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How well does the “Law of One Price” operate across countries? Interest in this question has been stimulated by the Monetary Aproach to the Balance of Payments (Frenkel and Johnson (1975)) which uses the law to determine the price of traded goods in open economies.

Following the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic, securities class plaintiffs can invoke the “rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market” [the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine] to prove classwide reliance. Although this requires plaintiffs to prove that the security traded in an informationally efficient market throughout the class period, Basic did not identify what constituted adequate proof of efficiency for reliance purposes.

Market efficiency cannot be presumed without proof because even large publicly traded stocks do not always trade in efficient markets, as documented in the economic literature that has grown significantly since Basic. For instance, during the recent global financial crisis, lack of liquidity limited arbitrage (the mechanism that renders markets efficient) and led to significant price distortions in many asset markets. Yet, lower courts following Basic have frequently granted class certification based on a mechanical review of some factors that are considered intuitive “proxies” of market efficiency (albeit incorrectly, according to recent studies and our own analysis). Such factors have little probative value and their review does not constitute the rigorous analysis demanded by the Supreme Court.

Instead, to invoke fraud-on-the-market, plaintiffs must first establish that the security traded in a weak-form efficient market (absent which a security cannot, as a logical matter, trade in a “semi-strong form” efficient market, the standard required for reliance purposes) using well-accepted tests. Only then do event study results, which are commonly used to demonstrate “cause and effect” (i.e., prove that the security’s price reacted quickly to news – a hallmark of a semi-strong form efficient market), have any merit. Even then, to claim classwide reliance, plaintiffs must prove such cause-and-effect relationship throughout the class period, not simply on selected disclosure dates identified in the complaint as plaintiffs often do.

These issues have policy implications because, once a class is certified, defendants frequently settle to avoid the magnified costs and risks associated with a trial, and the merits of the case (including the proper application of legal presumptions) are rarely examined at a trial.

In class action antitrust litigation, the standards for acceptable economic analysis at class certification have continued to evolve. The most recent event in this evolution is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1435 (2013). The evolution of pre-Comcast law on this topic is presented, the Comcast decision is thoroughly assessed, as are the standards for developing reliable economic analysis. This article explains how economic evidence of both antitrust liability and damages ought to be developed in light of the teachings of Comcast, and how liability evidence can be used by economists to support a finding of common impact for certification purposes. In addition, the article addresses how statistical techniques such as averaging, price-dispersion analysis, and multiple regressions have and should be employed to establish common proof of damages.

This paper aims to propose that a Neave-Worthington Match Test for Ordered Alternatives is a simple, non-parametric test that can be used to consider Gibrat’s law. Whether the law, that states that the proportional rate of growth is independent of absolute size, is supported by regional house price growth rates is considered. The Match Test is further used to test the applicability of beta-convergence and dual economy models to a house price context.

The Match Test relates an actual rank order with an expected one. Gibrat’s law implies house price growth rates are independent of the absolute price levels. Beta-convergence posits that growth rates are inversely related to the initial price level. With a divergent system, there is a direct relationship between size-order and growth rates. As such, the Match Test is used to test alternative models of size-growth relationship.

Rather than convergence, there is a tendency to diverge across the UK, but not in Eire. That said, the size of growth shocks is related to price level on the upswing of a price cycle, but not in the down. Assigning the high-priced regions of the two islands into core and the rest into a periphery, total matching is dominated by the capital cities’ growth. The sigma-convergence observed in British house prices is likely to be associated with slower beta-divergence, not a convergent system. The law of Gibrat is not found to apply in a regional house price context.

This work only covers two countries and nineteen regions. Gibrat’s law in regional house prices may be better examined using a multi-country analysis.

As the law of Gibrat is not found to apply in a regional house price context and core-regions appearing to dislocated, this has interesting implications for growth trend analysis and the claim of cointegration, which should be explored further. In particular, the level-growth relationship in the cyclical price upswing points to a ratcheting of differentials between high and low house price regions. The common trends in the long run may result from corrective periodic crashes. Not an ideal mechanism for policymakers.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper makes a novel use of the Neave-Worthington test in the realm of regional convergence-divergence and in the first consideration of the law of Gibrat in a house price context across two countries.

This paper investigates the role of the border in Canadian and U.S. prices, based on a sample of highly disaggregated city-level retail prices. It finds substantial short-run differences in cross-border prices. While most of these are eliminated over time, long-run differences in the cross-border prices remain. These long-run cross-border differences average just over 20%, compared to mean long-run intranational price gaps of 7–9%. Short-run price differences are eliminated at similar rates in the cross-border and intranational data. Evidence from national average prices suggests the gap between cross-border prices has not narrowed during the recent depreciation of the Canadian dollar.

This work presents evidence that cross‐isted stocks (ADRs) are traded in markets that are not completely integrated, and it is the presence of high frequency arbitrage activity that forces these stock pairs to be most commonly in relative equilibrium. A Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model tests the hypothesis that the reversion to equilibrium of the price discrepancy series is a nonlinear function that has nontrivial thresholds, and that large price discrepancies are relatively short‐lived. The TAR specification models the neutralization of arbitrage forces with thresholds that separate outer regions where large discrepancies have a strong reversion to equilibrium from a central region where transaction costs significantly mitigate this reversion.

This paper aims to make a preliminary estimate of the degree of integration in the US product market (widely acknowledged to be the most integrated among geographically large economies) as an upper bound of spatial integration that is practically achievable in markets covering fairly large territories.

The approach takes the form of an econometric model derived from the fact that local price of a tradable good should not be dependent on local demand under the law of “one price is a tool to measure market integration”. It is applied to data on the cost of a grocery basket and prices for three individual goods in 2000 across 29 US cities.

The regression results suggest that the US market is not perfectly integrated. Thus, the estimated degree of its integration can be deemed, indeed, as a feasible maximum. Applying this benchmark to the European part of Russia in 2000, its degree of market integration turns out to be comparable – by the order of magnitude – with the feasible one. The roles of a few factors that could potentially cause segmentation of the US market are estimated.

The estimated degree of US market integration is crude because of the relatively small spatial sample. Further research has to substantially widen the spatial sample and estimate integration of the US market across a number of points in time.

The paper suggests a realistic benchmark standard for judging the extent of market integration in various (geographically large) economies.

There is a widespread push by government and private payers to make the prices of health care services more transparent to consumers. The main goal is to promote more effective consumer shopping; secondary goals include promoting provider competition and reducing pricing variation. There are several headwinds opposing these efforts. One problem is that there may be several valid reasons for why price variations persist. Another is that provider (and other health care) markets are not very competitive, and sometimes widespread information about prices may make them even less so. A third is that price discrimination may be economically efficient. Any analysis of price transparency must take the specific market setting into account. This chapter analyzes markets characterized by monopolistic, oligopolistic, and competitive conditions to determine when and under what economic and managerial circumstances price transparency will be useful.

This paper documents a strong violation of the law of one price surrounding a large rights issue.

If prices are right, the relation between the prices of shares and rights follows the outcome of a simple calculation.

In the case of Royal Imtech N.V. in 2014, prices deviated sharply and persistently from the theoretical prediction. Throughout the term of the rights, investors were buying shares at prices that were many times what they should have been given the price of the rights. Short-selling constraints in the form of high recall risk and lacking stock lending supply are the most likely explanation for the failure of arbitrage as a safeguard of market efficiency. Still, it remains remarkable that investors were buying large volumes of shares at highly inflated prices in the presence of a cheap, perfect substitute.

The mispricing was special not just because of its severity but also because unlike previously documented cases there was no fundamental risk and no material noise trader risk.

This paper evaluates the extent and implications of Canada-U.S. economic integration in the wake of two formal trade liberalization agreements. The paper considers how quantity and price measures can be used to assess integration, then surveys the evidence on the extent of integration. Overall, we find little evidence that these trade agreements had significant incremental impacts on economic integration between Canada and the United States. We find some evidence that exchange rate variability may discourage integration. Microeconomic efficiency has not been enhanced through alignment of prices and costs and the volatility of the Canada-U.S. exchange rate may also account for this. The finding provides some tentative evidence in favor of a common currency arrangement.