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The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of setting access restrictions to legislative drafting records – specifically in New Zealand.

Various international archival institutions and other offices which create legislative drafting records were contacted to see what access restrictions were placed on any legislative drafting files that they held. The information provided by these institutions, together with written theoretical information regarding public access and legal professional privilege, was the basis for the research.

There is no standard approach to allowing public access to legislative drafting records across the institutions researched. The level of accessibility varies, as does the period of restriction. In New Zealand legislative drafting records are considered to be protected by legal professional privilege and therefore are restricted unless the privilege is waived.

The main form of communication used to contact the various institutions was e‐mail. A large number of institutions and offices from which information was requested did not reply, and some that did reply did not provide answers specific to legislative drafting records. The research is therefore limited to the information that was received.

There is very little published information available regarding legislative drafting records and public access to them. These records are unique due to debate over whether or not they are, or should be, covered by legal professional privilege. Because of the unique nature of these records, there is no common or widely available precedent to follow when applying access restrictions to them.

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of independent institution as moderation between community involvement and legislative institution responsiveness in Mataram City.

This research is explanatory research, which explains the effect between variables by hypothesis testing. This research was conducted in Mataram City, West Nusa Tenggara. Population in this study included all stakeholders involved in Mataram City’s participatory planning, including community leaders, legislative institutions (starting from the village/subdistrict, district to city levels) and independent institutions. The sampling was performed using nonprobability sampling technique, namely, quota sampling. The research model with inferential analysis used a structural equation modelling (SEM) with WarpPLS to answer the statements of problems and test the desired hypotheses.

The research results conclude that community involvement has a direct effect on legislative institution responsiveness and legislative institution responsiveness has a direct effect on the success of participatory development planning. This indicates that all variables in this research influence the success of participatory development planning. However, the indirect effect of legislative institution responsiveness on the success of participatory development planning through the role of independent institution is not significant.

The role of independent institutions as a moderation of the relationship between community involvement and legislative institution responsiveness can be learned as the novelty in this study.

The field of nonmarket strategy has expanded rapidly over the past 20 years to provide theoretical and practical guidance for managers seeking to influence policymaking. Much of this scholarship has built directly on spatial and “pivotal politics” models of lawmaking. While extremely helpful at identifying crucial targets for lobbying, these models treat all policymakers as identical in their abilities to advance legislative agenda items through various policymaking hurdles. We build upon these earlier models, but include policymakers who vary in their relative effectiveness at advancing measures through the legislative process. We identify how the implications of our model deviate from those of conventional (pivotal politics) analyses. We then present an empirical strategy for identifying effective Lawmakers in the United States Congress, and illustrate the utility of this approach for managers developing nonmarket strategies in legislative institutions, relying on the case of banking and financial services reforms between 2008 and 2011.

The purpose of this paper is to examine a curvilinear effect of legislative constraints on foreign debt.

A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 68 developing countries during the period from 1981 to 1999 was performed.

Foreign borrowing is most likely to increase at both low and high levels of legislative constraints, while it is most likely to decrease at moderate levels.

The paper is a first-cut empirical analysis of a curvilinear relationship between legislative constraints and foreign debt.

Many studies of the budgetary process focus on the national government while ignoring the state budgetary process and state budgetary actors. Executive budget analysts and legislative budget analysts are important gatekeepers in the budgetary process. These actors were surveyed to ascertain what influences their decisions and to determine what responsibilities are included in their job duties. The results show that many similarities exist between executive budget analysts and legislative budget analysts. Legislative budget analysts are more involved in the budgetary process than many believe. Consequently, they play important “gatekeeping” roles in the budgetary process.

This paper develops a new theory arguing that party change results from ruptures in political parties’ ties to civil society organizations. I demonstrate the utility of this approach by using it to explain why the Rhode Island Democratic Party (RIDP) changed from a hierarchical machine to a porous political field occupied by multiple interlegislator cliques and brokered by extra-party political organizations and professionals. While others attribute party change to bureaucratization, electoral demand, or system-level changes, I analyze historical, observational, and interview data to find that a severance in the RIDP’s relationship with organized labor prompted party change by causing power to diffuse outward as leadership lost control over nominations and the careers of elected office holders. In the spaces that remained, interest groups and political professionals came to occupy central positions within the party field, serving as brokers of the information and relationships necessary to coordinate legislative activity. This analysis refines existing theories of party change and provides a historically-grounded explanation for the institutionalization of interest groups and political professionals in American party politics.

We show that, in the US telecommunications industry, market participants have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and behave strategically in their allocation of contributions to state legislators as if seeking to purchase influence over regulatory policy. We find that interests respond defensively to contributions from rivals, take into account the configuration of support available to them in both the legislature and the regulatory commission, and vary their contributions according to variations in relative costs for influence by different legislatures. This strategic behavior supports a theory that commercially motivated interests contribute campaign resources in order to mobilize legislators to influence the decisions of regulatory agencies. We also report evidence that restrictions on campaign finance do not affect all interests equally. The paper therefore provides positive evidence on the nature and effects of campaign contributions in regulated industries where interest group competition may be sharp.

The death penalty has existed in a state of steady decline for the last two decades, during which state legislatures have been at the center of abolition efforts. Successful abolition is, however, very rare in contrast to how often death penalty repeal bills are introduced across state legislatures, year after year. Indeed, abolition is not a sudden event, but may be many years in the making. Research on the early phases of this process, where the groundwork for enacted legislation is laid, is nevertheless limited. This chapter explores patterns of death penalty bill introductions across all active death penalty states from 1999 to 2018, providing not only an overview of legislative activity at state level but also an analysis of potential factors fueling the activity. It argues that individual legislators play a significant role in the current trend of increased legislative support for a restricted, if not entirely abolished, death penalty, evident both in terms of persistency over time and cooperation across party lines. It also problematizes partisan aspects of legislative activity in the context of legislation on capital punishment.

This chapter examines the range of possible effects of ethics laws enacted by state legislatures. One objective of ethics law, to reduce corruption, cannot be demonstrated. Other objectives, to placate the media, defend against partisan attack, and permit the legislature to move on, have mixed results, while a final objective, to restore public confidence, is not achieved. Nevertheless, ethics law does affect the process, by somewhat discouraging legislator recruitment and retention, by raising the consciousness of legislators, and by changing the cultures of state capitals.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of budgeting in the monitoring functions of the Tanzanian Parliament, specifically the monitoring functions of the Parliamentary Budget Committee (PBC).

The paper uses Burchell et al.’s (1980) accounting “machines” framework and its development as a theoretical lens to interpret the research findings. Interviews, document analysis and observation were used for data collection.

The findings reveal that budget documents were used as learning and answering machines, as they served as the basis for questioning, for checking variances, for reviewing and for conducting monitoring visits. Budgeting procedures were utilized as ammunition machines, as they were used as the basis for expressing legislative officials’ positions and understanding the logic of executive officials’ actions.

The paper investigates the role of budgeting in a parliamentary setting. However, comparative analysis is missing. Nevertheless, the results provide a foundation for future studies and the opportunity to investigate the role of budgeting in the monitoring functions of other parliaments, especially in emerging economies.

The study has practical implications directed toward governments, especially in emerging economies. This study suggests that budgeting documents and procedures can be used to overcome the complexities of the PBC monitoring functions. Budgeting is, therefore, essential in the monitoring functions of the PBC, especially in emerging economies.

The study contributes to the understanding of the role of budgeting in monitoring functions in a parliamentary setting in emerging economies, where such research is lacking. The study also contributes by introducing an “ammunition” role to the theoretical literature on budget use (Simons, 1990, 1991; Abernethy and Brownell, 1999), which is argued to be relevant to politicians and organizations of a political nature, including parliaments.