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We highlight two mechanisms of limited attention for expert information intermediaries, i.e., analysts, and the effects of such limited attention on the market price discovery process. We approach analysts' limited attention from the perspective of day-to-day arrival of information and processing of tasks. We examine the attention-limiting role of competing tasks (number of earnings announcements and forecasts for portfolio firms) and distracting events (number of earnings announcements for non-portfolio firms) in analysts' forecast accuracy and the effects of such, on the subsequent price discovery process. Our results show that competing tasks worsen analysts' forecast accuracy, and competing task induced limited attention delays the market price adjustment process. On the other hand, distracting events can improve analysts' forecast accuracy and accelerate market price adjustments when such events relate to analysts' portfolio firms through industry memberships.

In crafting Auditing Standard No.3 (AS3), a primary objective of the PCAOB was to reduce auditors' exposure to litigation by raising the standard of care for audit documentation. We examine whether the increased documentation requirements of AS3 affect legal professionals' perceptions of audit quality and auditor responsibility in the event of an audit failure. Our experiment consists of a 3 × 2 between-participants design with law students serving as proxies for legal professionals. The results of our experiment indicate that when an audit procedure, namely the investigation of inconsistent evidence, is not required to be documented, legal professionals perceive the performance of the work itself but not its documentation to significantly increase audit quality and reduce the auditor's responsibility for an audit failure. When documentation of the procedure is required, as per AS3, legal professionals perceive enhanced audit quality and reduced auditor responsibility only if the performance of the work is documented.

The specific purpose of this study is to understand how firm size and public/private affiliation (employment status) affect voluntary disclosure decisions concerning quantitatively immaterial nonfinancial information. Although the prior disclosure literature is large and has considered a variety of factors including size and to a lesser degree employment status, this study offers a new perspective by considering both factors in the context of qualitative materiality.

This paper presents 136 manager participants with 24 cues representing nonfinancial, realistic business events and solicits their disclosure judgments. The cues are adapted from Pinsker et al. and contain information that does not meet widely-accepted quantitative thresholds for disclosure (e.g. 5 percent of net income), yet were identified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as more likely to be material. This paper uses a median split of total assets and total revenues to determine “large” and “small” firms. Managers' judgments are measured in an own-firm setting (The context is their current employer, which can be public or private.).

This paper finds that disclosure is positively linked to firm size, but this paper do not find an employer status effect. Additional testing reveals that private firm managers are sensitive to SEC oversight and other external, competitive pressures, suggesting that they face mimetic pressures to behave like their public firm counterparts. In sum, their findings contribute significantly to the disclosure, strategic management, institutional theory and judgment-and-decision-making (JDM) literatures.

Although there is a vast literature on public firm managers' voluntary disclosure behavior (mostly involving large firms), there is little research regarding the voluntary disclosure behavior of small or large private firm managers involving nonfinancial information.

Purpose – Past literature suggests that the performance and turnover of the subordinate are affected by the support, abuse, and feedback provided by the supervisor. In this study, we posit that support, abuse, and feedback in an accounting firm, are in turn, affected by the supervisor's personality, as defined by the Big Five personality factors.

Methodology/approach – We conducted a web-based study with 115 accountants from a top 100 US accounting firm. The accountants completed questionnaires related to the personality of their supervisors along with questionnaires related to the support, abuse, and feedback they received from their supervisors. We analyzed the data using factor analysis and multiple regression.

Findings – We hypothesize that Openness and Agreeableness increase support; Neuroticism increases abuse, but less so if the supervisor is an Extravert; and Extraversion and Conscientiousness increase feedback. Among the hypothesized relationships, all are supported except the relationship between Openness and support. Additional findings are that Extraversion and Conscientiousness increase support; Agreeableness and Conscientiousness decrease abuse; and Agreeableness increases feedback.

Research implications – Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the relationship between the personality traits of supervisors and their behavior toward subordinates in an accounting setting. The results of our study can be used in identifying the supervisors who have the right personality for the position, which will likely improve the work environment and reduce turnover.

Auditors use behavioral red flags (BRFs) to examine which individuals are more prone to unwarranted behavior such as corruption and asset misappropriation. Using a rich data set from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), we analyze the impact of BRFs on loss sizes from asset misappropriation. We control for antifraud mechanisms established at the company level and other factors both at the individual and the firm level. Performing an exploratory factor analysis yields six factors for BRFs which capture the principal perpetrator's situation both at the private level and the workplace. A general wheeler-dealer attitude and financial distress significantly increase loss sizes. By contrast, we find no evidence that nonmonetary private problems lead to higher losses.

Psychological contracts represent unofficial or informal expectations that an individual holds, most commonly applied to an employer–employee relationship. Understanding psychological contracts helps explain the consequences of unmet expectations, including increased budgetary slack and reduced audit quality. This chapter reviews and synthesizes accounting behavioral research that discusses psychological contracts and that was published in academic and practitioner journals in the areas of financial accounting, management accounting, auditing, taxes, non-profit organizations, accounting education, and the accounting profession itself. Despite the prevalence of psychological contracts in the workplace and the applicability to behavioral research, accounting literature remains limited regarding applications of psychological contracts. This chapter aggregates research across all areas of accounting to provide suggestions for use of psychological contracts in future research and thus create a connected research stream.

Purpose – Recruiting sufficient participants who adequately represent the population of interest is an ongoing issue for accounting experimental researchers. This study investigates the impact of recruitment method on the number of participants, effort on the experimental task, and sample bias with respect to three individual difference variables (locus of control, social desirability response bias, and prosocial behavior). We employ five different recruitment methods: three forms of monetary compensation and two levels of an appeal for help with a research project.

Methodology – We recruit students in five sections of the same course taught by the same instructor (not one of the researchers), manipulating recruitment method across sections. Immediately following recruitment, participants completed a simple experimental task and scales for the individual difference variables.

Findings – We find that the method of recruiting resulted in different response rates, with appeal from a fellow student yielding the highest response rate, and appeal from a professor yielding the lowest response rate. Effort was greatest for the appeal from the professor and least for the draw. While the five subsamples that resulted from the five recruiting methods were not different with respect to the individual difference variables, the relationship of those variables to effort did vary.

Research Implications – Our findings suggest that researchers must carefully consider recruitment method not only in terms of how many participants can be attracted, but also in terms of the potential impact of the manner in which recruitment was conducted on the attitudes and behaviors of the participants during the experiment.

Extant theory tends to treat Organizational Culture (OC) and fraud-related values as static, characterizing culture as synonymous with potential ethical values − but devoting less attention to how the culture and values arose and where they are headed. Buffer/conduit theory proposes that accountants learn to use a taxonomy containing three dynamic layers: collective fraud orientation, a buffer/conduit layer, and individual fraud orientation. The middle layer contains OC-related internal controls that buffer the orientation layers from spreading fraud-encouraging values, and serve as conduits transmitting fraud-deterring values − or, when controls do not function as intended, transmitting fraud-encouraging values. A factor analysis of 11 indicators of this three-layer taxonomy suggests that older generations of accounting practitioners apply the taxonomy, but millennials do not. Predisposition to commit fraud is especially salient to internally focused millennials, who uniquely perceive recruitment and training as compensating mechanisms and as collective buffers.