Search results

This paper examines an apparent contrast in organizing innovation tournaments; seekers offer contestant-agnostic incentives to elicit greater effort from a heterogeneous pool of contestants. Specifically, the study tests whether and how such incentives and the underlying heterogeneity in the contestant pool, assessed in terms of contestants' entry timing, are jointly associated with contestant effort. Thus, the study contributes to the prior literature that has looked at behavioral consequences of entry timing as well as incentives in innovation tournaments.

For hypothesis testing, the study uses a panel dataset of submission activity of over 60,000 contestants observed in nearly 200 innovation tournaments. The estimation employs multi-way fixed effects, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across contestants, tournaments and submission week. The findings remain stable across a range of robustness checks.

The study finds that, on average, late entrant tends to exert less effort than an early entrant (H1). Results further show that the effort gap widens in tournaments that offer higher incentives. In particular, the effort gap between late and early entrants is significantly wider in tournaments that have attracted superior solutions from several contestants (H2), offer gain in status (H3, marginally significant) or offer a higher monetary reward (H4).

The study's findings counter conventional wisdom, which suggests that incentives have a positive effect on contestant behavior, including effort. In contrast, the study indicates that incentives may have divergent implications for contestant behavior, contingent on contestants' entry timing. As the study discusses, these findings have several implications for research and practice of managing innovation tournaments.

The purpose of this paper is to review previous research and to propose a model for the impact of barriers to entry on the market strategy of an entrant firm, where product/market scope and product differentiation are central strategy components. The paper asks, what is the impact of barriers on market strategies of entrants? Are early and late entrants affected in different ways?

A model and propositions are developed‐based on a review of previous research. The model applies the contingency perspective and company cases exemplify the model.

It is proposed that a firm that enters a market late and faces extensive barriers would choose a broader product/market scope and differentiate its products to a larger extent than an early entrant. It is also proposed that incumbents' market strategies indirectly affect the market strategy of an entrant firm as incumbents' market strategies interact with barriers, and the effects are due to entry timing.

The study contributes theoretically as it extends current knowledge of the impact of barriers to entry on strategy. Management of entrant firms are advised to strive for a fit between barriers and market strategy and consider the propositions.

The model and the propositions concern barrier effects on two key components of the market strategy of an entrant firm: product/market scope and product differentiation. Another important value is that the model accounts for interactions between incumbent strategies and barriers to entry, and effects on the market strategy of an entrant firm.

Given that the majority of firms are followers of pioneering firms into new, related product markets, managers of almost all firms can benefit from benchmarking their competitive responses to pioneering new product introductions. This paper examines the competitive responses of firms not only in terms of the time until their responding new product introduction, but also in terms of the firms’ preceding stages of competitive response: awareness, interest, and evaluation. For example, how long does – and should – it take a follower firm to become aware of a pioneering new product introduction? A general conceptual framework and basic methodology is proposed for firms to evaluate and benchmark their competitive responses. Follower firm responses to pioneering new low‐fat food product introductions in North America are examined and illustrate the opportunity for benchmarking firms’ competitive responses.

Our prior work has identified a trade-off that new entrants face in obtaining favorable market reception, whereby initial entrants suffer from a deficit of legitimacy whereas later entrants suffer from a deficit of authenticity. This research has also proposed that a single mechanism is responsible for this trade-off: the tendency for customers and other stakeholders to assess the entrant's claim to originality based on the visible work that it has done to legitimate the new product or organizational form. This chapter extends and deepens our understanding of such “legitimation work” by showing how it can illuminate cases that seem in the first instance to defy this trade-off. In particular, we focus on two “off-diagonal” cases: (a) when, as in the case of “patent trolls” and fraudulent innovators, early entrants are viewed as inauthentic despite having a credible claim to originality; (b) when late entrants, as in the case of Dell Computers, mechanical watches and baseball ballparks, are viewed as authentic despite obviously not being the originators. We clarify how each off-diagonal case represents an ‘exception that proves the rule’ whereby audiences attribute authenticity on the basis of legitimation work rather than on the order of entry per se. The last case also leads to an opportunity to clarify why “cultural appropriation” can sometimes project authenticity and sometimes inauthenticity, why audiences bother to make inferences about a producer's authenticity on the basis of visible legitimation work, and why legitimacy is a universal goal of early movers whereas authenticity varies in its importance.

Literature on tournament mobility in internal labor markets (ILMs) is reviewed revealing a paucity of studies examining the promotion patterns of late entrants into internal promotion systems. An investigation of 502 managers in a large corporation indicated that late entry into the ILM organization was significantly and positively related to career attainment, supporting the “clean slate effect”. In addition, experience in the corporate office was positively related to managerial career attainment, while being female was negatively related to career attainment. In contrast to the tournament model theory, the number of years to reach middle management was positively related to career success. While no effect for race was found, this may be due to the relatively low representation of minorities in the firm studied. Moderating effects of late entry on gender, race or corporate experience were also not found.

This paper aims to address whether the order of entry yields competitive advantage in the discount grocery industry. More specifically, the paper aims to investigate whether such advantages are based on the effects of entry on consumer perceptions rather than factors such as technological leadership or cost efficiency.

The paper combines perceptual measures of overall preferences and attribute‐level beliefs with objective measures of attribute levels in order to explore whether entry‐based advantages in this industry are due to the relationships between entry and consumer perceptions.

The findings show that early entrants are perceived to be significantly superior to later entrants. This finding also hold true for store attributes documented to be similar across chains.

A number of papers have shown relationships between order of entry and indicators of competitive advantage. This is the first study that rules out “economic performance” based explanations for such advantages, i.e. superior efficiency, technological leadership or the pre‐emption of scarce resources.

This paper aims to present a new framework that describes the relationship among market entry order and timing, the advantages accruing to first-movers and late-movers, entry timing premium (ETP), marketing strategy and enduring market performance of the firms. The framework, empirically tested using data from 241 business executives, expands extant research into new territory beyond first- and late-mover advantages in an attempt to reconcile a few streams of research in the area and provides an entry related, strategic assessment tool (ETP) for the managers. Contribution to marketing strategy theory and managerial implications are also presented.

Participants included informants in a firm’s strategic business unit who were the most familiar with a new product’s commercial launch, market condition at launch, competitor offerings, marketing activities and capabilities and eventual integration into or withdrawal from the product’s portfolio. Therefore, for the survey, the study targeted chief executive officers, vice presidents of marketing or sales, product or sales managers, general managers and regional managers. Both preference bias (Narus, 1984) and survivor biases among the respondents were addressed.

The research result of this study reveals two very significant aspects of marketing and marketing strategies. First, the importance of financial, pricing and cost strategies further attests to the fiercely competitive nature of the global market today and the tendency for firms to commoditize most products and services. An effective financial and pricing strategy, coupled with a higher level of ETP, is capable of leading a firm to initial market success in the product-market in which it competes. Both ETP (a positional advantage and resource of the firm) and financial and pricing strategies (a deliberate strategic decision of the management) are important to achieve this goal.

This study is limited in several ways. The effects of entry order and timing on market performance could be dependent on the types of industries and types of product categories involved. However, as the hypotheses were well supported, the “industry specific” factors would provide “fine-tuning” in the future study. Second, the nature of the product (goods or services) may also present varying effects on the relationship studied (for differences between manufacturing and service firms in pioneering advantages, see Song et al., 1999). Services’ intangible nature, difficulty in protecting property rights, high involvement of boundary-spanning employees and customers, high reliance on delivery and quality, and ease of imitation may alter the proposed relationships in the model and the moderating effects. Third, although this study used a “retrospective” protocol approach in the data collection by encouraging respondents to recall market, product and business information, this study is not longitudinal. Lack of longitudinal data in any study involving strategic planning, strategy execution and the long-term effects is no doubt a weakness. In addition, due to peculiarity and complexity with regard to regulation and other aspects in pharmaceutical and other industries, the theory might be limited to a certain extent.

In all, the integrated framework contributes to the understanding of the intricate issues surrounding first-mover advantage, late-mover advantage, entry order and timing and the role of marketing strategy. The framework provides practitioners guidance as to when to enter a product-market to gain advantageous positions and how to maintain that advantage. Firms that use a deliberate late-mover strategy could also benefit from the research finding in mapping out their strategic courses of action.

This study believes that the halo effect surrounding first-mover advantage may have obscured the visions of some researchers and managers, and the pursuit of a silver bullet has led to frenzied interests in becoming a “first-mover” or a deliberate “late-mover”. The theoretical framework, which is substantiated by empirical testing, invalidates the long-held claim that entry of a particular kind (first-movers or late-movers) yields any unique competitive advantage. It is a firms’ careful selection of marketing strategies and careful execution of the strategies through effective operational tactics that would lead to enduring competitive advantage, under an adequate level of ETP.

Aims to evaluate the determinants of international pharmaceutical firms’ foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Chinese pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. Focuses on comparing the differences in FDIs between early entrants who started FDI before 1992 and the late entrants whose FDI started after 1992 in China. Field research was mainly conducted in China by personal interview as well as mail questionnaires over a period of three months in 1999 and 44 companies participated in total. The results of index of dissimilarity analysis, t‐test and Wilcoxon test consistently show that both early and late entrants are likely to agree that China’s huge market size played the most important role in motivating international pharmaceutical firms’ FDI in China. The results did not support the traditional FDI theories on domestic market imperfection and firm specific advantages.

This paper aims to study the effects of order of market entry on market share in prescription (Rx) and over‐the‐counter (OTC) pharmaceutical drugs market.

Data on sales, price, direct‐to‐physicians (DTP) advertising, and direct‐to‐consumers (DTC) advertising for three Rx drugs categories and two OTC drugs categories were obtained for the period, January 1998 to December 1999. A log‐log statistical model was estimated using OLS methodology.

There is a significant order of entry effect on market share in both Rx and OTC drugs categories. This effect is higher in magnitude in the OTC category than in the Rx category. The effects of price, and DTP and DTC advertising are also significant. The differential effects of DTP and DTC advertising in the Rx and OTC categories are intuitive.

This study is unique in studying the differential effects of order‐of‐entry, and DTP and DTC advertising on market share in Rx and OTC drugs product categories.

This chapter employs institutional theory and the demand-side approach to discuss the entry of new companies into industries. Theory and empirical evidence provides support for the hypothesis that the industry stage of development is the primary factor that determines whether a company should use innovation or imitation as an entry wedge. The evidence suggests that innovation is most often used successfully during the introduction and decline stages of industry development. Imitation is most often used successfully during the growth stage of industry development. During the mature phase both innovation and imitation are used, but usually with limited success.