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This paper attempts to analyze the mechanism of land rent distribution under the Soviet and post‐Soviet conditions. The subject is examined from a purely theoretical point of view. The procedure is as follows: first, the socioeconomic meaning of the word “Soviet” is defined. Second, the difference between land rent production and land rent distribution is examined. Finally, Soviet land rent distribution is investigated. Also, changes which the collapse of the Soviet system brought to the process of land rent distribution during the post‐Soviet period are examined. Within this framework, the role of Soviet turnover taxes versus post‐Soviet value‐added taxes is discussed.

This study investigates the effect of renting in land on farm productivity, and the impacts of rented-in land size and transaction partner type on farm productivity.

Data from the 2015 China Household Finance Survey are analyzed using an extended regression model and the two-stage least squares method.

Farm households that rent in land are likely to achieve higher farm productivity, and ignoring endogeneity underestimates the positive effect of land renting-in. Further evidence indicates that rented-in land size has an insignificant impact on farm productivity, and that there is no difference in farm productivity between lessees renting-in land from acquaintances and those renting-in land from non-acquaintances. These results may be caused by the higher degree of marketization of land rentals between acquaintances in China. With increasing competition in agricultural factor markets, in theory, rented-in land size should not affect farm productivity.

Overall, the analysis suggests that renting in land improves farm productivity, which supports the land transfer policies that have been rolled out in recent decades in China. However, our finding that rented land size does not affect farm productivity, consistent with the results in the literature, implies that the Chinese government should no longer subsidize or prefer large farms with low productivity. More attention should be paid to small lessees and market-oriented land rentals between acquaintances. Promoting the marketization of land transfers inside acquaintance networks could realize the potential of the land market, especially if land transfers decrease.

This study identifies the effects of renting in land, rented-in land size and type of rental transaction partner on farm productivity using nationally representative data. The findings imply that the government should pay more attention to the marketization of land rentals between acquaintances. Although existing studies regard land rental between acquaintances as informal and of low efficiency, the recent evidence shows that China's land markets are changing, and policy makers should adjust their policies accordingly.

This study examines the heterogeneous correlations between rural farmers' land renting behavior and their grain production when they experienced a significant price decline.

We used well-timed panel data obtained from a two-round survey held in 2013 and 2017 among 621 households in the North China Plain. The empirical analyses were conducted by using the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects models.

Rural tenants were having heterogeneous responses in land renting behavior and agricultural production when there was a price decline. A group of optimistic tenants (as professional farmers) were more likely to enlarge the farm scale for grain production through land rental markets but decrease variable investment levels (and subsequently decreased productivity) to cope with price decline. In contrast, nonprofessional farmers (the other rural tenants) were rather pessimistic about market performance, and they significantly decreased their grain production area to cope the price decline, but there was no decrease in grain productivity through reducing variable inputs.

This study contributes to the extant literature on the relationship between farmers' land renting-in behavior and agricultural production. By dividing the tenants into professional and nonprofessional farmers, we argue that there is a significant heterogeneous correlation between rural tenants' land renting behavior and grain production when farmers experience a price decline.

In formulating his theory of land rent, Ricardo did not take into account the fact that in the Europe of his time relationships between landlords and tenants were often regulated by customs that kept rents below marginal product, sometimes even in the long term. Since all those customs had a number of points in common, understanding the logic governing one of them can be a very useful way to gain an overall understanding of the phenomenon. This chapter analyses a case of such customs in the area of market-gardens surrounding the city of Valencia, eastern Spain. Here, tenants were by custom the owners of the improvements they carried out, agricultural efficiency increased, and land rents stagnated. The chapter addresses issues such as cooperation among large groups of people, definition of rights and the creation of property rights by means of social conventions that clashed with law.

Henry George's fame in the fields of economics, politics and literature rests largely on his powerful book, Progress and Poverty, first published in 1879. The centenary of this event sparked a modest revival of interest in George's work among academic economists, including a special session devoted to him at the December 1979 American Economics Association meetings in Atlanta. Generally, however, his work has been neglected by twentieth‐century economists and, as Robert Heilbroner (1969) remarked, he is cast as a member of the economics “underworld”. If any economics undergraduate has heard his name it is usually through a passing reference in a first‐year textbook to the Single Tax Movement. The impression is then given by the text that George was a single‐issue fanatic. The student is told that a tax on land rents is theoretically interesting and that it would have no disincentive effects but that it is either impractical to separate land from improvements or that rents are not sufficiently important to warrant much attention to them as a major source of government finance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of off-farm employment on the concentration of farmland via households’ land rental activities in rural China.

The paper uses Probit and Tobit models to estimate the effect of off-farm employment on land rental activities. Furthermore, the paper compares the degree of land concentration between pre-renting and post-renting in terms of Gini coefficients of farmland ownership at village level.

The authors find that off-farm employment has a positive effect on the renting out farmland, and insignificant effect on renting in farmland. Moreover, off-farm employment intensifies the concentration of farmland from small farms toward big farms by renting activities.

The authors believe that the results will contribute positively to the assessment of the effect of off-farm employment on land concentration in the context of the urbanization process in China.

Developing nations need good cultivated land rental markets to foster rational resource use and to enhance productivity and equity. Can cultivated land rental markets emerge in the face of rapidly developing off‐farm labor markets? The purpose of this paper is to measure the correlation between the emergence of off‐farm employment and cultivated land rental in China.

Based on a panel data from 2000 and 2008, the authors constructed econometric models to identify the impact of off‐farm employment on the decisions of households to rent out and rent in cultivated land.

This paper finds that the emergence of off‐farm employment has significant and positive impacts on stimulating household to rent out cultivated land. The effect is less prominent for renting‐in decisions.

The paper empirically estimates the impacts of off‐farm employment on cultivated land rent markets based on a unique panel data set from a national representative sample.

As a crucial institutional form established since the Chinese economic reform, the system of competitive local governments has been shaping the characteristics of China's socialist market economy to a considerable degree.

This study not only adopts the view of existing studies that attribute the economic motive of local governments to rent and consider land public finance as a means through which local governments carry out strategic investment but also attempts to further develop the view within a Marxist analytical framework.

As a result, the local governments have helped to maintain an incredibly high investment rate over a considerable period of time, facilitating the continuous, rapid growth of the Chinese economy.

This study concludes that China's local governments function as the productive allocator and user of rent in the strategic investment based on land public finance and thereby embed themselves in the relative surplus-value production initially arising from competition amongst enterprises, forming the dual structure of relative surplus-value production unique to China's economy.

Classical economics recognizes three categories of inputs into production: land, labor, and capital goods. The three factors are also germane to Austrian economics.

The position of these Irish agitators is illogical and untenable; the remedy they propose is no remedy at all – nevertheless they are talking about the tenure of land and the right to land; and thus a question of worldwide importance is coming to the front.³