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Book part
Publication date: 9 September 2020

Tom Pettinger

Purpose – The author investigates how those who have engaged in political violence in the UK understand Prevent’s preemptive rationality, and how Prevent conceptualizes the…

Abstract

Purpose – The author investigates how those who have engaged in political violence in the UK understand Prevent’s preemptive rationality, and how Prevent conceptualizes the trajectory toward “terrorism” in relation to the testimony of those who have engaged in “terrorist” violence and were convicted of terrorism offences.

Methodology/Approach – The author takes the assumptions that Prevent makes about risk (from the Prevent Strategy and other documents), and tests these against the testimony of former combatants from “the Troubles.”

Findings – Despite the trajectory toward violence not being considered to differ fundamentally nor demonstrated through evidence to operate differently from one era to the next, the premise of Prevent’s assumptions of the movement into violence and former combatant testimony are entirely foreign to each other.

Originality/Value – Although militants from “the Troubles” (a conflict ending in 1998) and Prevent (established in 2003) are speaking about the same country and narrating their “truth” within five years of each other, the differences in how former combatants and Prevent understand the trajectory toward violence have not been considered. This has remained a significant omission of terrorism scholarship.

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Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-83982-988-8

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Book part
Publication date: 11 December 2023

David J. Teece and Henry J. Kahwaty

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) calls for far-reaching changes to the way economic activity will occur in EU digital markets. Before its remedies are imposed, it is…

Abstract

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) calls for far-reaching changes to the way economic activity will occur in EU digital markets. Before its remedies are imposed, it is critical to assess their impacts on individual markets, the digital sector, and the overall European economy. The European Commission (EC) released an Impact Assessment in support of the DMA that purports to evaluate it using cost/benefit analysis.

An economic evaluation of the DMA should consider its full impacts on dynamic competition. The Impact Assessment neither assesses the DMA's impact on dynamic competition in the digital economy nor evaluates the impacts of specific DMA prohibitions and obligations. Instead, it considers benefits in general and largely ignores costs. We study its benefit assessments and find they are based on highly inappropriate methodologies and assumptions. A cost/benefit study using inappropriate methodologies and largely ignoring costs cannot provide a sound policy assessment.

Instead of promoting dynamic competition between platforms, the DMA will likely reinforce existing market structures, ossify market boundaries, and stunt European innovation. The DMA is likely to chill R&D by encouraging free riding on the investments of others, which discourages making those investments. Avoiding harm to innovation is critical because innovation delivers large, positive spillover benefits, driving increases in productivity, employment, wages, and prosperity.

The DMA prioritizes static over dynamic competition, with the potential to harm the European economy. Given this, the Impact Assessment does not demonstrate that the DMA will be beneficial overall, and its implementation must be carefully tailored to alleviate or lessen its potential to harm Europe’s economic performance.

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The Economics and Regulation of Digital Markets
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-83797-643-0

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Book part
Publication date: 29 August 2018

Michael A. Carrier and Steve D. Shadowen

Brand-name pharmaceutical companies have engaged in a variety of business conduct that has increased price. One of these activities involves “product hopping,” or brand switches…

Abstract

Brand-name pharmaceutical companies have engaged in a variety of business conduct that has increased price. One of these activities involves “product hopping,” or brand switches from one version of a drug to another. The antitrust analysis of product hopping implicates antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch–Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws, as well as uniquely complicated markets characterized by buyers different from decision makers. As a result, courts have offered inconsistent approaches to product hopping.

In this chapter, we offer a framework that courts and government enforcers can employ to analyze product hopping. The framework is the first to incorporate the characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry. It defines a “product hop” to include instances in which the manufacturer (1) reformulates the product to make the generic nonsubstitutable and (2) encourages doctors to write prescriptions for the reformulated rather than the original product.

When the conduct meets both requirements, our framework offers two stages of analysis. First, we propose two safe harbors to ensure that the vast majority of reformulations will not face antitrust review. Second, the framework examines whether the hop passes the “no-economic-sense” test, determining if the behavior would make economic sense if the hop did not have the effect of impairing generic competition. Showing just how far the courts have veered from justified economic analysis, the test would recommend a different analysis than that used in each of the five product-hopping cases that have been litigated to date, and a different outcome in two of them.

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Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78756-599-9

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Book part
Publication date: 29 August 2018

Paul A. Pautler

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and…

Abstract

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

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Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78756-599-9

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Topics in Analytical Political Economy
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84950-809-4

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Quantitative and Empirical Analysis of Nonlinear Dynamic Macromodels
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44452-122-4

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Structural Models of Wage and Employment Dynamics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44452-089-0

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