Search results

The purpose of this paper is to examine distinctive features that have surfaced in school leadership development programmes for more than two decades in Singapore.

The paper draws on information gathered from existing literature and the author's involvement in the programmes.

The Diploma in Educational Adminstration (DEA) programme and the Leaders in Education Programme (LEP), offered by the National Institute of Education of the Nanyang Technological University, primarily adopted the mentoring model and innovation model respectively. Irrespective of the models, evidence is provided to illuminate the co‐creation approach as well as synergy with the schools and Ministry of Education that permeate both programmes.

Instead of discarding the past as obsolete, it is suggested that programme developers take cognizance of local distinctive features in leadership preparatory programmes and capitalize their strengths, in their attempts to generate the next wave of seascape change.

Provides pertinent aspects of experience over a period of more than two decades of school leadership preparation in Singapore that could be of useful reference to practitioners and researchers in the field.

In Singapore, mentoring was the key feature of a development strategy for aspiring principals for one and a half decades. Many of the former participant protégés are currently practising principals in schools. This paper reports an exploratory study that sought to identify and examine the main learning source of these principals beyond mentoring. It is suggested that there is active networking for learning relationships at work among fellow principals. The principals create, seize and promote opportunities to improve their on‐the‐job practice through learning from the unstructured learning relationships at work. The formal principalship preparation programme that they attended emerges as a breeding ground for the initiation of informal learning relationships at work. Beyond formal mentoring, the principals appear to lead their own learning in collaboration with their peers in education.

The aim of this study is to trace the factors that have contributed to the adoption and institutionalization of foresight practices within the Singapore Public Service, Government of Singapore.

This study discusses the history of the adoption and institutionalization of foresight practices in the Singapore Government; this study has carried out content analysis of secondary literature and conducted 11 in-depth semi-structured interviews with elite informants.

This study finds that the adoption and institutionalization of foresight practices in the Singapore Government was brought about by a combination of five factors. The most foundational factor in our model is the role of institutional entrepreneurs, who drew upon the symbolic representation of Singapore’s vulnerability to legitimize the use of foresight, thus resonating well with local technocratic groups to maintain steady economic progress. This study further argues that the underdevelopment of foresight in the local private and academic domains can be at least in part explained by the historical connotations of foresight that were uncovered.

As the findings are fruit of the authors’ interpretation of the secondary literature/interview data, they require further triangulation by future research.

This study presents the interpretation of elite informants’ accounts and historical documents to explain one of the most exemplar yet classified case studies of governmental foresight globally.

The purpose of this paper is to compare two corruption scandals in Singapore to illustrate how its government has dealt with these scandals and to discuss the implications for its anti-corruption strategy.

This paper analyses the Teh Cheang Wan and Edwin Yeo scandals by relying on published official and press reports.

Both scandals resulted in adverse consequences for the offenders. Teh committed suicide on 14 December 1986 before he could be prosecuted for his bribery offences. Yeo was found guilty of criminal breach of trust and forgery and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The Commission of Inquiry found that the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was thorough in its investigations which confirmed that only Teh and no other minister or public official were implicated in the bribery offences. The Independent Review Panel appointed by the Prime Minister's Office to review the CPIB's internal controls following Yeo's offences recommended improvements to strengthen the CPIB's financial procedures and audit system. Singapore has succeeded in minimising corruption because its government did not cover-up the scandals but punished the guilty offenders and introduced measures to prevent their recurrence.

This paper will be useful for scholars, policymakers and anti-corruption practitioners interested in Singapore's anti-corruption strategy and how its government handles corruption scandals.

In today’s multi-channel distribution environment, it is crucial for the competitiveness of retail stores and companies to improve efficiency of dedicated logistics centers (DLCs) servicing types of retail outlets such as large retail-stores, super supermarkets, and convenient stores. This paper derives efficiency improvement strategies for DLCs through efficiency analyses. To this end, this paper empirically analyzes the efficiency of DLCs by applying DEA (data envelopment analysis) approaches using real data from a Korean distribution company. In detail, this paper analyzes operations, finance, and service efficiencies of DLCs and performs a comparison analysis on the efficiency between DLCs. Finally, this paper discusses the analysis results considering the DLCs’ characteristics and derives managerial and operational implications.

Since China’s “opening-up” in the late 1970s, Singapore has played a major role in enhancing China’s engagement with the world, especially in economic terms. This traditional relationship is well manifested in the third government-to-government (G–G) project under the BRI, which is known as the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative (CCI). The purpose of this paper is to address the following question: despite Singapore’s initial reluctance to agree on a third G–G project with China, why did Singapore eventually decide to join the CCI?

This paper draws on archives of over 700 Chinese language media reports and over 400 English language media reports, as well as private interactions with scholars interested in Sino-Singapore relations and with both sides’ officials in charge of the CCI project.

The paper finds that it is the goal of connecting the region, along with the need to maintain Singapore’s relevance to China and the regional economy that led to Singapore’s participation in the third G–G project. This paper also uses this case to analyse the changes that are taking place in the bilateral economic relations.

Despite wide media coverage, op-ed commentaries and respective government statements, there are a limited number of academic studies on the rationale of the third G–G project and contemporary Sino-Singapore relations in the literature. The scholarship has not addressed the rationale for Singapore’s changing attitude towards CCI and the manner in which the CCI has improved cooperation (or upgraded cooperation to a broader and regional level).

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore is a success story today despite the fact that its prospects for survival were dim when it became independent in August 1965.

This paper describes the changes in Singapore’s policy context from 1959 to 2016, analyses the five factors responsible for its success and concludes with advice for policy makers interested in implementing Singapore-style reforms to solve similar problems in their countries.

Singapore’s success can be attributed to these five factors: the pragmatic leadership of the late Lee Kuan Yew and his successors; an effective public bureaucracy; effective control of corruption; reliance on the “best and brightest” citizens through investment in education and competitive compensation; and learning from other countries.

This paper will be useful to those scholars and policy makers interested in learning from Singapore’s success in solving its problems.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing corruption and to recommend three measures for enhancing South Korea’s anti-corruption strategy.

The paper compares the contextual differences between Singapore and South Korea before analysing Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy and identifying the weaknesses of South Korea’s anti-corruption strategy.

Singapore’s success in minimising corruption is the result of its government’s strong political will and the adequate budget, personnel and operational autonomy given to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau to enable it to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. To improve South Korea’s anti-corruption strategy, the Korea Anti-Corruption Agency should be established and adequately staffed and funded to investigate corruption cases. Those found guilty of corruption offences should be punished according to the law, without suspending their jail sentences or being pardoned by the president. Finally, the existing public outreach anti-corruption programmes should be evaluated to identify their weaknesses and improve their effectiveness.

This paper recommends three measures for South Korean policy-makers to improve their anti-corruption strategy by learning from Singapore’s success.