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Purpose and approach – This research explores gender and gender inequality in representation in state legislatures among African Americans, Hispanics, and white Americans. Using 10 states with the largest concentrations of African Americans in the population and 10 with the largest concentrations of Hispanics in 2003, a parity index was used to compare each race/sex group's share of each state's population with that group's share of seats in the state legislature. Parity ratios were also constructed for white women and white men in both sets of states.

Findings – White men dominate all the state legislatures surveyed here; white women are severely underrepresented as are Black women, Hispanic women, and Hispanic men. Black men are slightly but not greatly underrepresented in political office in these states. A consistent pattern is that the higher the representation of any group of males, the greater is the gap between women and men.

For Black and white women in both sets of states, having a high proportion of women who are college graduates, who are employed, and who work as managers or professionals and garner larger earnings increases their chances for election, but this pattern is not observed among Hispanic women.

Implications – These findings are significant because they bring together previously disparate insights from political science and sociology; highlight differences between women and men and among people from different ethnic groups; and reveal the importance of an intersectional approach for understanding the representation of diverse groups in political office.

This chapter examines the range of possible effects of ethics laws enacted by state legislatures. One objective of ethics law, to reduce corruption, cannot be demonstrated. Other objectives, to placate the media, defend against partisan attack, and permit the legislature to move on, have mixed results, while a final objective, to restore public confidence, is not achieved. Nevertheless, ethics law does affect the process, by somewhat discouraging legislator recruitment and retention, by raising the consciousness of legislators, and by changing the cultures of state capitals.

This study aims to contribute to the emerging discourse on elite financial crime, with particular attention devoted to the role played by the legislature in corrupt practices in Nigeria. Separations of power, watchdog role of legislature and ideologies have become a major influence in democratic system. Legislative power has developed as a means of providing oversight functions over the executives, thereby inhibiting fraudulent practices in governments.

The paper argues that the political institutional structures embedded with monopoly, discretion and little or no accountability facilitate financial corrupt practices within the legislature. The paper uses publicly available evidence to show that the legislators in developing countries are actively engaged in corrupt practices.

The evidence provided in this paper shows that separation of power and representative democracy had not brought about transparency and accountability in government activities in Nigeria. Legislature often trade-off their constitutional power and their claim of service to the public interest by engaging in financial criminal practices.

This paper does not set out to provide a comprehensive analysis of political corruption. Instead, it considers the “dark” side of legislative practice by examining the involvement of legislature in facilitating corrupt financial practices in Nigeria.

The inability of the regulators to effectively sanction legislators implicated in corrupt practices suggests that the current institutional and regulatory apparatus are not fully equipped in dealing with the financial criminal activities of legislators.

Despite the arrest and prosecution of some legislators, a number of cases are swept under the carpet. Therefore, this paper suggests that Nigeria need to reform its political system and institutions to promote transparency and accountability in government and to build trust in the legislative process.

This paper considers the “dark” side of legislative practice by examining the involvement of legislature in facilitating corrupt financial practices in Nigeria.

The imposition of term limits in bicameral (two‐chamber) state legislatures could produce unforeseen consequences in the policymaking process. Supporters of term limit rules have not considered that their imposition could fundamentally shift the sequence of policymaking in legislatures. This is important given that research on sequential bicameral policymaking suggests qualities of the lower chamber allow it to cultivate policy expertise such that the upper chamber will defer to the lower chamber in policymaking. This project aims to explore whether this proposed policymaking sequence exists in term‐limited states.

A comparison of policy adoptions in states with and without term limits is performed using an original data set on bill adoptions for all US bicameral legislatures that had a regular session between the years 2000 and 2006. Least‐squares regression models evaluate whether basic characteristics of legislatures are as relevant as term limit characteristics in explaining the level of outputs from the lower chamber in term‐limited states.

In states with term limits, the level of policy adoptions initiated by the lower chamber is lower than levels seen in states without term limits. This finding holds when controlling for other relevant variables that can potentially explain lower chamber productivity.

The study analyzes aggregate state‐level data and does not interview individual legislators in states with and without term limits on whether term limits can alter future legislative behavior.

This study is the first to examine whether the policymaking sequence differs between states that possess and do not possess term limit rules.

Little is known about the strategies used by state courts during the appropriations process. This article examines court budgetary practices in the state of Oklahoma. It reveals how court funding works in Oklahoma, what strategies are used by the state courts, and which factors are most important in determining the success of the courts in getting the funds they need. It shows that the judiciary is not necessarily at the mercy of the other branches of government when seeking resources. The findings provide the first glimpse at court budgeting strategies and determinants of these strategies’ success at the state level.

Legislative procedures that expose tax expenditure proposals to scrutiny outside the taxation committees can improve a state legislature’s ability to control its tax base. These procedures -- fiscal notes, special subcommittees, joint taxation and spending committees, and bill size C move decisions away from the exclusive control of committees whose interests may be more narrow than the interests of the legislature as a whole. Strong legislative procedures do not, and should not, eliminate the passage of new tax exemptions, but it is desirable to enact only exemptions that match major policy objectives. Several factors, including an important economic special interest, a tax rate increase, or a major shift in intergovernmental fiscal relations, can boost an exemption past even the strongest procedures. Procedures appear to be most effective in limiting exemptions with a relatively small fiscal effect.

We show that, in the US telecommunications industry, market participants have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and behave strategically in their allocation of contributions to state legislators as if seeking to purchase influence over regulatory policy. We find that interests respond defensively to contributions from rivals, take into account the configuration of support available to them in both the legislature and the regulatory commission, and vary their contributions according to variations in relative costs for influence by different legislatures. This strategic behavior supports a theory that commercially motivated interests contribute campaign resources in order to mobilize legislators to influence the decisions of regulatory agencies. We also report evidence that restrictions on campaign finance do not affect all interests equally. The paper therefore provides positive evidence on the nature and effects of campaign contributions in regulated industries where interest group competition may be sharp.

The death penalty has existed in a state of steady decline for the last two decades, during which state legislatures have been at the center of abolition efforts. Successful abolition is, however, very rare in contrast to how often death penalty repeal bills are introduced across state legislatures, year after year. Indeed, abolition is not a sudden event, but may be many years in the making. Research on the early phases of this process, where the groundwork for enacted legislation is laid, is nevertheless limited. This chapter explores patterns of death penalty bill introductions across all active death penalty states from 1999 to 2018, providing not only an overview of legislative activity at state level but also an analysis of potential factors fueling the activity. It argues that individual legislators play a significant role in the current trend of increased legislative support for a restricted, if not entirely abolished, death penalty, evident both in terms of persistency over time and cooperation across party lines. It also problematizes partisan aspects of legislative activity in the context of legislation on capital punishment.

The paper aims to highlight differences in bank performance based on state politics during the onset of the Covid pandemic. The response to Covid pandemic created an unusual opportunity for an investigation of how politics impacts banking due to the initial response to the pandemic being heavily impacted by political affiliation states' governors and dominant parties in state legislatures. Previous research looked at impact of elections on the federal level (both executive and legislative branches) on bank risk and performance. The response to the Covid pandemic in 2020 allows for an investigation on how political influence on the state level impacted banks performance.

The Covid pandemic was an unexpected storm that entered the United States with a vengeance in 2020, taking countless lives and ravaging the economic landscape. The response to the pandemic quickly took a political spin as republican governors showed greater reluctance to shutter business activity in hopes of slowing down the spread of the virus than their democratic counterparts. This paper examines the impact of the two Americas created along the lines of political influence as it impacted bank performance over four-quarters beginning with the fourth quarter of 2019. All US banks are split into groups based on the political affiliation of state governors and the dominant party in state legislatures to measure impact of politics on bank performance and risk.

This research finds that banks operating in states with republican governors produced greater profits and exhibited higher liquidity levels. The same results held for banks in states where both the governorship and the legislature were controlled by republicans versus banks in states where both the governor and the legislature were democratic. Interestingly, the findings present a reversal when examining banks in states led by republican governors and democratic legislatures versus banks in states with democratic governors and republican legislatures. In those instances of mixed leadership, banks in states with democratic governors tend to show greater profits, greater liquidity while demonstrating lower asset quality.

A paper published in Managerial Finance in 2018 discussed the impact of the parties in control of the White house and the legislative branch on bank performance and risk. There have been no studies, to the author’s knowledge, that look at how states' political leadership (gubernatorial and legislative) impact on bank performance. Because the response to the Covid pandemic became a politically polarized issue, the onset of the crisis allowed for measurement of how different responses by republican and democratic state leadership impacted bank performance and risk.

The purpose of this paper is to apply a novel intersectional framework, the heavy lifter theory, to leadership attainability in state legislatures. It is a logical and unique way to examine the gender ascription of Black women. This work helps to shed light on the political behavior of Black women, the institutional obstacles they face, and the lasting power of ancestral talent development.

One way to examine this intersectional theory, as it relates to Black women and authentic talent development in a sociocultural context, is an examination of leadership attainment in state legislatures. The specific research question was: What is the probability that Black women will attain leadership in state legislatures in comparison to Black men and white women? This study used panel data that have individual-level data on state legislators from 2007 to 2014 and applied a logistic regression and a predictive probability.

Intersectionality, measured as the interaction term between sex and race, increases the probability of Black women earning formal leadership positions in state legislatures. In addition, Black women attain leadership positions at higher rates than both Black men and white women.

This research presents a historical context by which to understand and examine the gendered nature of the ascription process of Black women. Specifically, their experience as a marginalized group burdened them with the duty of the heavy lifter. Although being the heavy lifter is a burden, this focus on Black women’s ability to thrive under constant discrimination in the form of racism and sexism should give scholars pause. In looking at Black women legislators’ ability to gain leadership, the heavy lifter identity can potentially be a vehicle through which Black women legislators can find a sense of purpose and both psychological and social strength to forge their own unexpected path.