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This study examines laws regarding the legal features of traded shares in 25 developed and emerging economies. Included are civil and common laws in South and North America, Eastern and Western Europe, South Asia, Australia, and Middle Eastern countries. Significant changes have been implemented during the last two decades, especially those related to harmonization of corporate governance principles, best practices, and codes of conduct concerning stock trading. However, there are still significant differences among types of shares traded in world stock markets which may have different responds in case of high price volatility.

The aim of this article is to describe and analyze the legal issues of enforcement for corporate governance in Vietnam, focusing primarily on constraints that are faced by companies. And subsequent recommendations to Vietnam's policy makers are raised. In support of working out a legal framework on enforcement of corporate governance, the article has initially focused on assessment of the enforcement for corporate governance in Vietnam. The theoretical framework is that of OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (April 1999, Paris). Furthermore, this article briefly raises some relevant impacts by corporate governance enforcement on compliance with best standards of corporate governance. The article also addresses current impediments on enforcement of corporate governance. It is concluded that enforcement of corporate governance requires making the legal framework perfect to assist inspectors with enforcement of corporate governance; and improvements on the legal framework to enhance the capacity of implementing officials is a need.

We examine three corporate governance characteristics of preferred stock issuers relative to non-issuers: managerial equity ownership, board size, and block shareholder ownership. We find that the preferred issuers have significantly lower managerial equity ownership than their controls. The finding is consistent with our expectation that the use of preferred stock and managerial equity ownership both serve to reduce agency costs and thus, preferred issuers tend to have little incentive to resort to higher managerial ownership to lessen agency costs. Significantly larger board size for preferred issuers is evident, but we find no difference in block shareholder ownership.

This paper examines the determinants of corporate dividend policy in Jordan. The study uses a firm‐level panel data set of all publicly traded firms on the Amman Stock Exchange between 1989 and 2000. The study develops eight research hypotheses, which are used to represent the main theories of corporate dividends. A general‐to‐specific modeling approach is used to choose between the competing hypotheses. The study examines the determinants of the amount of dividends using Tobit specifications. The results suggest that the proportion of stocks held by insiders and state ownership significantly affect the amount of dividends paid. Size, age, and profitability of the firm seem to be determinant factors of corporate dividend policy in Jordan. The findings provide strong support for the agency costs hypothesis and are broadly consistent with the pecking order hypothesis. The results provide no support for the signaling hypothesis.