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This paper investigates the relationship of ownership structure and corporate performance of China’s listed property companies. Data from all the listed property companies on China’s stock market from 2000 to 2002 were used to study ownership concentration, type of controlling shares and their relation to corporate performance. The methodology applied is the conventional ordinary least square (OLS) model which is widely used in empirical studies on corporate governance. The study shows that ownership concentration has a positive association with corporate performance. Also that state shareholding is positively related to corporate performance; this is inconsistent with other empirical studies on the ownership structure and corporate performance of China’s listed companies and rflects the industry’s characteristics.

The aim of this paper is to investigate stakeholder power changes and their impact on firms' disclosure decisions in the Chinese stock market. Using legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, the paper identifies newly emerged stakeholder groups for listed Chinese firms during three distinguished periods of the development of the Chinese stock market.

Panel data analysis was undertaken over a period from 1995‐2006 with an aim to examine the influence of stakeholder power changes on voluntary disclosures made by 297 listed firms in their 12 years of annual reports. A voluntary disclosure checklist has been used for hand‐collecting data from annual reports.

The finding shows that different stakeholder groups exert different degrees of influence on firms' decision‐making in respect of information disclosure during different stages of the development of the Chinese stock market.

The impact of a stakeholder power changes on corporate disclosure has not been well addressed and how listed Chinese firms respond to these changes is still a significant gap in the Chinese corporate disclosure literature. In this study, the paper uses proxies to represent each stakeholder group, discuss power changes of each group and predict the impact of power changes on firms' voluntary disclosure.

The paper identifies the new content of the “social contract” between listed firms and Chinese society and identifies various stakeholder groups of listed Chinese firms in the context of a new “social contract”. The paper predicts that voluntary corporate disclosure is the result of stakeholder pressures and firms use voluntary disclosure as one of their strategies to manage the firm‐stakeholder relationship.

This paper seeks to investigate some current issues of ownership structure and corporate governance in China.

The methodology is a review, analysing issues of ownership structure and reviewing problems in corporate governance, followed by some suggestions for improvement.

It is found that the heavily concentrated equity ownership in the hands of large state‐owned shareholders mainly decides the status quo of the corporate governance system in China. In order to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance of Chinese‐listed companies, it is imperative to restructure roles of the government, restrict hands of controlling shareholders, enhance independence of the board of directors, reform the supervisory board, set up independent directors‐dominated sub‐committees and align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders.

This paper only investigates Chinese‐listed companies because of data availability.

It has implications for policy makers in China insofar as it offers evidence concerning ownership structure and corporate governance of Chinese‐listed companies. It also helps investors and trading partners (especially foreign ones) understand corporate governance and the investment environment in China.

This study contributes to the literature by extending the mainly US‐based board literature to China where there are important institutional differences in ownership structure and corporate governance system.

This chapter examines China’s corporate governance and accounting environment that shapes the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards. Specifically, it examines international influences, including supranational organizations; foreign investors and international accounting firms; domestic institutional influences, including the political system, economic system, legal system, and cultural system; and accounting infrastructure. China’s convergence is driven by desired efficiency of the corporate sector and legitimacy of participating in the global market. Influenced heavily by international forces in the context of globalization, corporate governance and accounting practices are increasingly becoming in line with internationally acceptable standards and codes. While convergence assists China in obtaining legitimacy, improving efficiency is likely to be adversely affected given that corporate governance and accounting in China operate in an environment that differs considerably from those of Anglo-American countries. An examination of the corporate governance and accounting environment in China suggests heavy government involvement within underdeveloped institutions. While the Chinese government has made impressive progress in developing the corporate governance and accounting environment for the market economy, China’s unique institutional setting is likely to affect how the imported concepts are interpreted and implemented.

The paper aims to examine the impact of ownership structure and board composition on voluntary disclosures of listed companies in China.

Using an OLS‐regression model to test the relationship among ownership structure, board composition and the level of voluntary disclosure. The sample is based on 559 firm observations in 2002.

Higher blockholder ownership and foreign listing/shares ownership is associated with increased disclosure. However, managerial ownership, state ownership, and legal‐person ownership are not related to disclosure. An increase in independent directors increases corporate disclosure and CEO duality is associated with lower disclosure. The paper also finds that larger firms had greater disclosure, while firms with growth opportunities are reluctant to disclose information voluntarily.

Firstly, the sample is comprised of companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2002 and only 45.7 percent of representative firms listed in China. Secondly, the disclosure checklist does not cover all voluntary disclosure in corporations as employed and supported in several prior studies. Thirdly, the award of checklist items may be subjected to errors.

This paper indicates the relationship among ownership structure, board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure, and provides evidence for Chinese regulators to improve corporate governance and optimize ownership structure.

Distinct from prior empirical research based on disclosure behavior in developed‐western markets, this study examines the impact of ownership structure and board composition on voluntary disclosures of listed companies in the Asian setting of China.

Corporate governance has attracted enormous attention both in the area of law and in the area of financial economics. In comparative corporate governance studies, many people have devoted their energy to find a best corporate governance model. I argue that a functional analysis does not support the view that there is a single best corporate governance model in the world. I further use the transplantation of an English style takeover law into China to show that the importation of foreign law is not always based on careful analysis whether the imported foreign law is the best in the world. Furthermore, I use the subsequent adjustment of the transplanted English takeover law in China to show that the imported foreign law is subject to local political and economic conditions. If there is no best corporate govern model and the transplantation of foreign law into other countries with different social and political background does not achieve similar objectives, the search for a best corporate governance model is misguided. Just as tort law or constitutional law regimes may have diversified models, so do corporate governance regimes in countries with different historical, social and political backgrounds.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between external regulation pressure and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting decision and comprehensiveness and the relationship between block ownership and CSR in China.

This paper provides descriptive statistics of the current state of CSR reporting in China. In addition, regression models are utilized to analyze the behavior of CSR reporting of a sample of 5,334 listed firms in China.

Our paper records a significant increase of CSR reporting in the period of 2008-2010. Using a sample of 5,334 listed firms in China, we find a positive yet weak association between centrally controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and CSR reports. Moreover, we find that firms with more concentrated block ownership are less likely to issue CSR reports.

Taken as a whole, our analyses suggest that the entrenchment effect from blockholders seems to dominate the incentive effect and this depresses the quality of CSR reports.

Despite the well-known effect of economic factors on CSR decision, corporate governance such as ownership structure could complicate the final results. Furthermore, the institutional background of the country and its implications for corporate governance should be considered jointly and concurrently.

The positive effect from regulatory pressure on centrally owned SOEs suggests that regulation remains an effective tool to encourage CSR reporting in emerging markets.

First, our study confirms prior research that CSR disclosure decision is primarily driven by economic and strategic considerations. Moreover, our results suggest that a country’s institutional background, in addition to economic and strategic considerations, influences the decision and quality of CSR disclosures. Second, we extend the literature on ownership structure, particularly with respect to blockholders. Third, our research design addresses a weakness in earlier studies which are biased exclusively on state ownership to the exclusion of all other blockholders.

The paper aims to discuss the amended provisions relating to protection of minority shareholders (PMS) in the newly amended Chinese Company Law and evaluate whether it adequately protects the interests of minority shareholders.

In total, 26 cases will be examined by discussing the characteristics of the relevant parties involved, specifically plaintiffs, defendants, their lawyers, judges and also the grounds of complaint. A comparison will be made between the cases decided by following the first Company Law (1994) and the cases decided in accordance with the newly amended Company Law (2006).

The findings indicate that the amended Company Law has removed certain drawbacks in PMS present in the first Company Law (1994) but the New Company Law can protect interests of minority shareholders only to a certain extent. Further amendments are still needed.

This is one of the first studies to actually examine the implementation of PMS‐related provisions in the newly amended Company Law.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the phenomenon in China of listed companies propping up their reported earnings through the use of abnormal related‐party sales. It is hypothesised that two factors associated with securities regulation of listed companies in China will distort the market for ownership control and consequently impact on the practice of propping. The first factor is the firm's risk of being classified as a “special treatment” firm and potentially being delisted. The second factor is the proportion of non‐tradable shares retained by a State‐based controlling shareholder from a government allocation.

The hypotheses are modelled and tested using secondary data from 2010 annual reports and a financial database for companies sampled from the top 100 on the Shanghai and Shenzen Stock Exchanges.

Both hypotheses are supported. Abnormal sales (a proxy for propping) are found to be higher for firms whose ROE had fallen to a level that potentially put them under “special treatment” scrutiny, and also are higher for firms whose proportion of non‐tradeable shares had declined.

Prior studies on propping have focused on companies faced with moderate financial shock being propped up by controlling shareholders so as to preserve their future opportunities to tunnel funds away from minority shareholders. Not previously investigated are the potential side effects of securities regulations on controlling shareholders' incentive for propping, namely, the identification that propping relates to the level of ROE needed to avoid “special treatment” status and the proportion of non‐tradable shares needed as a buffer in the market for corporate control.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005.

This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression.

This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality.

Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country.

The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China.

This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.