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1 – 10 of over 33000This paper addresses the interaction relationship between debt financing and ownership structure towards firms’ value in Malaysia. Two issues are addressed in this study. The…
Abstract
This paper addresses the interaction relationship between debt financing and ownership structure towards firms’ value in Malaysia. Two issues are addressed in this study. The study examines whether managers and controlling large shareholders pursue rent-seeking objective through excessive leverage in a firm. Second, the paper examines whether financial restraint policy is effective in enhancing corporate governance. The sample of the study covers a small economy – Malaysia where rent-seeking opportunities prevail. A total 256 manufacturing firms are examined. The hypotheses are set to examine whether rent seeking prevails in firms with high intangible asset and less competitive industries. The findings show that first, financial restraint policy is only effective when managerial equity interest is relatively low. Managers with a higher equity interest hinder the positive effects driven by financial restraint policy. Second, at a higher threshold of equity interest, the use of excessive leverage by managers leads to a lower firm value, confirming the presence of rent-seeking motive. The presence of the largest shareholder as directors also follows the same conjecture despite at a lower magnitude. Both findings could not be refuted in less competitive industries. Other findings from this paper conclude that a high industrial concentration industry increases firms’ value in this economy. Financial institutions can also exert corporate governance on firms in less competitive industries. It is, however, the agency problem mitigates the positive effects brought forth by financial rent in this emerging economy.
Xiaoqing Feng, Wen Wen, Yun Ke and Ying He
This study aims to examine whether a firm's demand for high-quality auditors is influenced by multiple large shareholders (MLS). As one type of ownership structure, MLS have…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine whether a firm's demand for high-quality auditors is influenced by multiple large shareholders (MLS). As one type of ownership structure, MLS have gained popularity in China recently and have different types of large shareholders, including large institutional shareholder, large foreign shareholder and large state shareholder. The authors also examine whether different types of MLS have heterogeneous impacts on appointing high-quality auditors.
Design/methodology/approach
With a sample of 27,131 firm-year observations from Chinese public companies from 2003 to 2018, the authors use multivariate regressions to examine the effect of MLS on auditor choice. Heckman two-stage analysis, a firm fixed effects model, propensity score matching and difference-in-differences test are used as robustness checks.
Findings
This paper finds that the presence and power of MLS increase the likelihood of appointing high-quality auditors. With regard to the types of MLS, large institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders have significant positive effects on appointing high-quality auditors, while the presence of state-owned large shareholders has no effect on auditor choice. Further analyses reveal that the positive effect of MLS on high-quality auditor choice is more pronounced in firms with severe agency problems and information asymmetry. Taken together, these results suggest that MLS play a monitoring role by demanding high-quality auditors.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of auditor choice. While prior studies primarily focus on the impact of concentrated ownership structure, corporate governance and the pressure from stakeholders on auditor choice, this paper complements the literature by providing evidence from the heterogeneous effects of different types MLS. This paper also extends the literature on the consequences of MLS from the perspective of auditor choice.
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He Wan, Qiuping Peng and Xi Zhong
Noncontrolling large shareholders can reduce the agency problem of executives and can reduce the expropriation or tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, thereby promoting…
Abstract
Purpose
Noncontrolling large shareholders can reduce the agency problem of executives and can reduce the expropriation or tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, thereby promoting corporate innovation. However, too many noncontrolling large shareholders may also lead to excessive supervision, thereby inhibiting innovative activities that contribute to the long-term value of the firm. Research to date, however, has not examined the nonlinear impact of noncontrolling large shareholders on corporate innovation. Based on principal–agent theory and the too-much-of-a-good-thing (TMGT) effect, the authors discuss the inverted U-shaped influence of noncontrolling large shareholders on corporate innovation and the moderating effect of industry competition and corporate product diversification on the above relationship.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on the empirical data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2017, the authors use the bidirectional fixed effects model to conduct empirical testing and robustness testing of the research hypotheses.
Findings
There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation; type I and type II agency costs play a mediating role between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation. In addition, firm product diversification weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation, but industry competition has no significant moderating effect on the above relationship.
Practical implications
This research has important implications for policy makers, to better activate corporate innovation vitality, and investors, to better choose investment targets. Specifically, investors and policy makers should be aware that an appropriate increase in larger noncontrolling shareholders can maximize the enthusiasm of firms for innovation and enhance corporate value, but they should also realize that having too many noncontrolling large shareholders may backfire.
Originality/value
This research helps the authors to understand the pros and cons of increasing the number of noncontrolling large shareholders more comprehensively and also helps to understand corporate innovation more comprehensively from a supervisory perspective. In addition, this research also enhances the explanatory and predictive power of the TMGT effect.
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– The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in China private listed companies.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in China private listed companies.
Design/methodology/approach
By taking into account of the difference of managerial positions of large shareholders in listed companies (whether they assume the posts as presidents or general managers), and based on the two agency theories, the paper analyzes the state dependency of the relationship between ownership concentration and the company performance of listed companies with the samples of China private listed companies from 2003 to 2011.
Findings
The paper finds that if the large shareholders assume no posts in the listed companies, there is an inverted U shape relation between shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders and the company performance. This result indicates the inadequate or excessive monitoring to the companies by the large shareholders according to different shareholding ratios. If large shareholders assume posts in the listed companies, there is a U shape relation between shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders and the company performance. This result indicates the tunneling and propping to the small shareholders by the large shareholders according to different shareholding ratios.
Research limitations/implications
This paper has not taken the influence of earnings management of the listed companies.
Practical implications
For strengthening the protection of investors, proper distinction shall be made among shareholders of different conditions, and difference of roles large shareholders play in the company under different conditions shall be understood correctly, so as to formulate and perfect market rules for corporate governance, rather than just restraining the power (rights) of large shareholders. The study in this paper is for helping understand the different roles large shareholders play under different corporate governance conditions.
Originality/value
First, different from the research paradigm of relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in existing literature, the paper discriminates the study background with the post-assuming conditions of large shareholders in listed companies and believes that relationship between ownership concentration and company performance shall be presented differently under different post-assuming conditions. Second, by using monitoring theory and tunneling and propping theory to explain the behaviors of large shareholders under different post-assuming conditions respectively, a new theory explanation view is provided for explaining the relation between ownership concentration and company performance.
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Hyun-Young Park, Ho-Young Lee and Jin Wook Kim
Based on 3,775 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013 using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study examines whether and how firm-level governance…
Abstract
Purpose
Based on 3,775 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013 using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study examines whether and how firm-level governance characteristics are associated with investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors investigate the association between governance characteristics and investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.
Findings
The authors find that firms with greater ownership of the largest shareholders and with a higher proportion of outside directors invest more in internal auditing. These results indicate that firms with higher incentive and demand for monitoring are more likely to invest more in internal auditing. The authors further find that the positive effect of the largest shareholder ownership (board independence) on investment in internal auditing is attenuated in firms with greater board independence (ownership of the largest shareholders) suggesting that the complementary effect of the two governance mechanisms associated with internal auditing weakens as they function simultaneously.
Research limitations/implications
The results provide regulators and investors with a clear picture of the governance characteristics of firms associated with investment in internal auditing. The results imply that both the largest shareholders and the outside board of directors play a significant role in resource allocation in internal auditing within a firm. The effect of allocation, however, can be attenuated contingent upon the combined characteristics of governance mechanisms.
Originality/value
Using large amounts of public archival data, this study adds to the extant literature on firm characteristics associated with investment in internal auditing. This study also contributes to the literature by expanding the scope of research on executive compensation to the locus of statutory internal auditors.
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The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms'…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms' earnings.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses regression models that relate earnings to stock returns for a sample of 402 French publicly traded firms covered during 2003‐2007.
Findings
The paper shows that earnings informativeness is significantly positively related to the owner's ultimate cash flow rights. Consistent with the alignment effect, stock ownership aligns management and shareholders interests which reduces managers' incentives to manipulate accounting information. It also finds that earnings informativeness is significantly negatively related to the excess control of the ultimate controlling shareholder. This result supports the entrenchment effect and suggests that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to obscure accounting figures when expropriation is likely. Finally, control contestability of the largest controlling shareholder mitigates information asymmetry problems thereby enhancing earnings informativeness.
Research limitations/implications
The findings stress the importance of MLS in enhancing internal monitoring and mitigating agency costs. Because France is characterized by a weak legal system, highly concentrated ownership structures and excess control, the results provide valuable insights to mitigate extreme agency problems.
Originality/value
The paper adds to the literature on corporate governance and the quality of accounting information by investigating strategic interactions between various blockholders and their impact on earnings informativeness. The study complements prior studies on the monitoring role of MLS by demonstrating that both their presence and control size translate into significantly greater earnings informativeness.
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Jun Xie and Xiaotao Zeng
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the shareholding of the largest shareholder and other large shareholders could exert a good stimulating effect within a firm's…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the shareholding of the largest shareholder and other large shareholders could exert a good stimulating effect within a firm's corporate governance structure and what impact the balance of power among large shareholders could have on top management turnover.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper has investigated 787 firms publicly listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and checked the relation between power balance of firms' block shareholders and their top management turnover.
Findings
The paper's empirical results show that there is a U‐shaped relationship between the proportions of shareholding of a firm's largest shareholder and its top management turnover, that is, the controlling shareholder could impose either negative or positive effect for different types of equity ownership. We also find that the proportion of shares held by other block shareholders is significantly and positively related to the turnover of management and the monitoring effect of other large shareholders is strong. Furthermore, duality of chairman and CEO shows a significant negative effect on firms's top management turnover.
Originality/value
The paper usefully shows that under the institutional background of relatively weak legal protection for medium and small investors in China, centralized shareholding by large shareholders in listed firms, or the so‐called mechanism of power balance among block shareholders, has the ability to effectively supervise and restrain the corporate governance of a firm, replace ineffective managers and thus improve its whole management performance.
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Narjess Boubakri, Jean-Claude Cosset and Dev Mishra
We examine the market valuation of targets with multiple large shareholders (MLS) and single large shareholder (SLS) structures, in an international sample of M&A announcement in…
Abstract
We examine the market valuation of targets with multiple large shareholders (MLS) and single large shareholder (SLS) structures, in an international sample of M&A announcement in 19 countries outside North America. We find that the presence and power of MLS in these firms are negatively associated with abnormal returns and first-bid-to-merger-completion returns, suggesting that MLS mitigate agency problems in the target, and hence their acquisition is perceived as “a loss of good governance.” The negative association between MLS targets and returns is stronger in widely held firms suggesting that MLS indeed curb expropriation of minority shareholders. By contrast, when the second largest shareholder in the MLS structure of the target is a family, we find positive cumulative abnormal returns at the merger announcement, suggesting exacerbated agency problems in these firms that should benefit from the “acquisition of good governance.” Our evidence is robust to a battery of tests and to addressing potential endogeneity.
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In this chapter, we assess the ownership characteristics for the companies in our sample. For this, we do not only use ownership concentration measures such as the…
Abstract
In this chapter, we assess the ownership characteristics for the companies in our sample. For this, we do not only use ownership concentration measures such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index but also voting power measures since ownership and voting power are not necessarily equivalent. We find that, in line with previous studies, ownership concentration and voting power of large shareholders is generally higher in continental European countries, which has important implications for corporate governance.
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Mohammad Tayeh, Rafe’ Mustafa and Adel Bino
This study investigated the impact of corporate ownership structure on agency costs in the insurance industry.
Abstract
Purpose
This study investigated the impact of corporate ownership structure on agency costs in the insurance industry.
Design/methodology/approach
The study sample included 23 insurance companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2010 to 2019. Panel regression was used to account for the firm- and time-specific unobservable variables and system-GMM estimation was used to address endogeneity concerns.
Findings
The results show that managerial ownership positively (negatively) affects selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (assets turnover), implying that unmonitored managers engage in activities that serve their own interests rather than those of shareholders. The largest shareholder's ownership has no impact on agency costs, implying that the ownership of the largest shareholder is irrelevant. However, as the wedge between the percentage of capital owned by the largest shareholders and managers increases, SG&A expenses (efficiency ratio) decrease (increases), indicating that the existence of large non-management shareholders reduces agency costs. After accounting for the endogeneity problem, the impact of ownership structure on agency costs measured by asset turnover remains robust.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to provide unique evidence and useful insights into the determinants of agency costs from a frontier market in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with a focus on the insurance sector. Additionally, this study uses a new measure of separation between ownership and control by calculating the wedge between managers' and large shareholders' ownership.
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