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How well does the “Law of One Price” operate across countries? Interest in this question has been stimulated by the Monetary Aproach to the Balance of Payments (Frenkel and Johnson (1975)) which uses the law to determine the price of traded goods in open economies.

Following the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic, securities class plaintiffs can invoke the “rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market” [the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine] to prove classwide reliance. Although this requires plaintiffs to prove that the security traded in an informationally efficient market throughout the class period, Basic did not identify what constituted adequate proof of efficiency for reliance purposes.

Market efficiency cannot be presumed without proof because even large publicly traded stocks do not always trade in efficient markets, as documented in the economic literature that has grown significantly since Basic. For instance, during the recent global financial crisis, lack of liquidity limited arbitrage (the mechanism that renders markets efficient) and led to significant price distortions in many asset markets. Yet, lower courts following Basic have frequently granted class certification based on a mechanical review of some factors that are considered intuitive “proxies” of market efficiency (albeit incorrectly, according to recent studies and our own analysis). Such factors have little probative value and their review does not constitute the rigorous analysis demanded by the Supreme Court.

Instead, to invoke fraud-on-the-market, plaintiffs must first establish that the security traded in a weak-form efficient market (absent which a security cannot, as a logical matter, trade in a “semi-strong form” efficient market, the standard required for reliance purposes) using well-accepted tests. Only then do event study results, which are commonly used to demonstrate “cause and effect” (i.e., prove that the security’s price reacted quickly to news – a hallmark of a semi-strong form efficient market), have any merit. Even then, to claim classwide reliance, plaintiffs must prove such cause-and-effect relationship throughout the class period, not simply on selected disclosure dates identified in the complaint as plaintiffs often do.

These issues have policy implications because, once a class is certified, defendants frequently settle to avoid the magnified costs and risks associated with a trial, and the merits of the case (including the proper application of legal presumptions) are rarely examined at a trial.

In class action antitrust litigation, the standards for acceptable economic analysis at class certification have continued to evolve. The most recent event in this evolution is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1435 (2013). The evolution of pre-Comcast law on this topic is presented, the Comcast decision is thoroughly assessed, as are the standards for developing reliable economic analysis. This article explains how economic evidence of both antitrust liability and damages ought to be developed in light of the teachings of Comcast, and how liability evidence can be used by economists to support a finding of common impact for certification purposes. In addition, the article addresses how statistical techniques such as averaging, price-dispersion analysis, and multiple regressions have and should be employed to establish common proof of damages.

The economic doctrine of market efficiency plays an essential role in securities fraud litigation. In lawsuits alleging violations of SEC Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs typically must argue that the market for the relevant security is efficient, and therefore that the “fraud on the market” doctrine applies. However, the term “market efficiency” is often applied imprecisely. In this chapter, we discuss properties of efficient markets that have been proposed in academic research, legal scholarship, and case law. We explore what must be assumed about capital markets for each of these properties to hold. We then ask how, in practice, each property could be rebutted.

This paper aims to propose that a Neave-Worthington Match Test for Ordered Alternatives is a simple, non-parametric test that can be used to consider Gibrat’s law. Whether the law, that states that the proportional rate of growth is independent of absolute size, is supported by regional house price growth rates is considered. The Match Test is further used to test the applicability of beta-convergence and dual economy models to a house price context.

The Match Test relates an actual rank order with an expected one. Gibrat’s law implies house price growth rates are independent of the absolute price levels. Beta-convergence posits that growth rates are inversely related to the initial price level. With a divergent system, there is a direct relationship between size-order and growth rates. As such, the Match Test is used to test alternative models of size-growth relationship.

Rather than convergence, there is a tendency to diverge across the UK, but not in Eire. That said, the size of growth shocks is related to price level on the upswing of a price cycle, but not in the down. Assigning the high-priced regions of the two islands into core and the rest into a periphery, total matching is dominated by the capital cities’ growth. The sigma-convergence observed in British house prices is likely to be associated with slower beta-divergence, not a convergent system. The law of Gibrat is not found to apply in a regional house price context.

This work only covers two countries and nineteen regions. Gibrat’s law in regional house prices may be better examined using a multi-country analysis.

As the law of Gibrat is not found to apply in a regional house price context and core-regions appearing to dislocated, this has interesting implications for growth trend analysis and the claim of cointegration, which should be explored further. In particular, the level-growth relationship in the cyclical price upswing points to a ratcheting of differentials between high and low house price regions. The common trends in the long run may result from corrective periodic crashes. Not an ideal mechanism for policymakers.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper makes a novel use of the Neave-Worthington test in the realm of regional convergence-divergence and in the first consideration of the law of Gibrat in a house price context across two countries.

This paper investigates the role of the border in Canadian and U.S. prices, based on a sample of highly disaggregated city-level retail prices. It finds substantial short-run differences in cross-border prices. While most of these are eliminated over time, long-run differences in the cross-border prices remain. These long-run cross-border differences average just over 20%, compared to mean long-run intranational price gaps of 7–9%. Short-run price differences are eliminated at similar rates in the cross-border and intranational data. Evidence from national average prices suggests the gap between cross-border prices has not narrowed during the recent depreciation of the Canadian dollar.

This study examines whether the law of one price (LOP) or price convergence holds during the COVID-19 pandemic for essential food items in India.

The authors use the daily retail price data of 22 essential food items from 103 Indian markets for two years (2019 as pre-COVID and 2020 as COVID period). Pesaran's (2007) second-generation panel unit-root test has been used to examine the price convergence of essential food commodities across various markets of different zones in the pre-COVID and COVID periods.

The authors find a tendency toward the convergence of prices across the spatially segregated markets for essential products. But, during the COVID period, there is a weak or no convergence of prices for essential food items. Hence, the LOP does not hold during the pandemic, indicating massive price deviations for food items across Indian markets. This has severe implications for food security as enormous price increases in some markets have been evidenced during the pandemic.

The study calls for immediate policy adoption to restore the disrupted supply chain of essential food items. Along with that, the public authority should strictly prohibit black marketing and unlawful hoarding of essential food items. In addition, farmers should be provided direct cash benefits for restoring their farming activities.

This paper is first study to examine that hypothesis of LOP in the context of COVID crisis.

This work presents evidence that cross‐isted stocks (ADRs) are traded in markets that are not completely integrated, and it is the presence of high frequency arbitrage activity that forces these stock pairs to be most commonly in relative equilibrium. A Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model tests the hypothesis that the reversion to equilibrium of the price discrepancy series is a nonlinear function that has nontrivial thresholds, and that large price discrepancies are relatively short‐lived. The TAR specification models the neutralization of arbitrage forces with thresholds that separate outer regions where large discrepancies have a strong reversion to equilibrium from a central region where transaction costs significantly mitigate this reversion.

There is a widespread push by government and private payers to make the prices of health care services more transparent to consumers. The main goal is to promote more effective consumer shopping; secondary goals include promoting provider competition and reducing pricing variation. There are several headwinds opposing these efforts. One problem is that there may be several valid reasons for why price variations persist. Another is that provider (and other health care) markets are not very competitive, and sometimes widespread information about prices may make them even less so. A third is that price discrimination may be economically efficient. Any analysis of price transparency must take the specific market setting into account. This chapter analyzes markets characterized by monopolistic, oligopolistic, and competitive conditions to determine when and under what economic and managerial circumstances price transparency will be useful.

To understand the new non-linear pricing in E-commerce. The present paper aims to put forth an idea of using tie-in agreement in the electronic commerce market in the name of trust in India. According to the Indian antitrust law, tie-in agreement is not allowed to use as compulsory in an offer to the buyer. This means that a tie-in agreement cannot be a compulsion or only an option to the buyer. This means it can be an extra option.

The paper shows that using this logic the sellers are giving two options simultaneously to the buyer: (1) a commodity with a tie-in agreement and (2) the same commodity without a tie-in agreement. Therefore, there are two price mechanisms that are present. Now it is the decision of the buyer to choose between the two. These two price mechanisms create a new variable called trust. If the buyer selects the first option, then that buyer will not be treated as a trustworthy buyer, but in the second case, the buyer would be treated as a trustworthy or the affianced buyer. Therefore, the buyer would be leaning toward the second option. The paper proves that in the second option it would be difficult to minimize the consumer expenditure. As a result, there would be a situation of non-linear pricing in the name of trust which is hidden in the offer. The present work gives both theoretical models and empirical justifications.

We find that E-wallet is often used when a consumer orders food online but offline cash payment is preferred. Therefore, the offer does matter for the consumer. Hence, the offer can be used to make a tie-in arrangement. Therefore, even if there is a tie-in arrangement in online food servicing applications, the Competition Commission of India can restrict such practices as for illegal tying, the firm has to have the monopoly power in one market and there should be compulsory tie-arrangement in another market. But it does not mean that E-wallet tie-arrangement cannot be ignored as the monopoly power in the online food servicing market can influence the market share in the E-wallet market. Tie-in arrangement is also important, as the consumer has to spend more under cashback offer conditions which reduce the long-run gain of consumers.

The paper considered trust as a new element in forming non-linear pricing. This is new to this literature.