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This article describes the practical and theoretical implications relating to the labor managed firm (LMF), which has been formed from an insolvent company purchased by its workers. The research focuses on an international comparison and the cultural context of six LMFs – two each in the United States, Spain, and Italy where legislation supports worker buyouts from insolvency. Adopting a critical theoretical approach it draws on the scholarship of industrial relations and human resource management, grounded in a historical analysis to predict when a transformative or integrative LMF will be formed.

Taking a case study methodology to enable an in-depth understanding of the firms internal processes and relationships the use of semi-structured interviews of blue- and white-collar workers (with the use of a translator) and the administration of a structured questionnaire are used to gather and triangulate qualitative and quantitative data. The research limitations relate to the small number of respondents in each firm, which prevented more rigorous analysis, and calls for further research with larger numbers of respondents.

The results reveal that at macro level the theoretical model predicts that the LMF will have a propensity to emerge when there are market failures, when there is support from the state and the labor movement. The type of LMF was found to depend on the national context of industrial relations. At the micro level a core set of practices were found to work together to lead to high member commitment and positive behavioral outcomes.

The research has important social implications by informing public policy aimed at redressing the injustice to employees when a business fails and jobs and entitlements are lost.

The article advances an understanding of the theoretical nature of the LMF.

The literature on labor-managed firms identifies the source of under-capitalization in the Furubotn–Pejovich effect. Appropriable capital accounts can counteract the horizon problem, but they engender little-examined problems connected with the distribution, reinvestment, and reimbursement of net surpluses. This paper proposes that the introduction of cooperative bonds would provide a better match between the horizons of members and their firms. However, bonds generate risks of their own due to capital variability, thus requiring the imposition of various constraints and the retention of appropriate levels of collective reserves. Finally, a hierarchy of liabilities is proposed to protect parties who undergo information disadvantages.

Empirical evidence suggests that labour-managed firms (LMFs) are relatively rare in market economies not because they are unable to survive as long as their capitalist firm (CF) counterparts, but rather because they are created much less frequently. In this chapter we use event count models applied to panel data on UK manufacturing to provide a direct comparison of the entry process of CFs and LMFs. Our main finding is that risk and capital requirements constitute greater entry barriers for LMFs than for CFs.

The purpose of this paper is to delve into three themes about democratic enterprises.

(1) The first theme is the question of capital structure where labor-managed firms (LMFs) are often pictured as having “horizon problem.” Yet this is only a minor technical problem which is solved by the system of internal capital accounts as in the Mondragon cooperatives.

(2) The second theme concerns the attempt to implement participative management and the related ideas of active learning in educational theory in the workplace. The point is that the democratic firm is the natural setting to implement these ideas, not the conventional firm where the staff have the legal role of “employees” rented by the company.

(3) The third theme is the old canard the cooperatives are incompatible with entrepreneurship. My rethinking of the issue was inspired by the analysis of the late Jane Jacobs who emphasized that the primary means of growing economic “biomass” is through economic offspring (e.g., spin-offs) – in analogy with the biological principle of plentitude. Yet the conventional form of ownership operates as a fetter on this process since the ownership and management wants to expand its empire and maintain “ownership” of any potential offspring. But that constraint against spin-offs is absent in democratic firms, and the Mondragon complex has indeed illustrated how to catalyze this process of growth through offspring.

A public policy to encourage all companies to grow by affiliated and perhaps democratic spin-offs would create more jobs (through filling extra niches) and more stability (through the agility of separate companies).

This paper revisits the early-20th-century British blueprint for Guild Socialism and discusses its similarities and differences with labor managed firm (LMF) theory and with the historic Yugoslav system. It finds that the Guild Socialist vision of a corporatist workers’ state based on universal, non-anonymous, multi-party negotiation of incomes, prices, and quantities comes much closer to anticipating the real-world Yugoslav experiment in worker-managed market socialism than the market-syndicalist utopia embodied in the Western economic model of the LMF and economy.

We outline an economic theory of choice of organizational form, concentrating on explaining the selection of contractual relations within employee-owned firms. We then test the theory on a new database of U.S. producer cooperatives and find that the theory is largely supported by the data. Our principal conclusion is that producer cooperative formations have been rather strongly responsive to variations in economic conditions. While procyclical theories are clearly rejected, countercyclical theories receive considerable support. Neither political motivations nor legal institutions, especially the existence of cooperative incorporation laws, appear to have accounted for a portion of cooperative formations on a systematic basis. Support organizations have significant positive impacts on the formation rate of new cooperatives.

Most analyses of the relationship between the internal distribution of formal organizational power, generally manifested in ownership and governance rights, and innovation efforts apply a principal-agent framework. The key implication of this framework is that firms with distributed formal power are more likely to engage in labor-intensive innovation because external capital providers are unwilling to entrust their investments to a worker controlled firm. In this paper, we critique the principal-agent framework and propose an alternative institutionalist approach, where the type of innovation pursued by firms with distributed formal power is contingent on the norms advanced by the innovation and the alignment of external stakeholders with those norms. After presenting this alternative framework, we illustrate its application with positive and negative cases of capital and labor-intensive innovation at the MONDRAGON cooperatives, a network of worker cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain. We conclude with a set of propositions to guide future research.

This volume of Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor Managed Firms consists of nine original papers grouped together under the title of “Employee Participation, Firm Performance and Survival.” The first four papers explore the growing area of empirical studies of participatory and labor-managed firms’ survival. The second group of three papers offers a number of new approaches and insights into the performance effects of participatory firms, while the final group of papers provides a broad-ranging synthesis and assessment of the experience of employee ownership and participation in transition.

Existing theoretical and empirical evidence is inconclusive concerning the comparative performance of labor-managed firms (LMFs) and conventional firms. By assembling and analyzing new data for a sample of 51 conventional firms and 26 producer cooperatives in the Italian construction industry during the period 1981–1989 we provide additional evidence. Except for organizational form, the cooperatives in our sample are fairly comparable to our conventional firms. Based on our production function estimates, and unlike some previous econometric studies, we find no significant productivity advantage of cooperatives over conventional firms. Our ordinary least squares (OLS) point estimates generally indicated that output would be lower in a cooperative than in an otherwise identical conventional firm. The only statistically significant measure of financial and decision-making participation is collective reserves. We conclude by offering some possible explanations for why our results may differ from some previous findings, especially those for Italian producer cooperatives. In particular we suggest that research methods that are new to the study of cooperatives are needed to help to resolve these questions.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the conjecture that worker cooperatives (firms that practice participatory management and share profits broadly) suffer a competitive disadvantage relative to conventional firms is not supported by existing empirical research. It also considers alternative explanations for why such cooperatives are rare.

Historical analysis, literature survey, and survival analysis.

Studies of worker cooperatives in a variety of national settings indicate their failure rate is lower than conventional firms at least in the short and medium term. This contradicts the proposition that they are rare because they suffer a competitive disadvantage and focuses attention instead on their low formation rate.

The “liability of newness,” wealth and credit constraints, entrepreneurial rents, and collective action problems are cited as important barriers for the creation of worker cooperatives de novo, but these factors should be greatly reduced for those created through the conversion of an existing firm. Paradoxically, the overwhelming majority of cooperatives are created from scratch, and hence this explanation remains incomplete.

Existing policies incentivizing the creation of worker cooperatives, and current initiatives to promote them, do not encourage the creation of inferior economic institutions.

This paper contradicts the widely held belief that the distinctive features of worker cooperatives (participatory management and broadly shared profit) place them at a competitive disadvantage in a market economy. It also provides insight into why cooperatives are rare by challenging explanations based in presumed inefficiencies and focusing attention instead on barriers to creation.