During the analysis of the 1999 avalanche winter and of the winter storm Lothar on 26 December 1999, the Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF, Davos…
During the analysis of the 1999 avalanche winter and of the winter storm Lothar on 26 December 1999, the Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF, Davos conducted an inquiry of the cable car‐ and ski lift‐companies in German‐ and French speaking part of Switzerland. This arti‐cle presents the results in detail. In the whole of Switzerland there were 1'821 cable cars and ski lifts in 1999 (not counting 550 small ski lifts). The SLF sent its questionnaire to 117 companies. A considerable proportion of them (79%) have been returned. In February 1999 avalanches and snow pressure induced damages on 44 cable cars and ski lifts; repairs cost more than 17 Mio. SFr. Due to high avalanche danger, 37% of all lift facilities had to be closed for an average of seven days. The loss of earnings for Switzerland (without Ticino) is estimated at 78 Mio. SFr. compared to February 1998. The winter storm Lothar caused damage to 127 cable cars and ski lifts. The cost of damage repairs is estimated at 7.6 Mio. SFr. The storm interrupted power supply for 14% of the lift facilities; 58% had to be closed down due to high wind speeds. The loss of earnings caused by winter storm Lothar amounts to approx. 39 Mio. SFr. for the Swiss cable car and ski lift companies (without Ticino). Immediately after the events of 1999, 32% of the companies interviewed took measures to reduce the negative consequences (e.g. price reductions, press releases or publicity campaigns). To improve public relations is considered to be an important measure to cope with consequences of natural hazards in the future by 39% of the companies.
Ziemlich genau vor dreissig Jahren, am 22. Juni 1939, erfolgte in Bern die Gründung der Schweizer Reisekasse. Deren Werdegang, Bedeutung und Problematik haben durch eine grosse Zahl von Vorträgen, Artikeln in Zeitungen und Zeitschriften der Tages‐ und Fachpresse, ebenso in Monographien, selbst solchen wissenschaftlichen Charakters, ihre Darstellung gefunden. Dies geschah namentlich anlässlich des Jubiläums zum fünfundzwanzigjährigen Bestehen der Reisekasse. Es ist deshalb überflüssig, schon oft Gesagtes und Geschriebenes bei Anlass des Jubiläums zum dreissigjährigen Bestehen zu wiederholen, und zwar um so mehr, als sich in den dazwischen liegenden fünf Jahren nur wenig grundlegend Neues ereignet hat. Andererseits wäre es auch ungerecht, das dreissigjährige Bestehen der Reisekasse mit Stillschweigen zu honorieren und zur Tagesordnung überzugehen. Vielmehr erscheint es doch angezeigt, etwas Einkehr zu halten und einige Betrachtungen über die Gründe anzustellen, die dazu beigetragen haben, dass sich die Reisekasse nicht allein bewährt, sondern in einem Ausmasse entwickelt hat, wie es nicht vorausgesehen wurde. Dies soll nunmehr geschehen.
In this chapter, the performance of Swiss mountain ropeway companies in the period from 2011 to 2016 have been analyzed. The sample includes 194 observations from 43…
In this chapter, the performance of Swiss mountain ropeway companies in the period from 2011 to 2016 have been analyzed. The sample includes 194 observations from 43 companies, covering about 90% of the market. In order to explain the levels of cash-flow returns, the degree of self-financing and revenue growth for ropeway companies, firm-specific characteristics, meteorological data, infrastructure information and market-specific factors were taken into account. The results, which are based on a general method of moments estimates, reveal that a high equity ratio and consistent capital expenditures are important for performance. Also, the market environment, including such factors as exchange rates and brand recognition of ski areas in Europe and Asia, are important for firm performance. Overall, the Swiss market is a unique country for this type of analysis, given either that the required data on mountain ropeway companies in other countries are unavailable or that a few rather large companies dominate the market.
The purpose of this research paper is to explore the role and effectiveness of particular participation styles that affect the effectiveness of urban planning being…
The purpose of this research paper is to explore the role and effectiveness of particular participation styles that affect the effectiveness of urban planning being integrated with disaster risk reduction (DRR) practices.
This research was conducted using a heuristic approach to the examination of urban planning and DRR practices focussing particularly upon citizens’ participation in four case studies internationally: the UK floods in 2007; Hurricane Katrina in the USA in 2005; wildfires of 2009 in Victoria, Australia; and Swiss avalanche prevention and preparedness. Desktop research was conducted to analyse cases and identify key findings, confirmed and augmented by interviews with relevant specialists in each country through semi-structured interviews.
The research reveals some similarities across all four cases studied. It appears that urban planning and DRR approaches, particularly those with a regulatory outcome and based on highly technical tests, are common. Further, it is apparent in the cases studied that circumstances where deeper technical knowledge and/or self-interest are strong factors, that informing and sometimes consulting styles are the most appropriate. While the scope of the paper means that this principle cannot be widely applied, there is a need to investigate these issues further.
The heuristic and inductive nature of this research limits the potential for in-depth analyses of the case studies, but rather provides a base for future research in this area, which currently has limited literature.
This study provides a wide base for future research and partially addresses the gap in the literature on the topic of integration of urban planning and DRR with a focus on the community involvement in it.