introduces students to the nature of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and the CDO origination process, with emphasis on the corporate structure of the special purpose vehicles, cash flows to various CDO tranches, and motivation behind CDO origination. Students will learn to quantitatively evaluate the risk-return profile of CDO tranches with emphasis on the equity tranche (also known as “toxic waste”). This is ideal for MBA and advanced undergraduate level courses on financial markets, financial institutions, and investments. In the case, an associate at the Debt Capital Markets desk of Lehman Brothers prepares a CDO issuance for Western Asset. Western Asset had been contacted by a group of commercial banks eager to sell senior secured bank loans and high-yield corporate bonds to lower their capital requirements and free up capital for additional lending.

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.

This case is suitable for students just beginning to learn finance principles but is also appropriate to use in courses with experienced students and executives. In January 2008, Delphi Corporation (Delphi) had been in Chapter 11 bankruptcy for more than two years but appeared to be on the brink of approving a plan of reorganization (POR) that would allow it to emerge from bankruptcy with a significantly improved balance sheet. Delphi's POR called for a reduction of the company's leverage by exchanging the debt of the unsecured creditors for a mixture of new debt and new equity. The resulting reduction in interest expense was projected to return Delphi to profitability and make the restructured company a viable going concern. Students take the position of various claimants to explain why that claimant class would or would not vote for the plan.

This case presents financial and macroeconomic data for the United States between 2007 and 2013, a period covering the financial crisis and Great Recession of 2007–2009 and the slow economic recovery from 2009 onward. During this period, the Federal Reserve had set the federal funds rate, its primary monetary policy instrument, near zero and was using additional monetary policy tools to stimulate the economy. One of these additional tools was quantitative easing (QE).

Students will use the data provided in the case to examine how financial markets reacted to QE actions by the Federal Reserve and to analyze the potential impact of QE on the macroeconomy.

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

• Apply the event study methodology to analyze economic effects

• Recognize how macroeconomic news affects the prices of financial securities

• Describe the connections between the prices of financial securities and the macroeconomy

• • Debate the relative costs and benefits of quantitative easing and the optimality of Federal Reserve policy

Apply the event study methodology to analyze economic effects

Recognize how macroeconomic news affects the prices of financial securities

Describe the connections between the prices of financial securities and the macroeconomy

• Debate the relative costs and benefits of quantitative easing and the optimality of Federal Reserve policy

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

Midway through construction, a hotel developer realised that costs had risen too much to be feasible for equity capital. They repositioned the asset as a ResiTel wherein each suite would be sold as a condominium unit to retail buyers. This called for setting up two separate entities: one (PropCo) for asset management and the other (LeaseCo) for operating the hotel. Unit owners would earn a regular share of hotel income. The lenders protected additional sale-risk by more conservative loan terms. The developer must analyse the feasibility of the repositioned asset.

Are hedge funds heroes or villains? Management of Blockbuster, Time Warner, Six Flags, Knight-Ridder, and Bally Total Fitness might prefer the “villain” appellation, but Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and HealthSouth shareholders might view management as the real villains and hedge funds as vehicles to oust incompetent corporate managers before they run companies into the ground or steal them through fraudulent transactions. Could the pressure exerted by activist hedge funds on targeted companies result in increased share prices, management accountability, and better communication with shareholders? Or does it distract management from its primary goal of enhancing long-term shareholder value?

To determine the benefits and disadvantages of activist hedge fund activity from the perspective of corporate management and shareholders; to examine if a hedge fund's suggested corporate restructuring could create greater shareholder value; and to explain the changing roles and perspectives of hedge funds.

Kwench Library Solutions (Kwench), a Mumbai-based start-up that offered library services to corporate clients, looked anxiously for angel funding to establish itself and expand to other parts of the country. The time – the first few months of the 2008–09 global recession – was particularly bad. The angel investors who came forward valued the start-up at one third of what the promoters had confidently expected. Their valuation was unacceptable, but spurning their offer was fraught with additional risks. The promoters, who had given up high-paying corporate jobs and invested heavily in the start-up, had to find a way out.

Jim Reynolds Jr. founded Loop Capital in 1997 as an investment bank specializing in bond sales for municipalities. Ten years later, with thirteen offices and almost 100 employees, Loop Capital was a national company and had brokered more than $800 billion of underwritings in equity, tax-exempt, and taxable fixed income markets. In the process of building its municipal finance and equity trading businesses, Loop Capital had developed close relationships with a number of government officials, large institutional money managers, and corporate executives. These customers began asking Loop Capital for help with other financial services, leading the firm to build corporate finance, tax-exempt, and taxable fixed-income platforms so it could offer a wider array of investment services. Municipal and corporate finance as well as equity, taxable, and tax-exempt trading were generating positive cash flow. In a field where failures were frequent, Loop Capital was thriving, and Reynolds saw great but untapped potential in the company's future. Over the past several years, Loop Capital had served as financial advisor to several municipalities that wanted to lease or sell public assets such as airports, toll roads, and seaports. Now he confronted several intriguing questions: Should he launch a $700 million infrastructure fund to invest in the types of deals the firm had helped structure? Did it make sense to invest in order to staff, market, and support the start-up of this new fund? If the fund was launched, should Loop Capital commit to the 1% investment likely to be required as the fund's general partner?

Learn how to start a new financial services firm/investment bank venture Learn how an investment banking firm becomes successful at doing a few things well Assess risks of expanding into a new line of business with a different business model Examine differences between investment banking and fund management, and between high-growth entrepreneurship and lifestyle entrepreneurship Examine the significance, if any, of being a minority entrepreneur